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This study offers a new interpretation of the theoretical basis of the political 
alliance and rupture between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.  The central 
thesis is that Madison was correct that his and Hamilton’s disagreement was rooted in 
their different orientations toward republican versus monarchical governments.  
Although for the past century scholars have rejected Madison’s claim that Hamil on 
harbored monarchical principles and intentions, this study argues that the textual 
record suggests that he did.  More specifically, it is demonstrated that there is no 
evidence that Hamilton had a genuine principled commitment to republican 
government.  Moreover, the evidence does indicate that he always believed America 
would be better served by emulating the British mixed regime, complete with a 
hereditary monarch, and that he sought to put the United States on a developmental 
path toward such a regime.  This difference between Hamilton and Madison was 
  
based on both disparate political principles and differences in their prudential 
judgments about the possibility that the Americans could overcome what this study 
calls the “18th century critique of republics.”  This powerful tenet of Enlightenment 
political science claimed that two sociopolitical processes tended to transform 
republics into despotic or, at best, limited monarchical regimes.  One of these 
processes, “the republican violent death,” was thought to naturally lead republics into 
anarchy and eventually monarchy or despotism.  The other process, “the republican 
security dilemma,” consisted of several pressures placed on regimes by their ex ernal 
security environment to adopt policies and establish institutions that undermined the 
domestic requisites for republican liberty.  The most salient implication of the 18th 
century critique of republics was that the British balanced constitution presented the 
best model for durable liberty under modern conditions.  This study argues that 
Madison and Hamilton were united in taking this critique seriously and that they both 
believed the two processes could have led to despotic regimes throughout North 
America if something had not been done to curb what they perceived as the excessive 
democracy and sovereign pretensions of the State governments.  Their principal 
prudential difference was that Madison, unlike Hamilton, believed he had found 
republican cures for these republican diseases. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In my private opinion, I have no scruple in declaring, supported as I 
am by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British 
government is the best in the world; and that I doubt much whether 
anything short of it will do in America. 
- Alexander Hamilton (1787)1 
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they have paid a 
decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they 
have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for 
names, to over-rule the suggestions of their own good sense, the 
knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own 
experience? 
- James Madison (1788)2 
In 1818, retired at Monticello, Thomas Jefferson decided to publish a 
compilation of notes and papers from his years in public office. The “loose scraps,” as 
he referred to them, were accompanied by a preface wherein he offered his 
understanding of the nature of the decision at the Constitutional Convention and of 
the political dispute between his and James Madison’s Republican Party and 
Alexander Hamilton’s Federalists that had ravaged the fledgling federal republic 
throughout the 1790s.  He began by noting that most individuals at the time of the 
Convention were in fundamental agreement that continuance under the Articles of 
                                                
1 Hamilton, “Speech at Federal Convention” (Madison’ Notes). For this study, I relied on the 
collected works from the early 20th century that have been made freely and publicly accessible in a 
variety of digital formats by the Liberty Fund’s Online Library of Liberty.  For Hamilton, this is the 
collection edited by Lodge (1904) (12 volumes / 1090 documents), while for Madison, this is the 
collection edited by Hunt (1900) (9 volumes / 830 documents.)  I also acquired and made use of the 
Jefferson collection edited by Ford (1904) (12 volumes / 2019 documents.)  All references to the works 
of each author are from those edited volumes.  Since the digitized volumes do not have page numbers, 
references to these primary sources are cited throug  footnotes (rather than imbedded parenthetical 
citations) that give the author, title, and date.  This seems to be the best way to facilitate cross-
referencing. 




Confederation would threaten anarchy between the States, which would lead them, 
“like the petty States of Greece,” to “be eternally at war with each other, & … at 
length the mere partisans & satellites of the leading powers of Europe.” 3  N arly 
everyone, therefore, “looked forward to some further bond of union, which would 
ensure internal peace, and a political system of our own, independent of that of 
Europe.”  Amid this agreement, the debate between the delegates at Philadelphia was, 
according to Jefferson, quite obviously over two fundamental questions: 
Whether all should be consolidated into a single government, or each 
remain independent as to internal matters, and the whole form a single 
nation as to what was foreign only, and whether that national 
government should be a monarchy or republic, would of course divide 
opinions according to the constitutions, the habits, and the 
circumstances of each individual.4 
In his view, moreover, that debate, and the political “contests” that ensued throughout 
the next decade were at root “contests of principle, between the advocates of 
republican, and those of kingly government.”  As nothing less was at stake in those 
years, Jefferson claimed further that the regime owed its continued conformity with 
genuine republican principles in 1818 to the Republican opposition to the Federalists 
in the 1790s.  “[H]ad not the former made the efforts they did,” he argued, “our 
government would have been, even at this early day, a very different thing from what 
the successful issue of those efforts have made it.”5 
Although scholars of the founding era continue to debate the true nature, and 
role, of the political beliefs and ideas of leading members of the founding generatio , 
they are united in rejecting two of the three elements of this Jeffersonian account.  All 
                                                






scholars recognize the significance of the debate over consolidation and federalism, 
but nearly as many ignore or actively deny that the founders genuinely believed there 
was a realistic threat of civil war and other political evils emanating from disunion in 
the 1780s and 1790s, and no one today claims that any prominent members of the 
founding generation, including the iconoclastic Hamilton, seriously envisaged leading 
the American regime away from republicanism and toward any form of monarchic l 
government.  As is discussed and explained in greater detail below, the leading 
schools all tend to assume relative stability of the union and to emphasize that 
American public opinion and social conditions rendered hereditary monarchy or 
aristocracy out of the question.  Claims by these founders to the contrary are simply 
dismissed as propaganda.  For example, the central thrust of Madison’s and 
Hamilton’s argument in Federalists 6-36—that not only was the union necessary for 
the basic goods most Americans wanted (security from foreign war; internal s curity 
from violent rebellion, usurpation, and civil war; prosperity through favorable trad
relations; and the preservation of free government), but also that a central government 
at least equally as strong as the one proposed was necessary for preventing 
disunion—is generally viewed as at best an exaggeration.  Likewise, Jefferson’s 
attribution of monarchism to the Federalist Party’s policies and actions is viewed as 
ideological delusion if not deliberate partisan distortion. 
Operating from this set of assumptions, debates about the nature of the 
founding era have revolved around the relative importance of ideas and interests, and, 
among those emphasizing the former, whether their ideas were essentially 




aristocratic,” “ancient,” “modern,” or some variant or combination thereof.  
“Monarchical” has not been a category of analysis. 
These assumptions have informed the leading perspectives on the central 
historical issue addressed in this study:  What was the theoretical basis of Madison’s 
and Hamilton’s political rupture that ensued shortly after their collaboration on the 
Federalist?  Although Madison, like Jefferson, always claimed his disagreement with 
Hamilton and other Federalists was fundamentally over republican vs. monarchical 
principles, leading interpretations of the 20th century have emphasized other bases of 
contention, such as their relative trust of national power, theories of constitutional 
interpretation, and/or different theories of republicanism.  Though some claim that 
Madison may have genuinely believed that Hamilton’s principles were at root 
monarchical, no one today argues that Madison and Jefferson may have been right 
about Hamilton. 
Summary of Thesis 
Although I do not deny that many of the other issues emphasized by scholars 
were relevant to Hamilton’s and Madison’s disagreement, in this study I present the 
case that, not only did Madison and Jefferson genuinely believe that their 
disagreement with Hamilton and the Federalists was primarily a question of 
republicanism vs. monarchism, but also that they were essentially correct about 
Hamilton’s monarchical intentions.  That is, I argue that Hamilton never had a 
genuine principled commitment to republican government and that not only did he 
believe America would be better served by emulating the British balanced 




American regime away from republicanism and toward such a constitution.  Madison, 
by contrast, did have a principled commitment to republican government and 
understood himself to be seeking to save America’s republican experiment, not only 
from Hamilton’s program, but also from what Hamilton and Madison both believed 
to be inherent deficiencies of republican regimes. 
Perhaps the most important part of my argument lies in my attempt to explain 
both their points of agreement and their disagreements as emanating from their 
different approaches to a common fear.  Amid their differences, they agreed that the 
survival of republican government in North America was far from a forgone 
conclusion and that a return to the British constitution was not the worst possible 
outcome of the failure of their republican experiment.  Both evidenced a fear that 
military despotism could develop in North America if something was not done to 
curb what they perceived to be the excessive democracy and sovereign pretensions of 
the State governments.  Although we continue to debate the alternatives presented by 
Madison in Federalist #10—Anti-Federalist participatory “democracy” practiced 
within maximally autonomous State or sub-state units vs. representative 
“republicanism” projected over a large sphere—I demonstrate that neither of t m 
thought localized participatory democracy was a realistic out ome of American 
political development.  If such a regime were pursued along the lines advocated for 
by the Anti-Federalists, they believed that some form of military despotism would be 
the most likely result.  If forced to choose between military despotism and the British 
balanced constitution, Madison, and most anyone in the 18th century, would have 




unlike Madison, was convinced that the Americans faced such a choice and had o 
principled objection to the introduction of limited monarchy in America.  Madison, 
on the other hand, had principled and prudential objections to monarchy and believed 
that the federal republic presented a superior middle path between Anti-Federalist 
republicanism, which would lead to despotism, and the British balanced constitution, 
which he believed was incompatible with the principles of the Revolution and was 
less conducive than the federal republic to reconciling durable liberty with external 
security. 
Their mutual belief that Anti-Federalist republicanism would lead to 
despotism was based, I argue, on two additional points of agreement.  First, they both 
agreed that disunion was a realistic possibility.  Second, they both took seriously what 
I call the 18th century critiques of republicans, which had hitherto led most 
Enlightenment-era political theorists to doubt the feasibility of sustaining popular 
forms under modern conditions.  That critique was based on the belief that two 
developmental processes tended to naturally lead republican regimes toward 
despotism.  I refer to these as the “republican violent death” and “the republican 
security dilemma.”   
Republican Violent Death 
A widely-believed tenet of Enlightenment political science held that modern 
regimes were susceptible to a process analogous to the classical cycles empha ized by 
Aristotle and Polybius.  All regimes were thought to exist on a continuum ranging 
from pure republics to absolute despotisms, and all were thought to be naturally in 
motion toward one extreme or the other.  Moreover, leading authorities, such as 




commercial conditions, if a regime became republican, it would quickly fall into to 
anarchy, violence, and, from there, move into despotism.  It is this idea that I refer to 
as the “republican violent death.” Montesquieu argued that only widespread civic 
virtue could prevent such a fate, but he also emphasized that modern commercial 
nations generally lacked such virtue.  Conventional European wisdom held that the 
British constitution, as a modern analog to Aristotle’s mixed regime, presented a 
proven solution for preserving the essential modern liberal republican aspiration of 
individual liberty from either path to despotism.  That is, its balance among the social 
estates and separation of powers sustained the rule of law without the need for a 
virtuous citizenry. 
Hamilton and Madison, I argue, both believed that the republican violent 
death was at risk of manifesting in the States in 1787-88.  One of the sources of their 
theoretical rupture, I argue, is that Madison believed the federal republican 
constitution had resolved this problem at both the State and national level, while 
Hamilton did not.  Indeed, Hamilton seems to have continued to believe that nothing 
short of the British monarch was likely to preserve the national government from 
degeneration into anarchy and then despotism.  This was one reason that he, unlike 
Madison, believed the preservation of liberty in America required giving the national 
executive as much power as possible. 
Republican Security Dilemma 
The other process, which I call the “the republican security dilemma,” 
suggested that physically contiguous regimes in anarchy with one another will t nd to 
create institutions and pursue policies for their external security that have the effect of 




several manifestations of this problem, but two are the most salient.  First, it was 
widely held that regimes needed to have moderately sized territories to be externally 
secure, but republican governments needed to be small if they were to sustain the 
civic virtue necessary for avoiding the republican violent death.  Montesquieu argued 
that there were just two forms of political association that had proven capable of 
resolving this problem:  confederacies and the British balanced constitution.  The 
former allowed republics to remain small while creating an external defensive force 
equivalent to that provided by monarchy.  The latter, as already discussed, sustained 
the rule of law equivalent to that provided (less durably) by republics and also 
enjoyed the external force provided by its literal inclusion of monarchy in its 
constitution. 
The other most salient manifestation of the republican security dilemma 
emanated from the interrelationship between modern warfare and modern state 
development.  Most political thinkers at the time believed that the advent of standing 
armies had created a vicious cycle of warfare and monarchical power aggrandizement 
that had resulted in military despotisms across the European continent.  With 
neighboring states raising standing armies of their own, and some demonstrating 
apparent ambitions to create a “universal empire,” European monarchs had 
reasonable justification for keeping up standing armies for external defense.  As 
modern armies and warfare were an expensive enterprise, they had to raise revenue, 
which was funded through borrowing and taxation.  However, the standing armies 
and ability to borrow became the means by which monarchs could obtain revenue 




genuine or exaggerated, became the means by which monarchs monopolized the 
power of the purse and the sword, thus undermining rule of law.  At the time, it was 
widely believed that the British constitution had avoided this fate largely becaus  of 
Britain’s insular position, which allowed them to rely principally on a navy for 
pursuing their foreign policy.  With the monarch unable to use external security as a 
pretense for raising a standing army to dominate the Lords and Commons, the 
balanced constitution, and thus rule of law, was preserved in Britain. 
Madison’s and Hamilton’s orientations toward the republican security 
dilemma also help to explain their points of agreement and disagreement.  They both 
agreed that disunion would place the States in the republican security dilemma in 
their relations with each other.  Thus, over the long-run, disunion ran the risk of 
resulting in military despotisms across the North American continent.  What was 
worse, they believed disunion would enable, and thus invite, existing European 
despotisms to intervene and intensify the despotism-creating developmental process 
that would already naturally emanate from anarchy among the States.  This set of 
fears is one reason why Madison and Hamilton converged on the need for a strong 
national government.  They both agreed that a government at least as strong as that 
provided for by the federal constitution was necessary to prevent disunion and thus 
the advent of military despotism in North America. 
However, their different perceptions of the republican security dilemma were 
a source of three disagreements.  First, as is well known, Madison reversed the logic 
of size, arguing that larger republics would be more, not less, stable than small 




and large republics were equally susceptible to the republican violent death.  Thus, he 
did not think the dilemma was averted. 
Second, I suggest that one reason Madison became supportive of States’ rights 
is that he came to believe in the early 1790s that a moderate degree of State autonomy 
was necessary for making the promise of the extended sphere work in practice.  
Madison came to view the States as not only useful for preventing arbitrary power by 
the national government, but also for sustaining citizen engagement and mobilizing 
support in times of war.  This revelation meant the sphere could be extended further 
than he had believed possible in 1787-1788.  Moreover, Madison agreed with 
Jefferson that extending the sphere was necessary for prolonging the agrarian stage of 
development (and thus avoiding the class conflict that could ignite the violent death) 
and for ridding the continent of European powers (avoiding the republican security 
dilemma).  Thus, in Madison’s thinking, the States became vital for preserving 
republican government from both the violent death and the republican security 
dilemma. 
Hamilton, by contrast, believed that subordinating the States under a much 
stronger—ideally monarchical— national executive was necessary to preserve and 
govern the union.  He consequently thought of territory size in terms of the degree of 
national executive power necessary for administration.  Fearing despotism, he 
believed America should not expand west of the Mississippi.  But his statements 
suggest that he believed governance of even that contracted sphere would require 




Third, the logic of the republican security dilemma, coupled with that of the 
republican violent death, provide two reasons for believing Hamilton’s foreign policy 
of “American greatness” required, at a minimum, that he lack an aversion to the 
development of constitutional monarchy in North America.  First, as his policy 
required an economic program that would significantly alter American property 
relations, it would exacerbate the class conflict that he had already argued was in 
need of monarchical superintendence to prevent the republican violent death.  
Second, as his foreign policy would not rely exclusively on a navy, and as he favored 
creating a modern system of credit that would potentially enhance effectual xecutive 
unilateral warmaking power, his policy would predictably have the consequence of 
allowing for significant executive aggrandizement of power.  Moreover, the broad 
construal of Presidential formal authority in foreign affairs that he sought to construct 
in his Pacificus essays would exacerbate the latter tendency. 
It is well known that Madison claimed each of these things would tend to lead 
the regime toward monarchy.  I attempt to demonstrate that, given the tenets of 
Enlightenment political science that Hamilton and Madison both believed, and the 
principles Hamilton articulated both in public and in private, Madison was justified in 
believing that his opposition to Hamilton was a fight on behalf of the Americans’ 
revolutionary repudiation of monarchy.  However, my intention is not to villainize 
Hamilton, but rather to explain why he thought monarchy was necessary to preserve 
American liberty, something for which he always claimed to be “as zealous n 
advocate … as any man whatever, and … as willing a martyr to it.”6  My larger 
                                                




purpose in making this argument is to construct a more realistic view of how these 
founders went about applying Enlightenment political science to secure valued human 
ends in a world that they believed placed considerable limits on human opportunities 
to, as Hamilton famously put it, establish “good government from reflection and 
choice” rather than “accident and force.”7 
Literature Review: Scholarly Consensus and Dissensu s on 
Hamilton vs. Madison   
The rupture between Madison and Hamilton after the ratification of the 
Constitution is one of the most momentous events in American political history.  
Though the reasons for Madison’s break from Hamilton are widely debated, the 
essential facts are well known.  Madison and Hamilton had frequently allied as 
members of the Continental Congress in the early 1780s, worked together to bring 
about the Constitutional Convention in 1787, had been among the most 
“nationalistic” members of that Convention, and had collaborated together on the 
Federalist to win ratification of the new Constitution.  Soon after ratification, 
Madison (as member of the first House of Representatives) joined forces with 
Jefferson (who was Secretary of State) during the Washington Administraton to rally 
opposition to Treasury Secretary Hamilton’s financial program, the Jay Treaty, and 
eventually over the proper strategic response to the outbreak of war between France 
and England.  Moreover, Madison made a noticeable departure during this time in his 
stance toward the appropriate balance between national power and States’ righ s.  
Before and during the Convention, Madison was among the severest critics of 
the States and most outspoken proponents of their subordination to a supreme 
                                                




national authority.  Writing to Jefferson soon after the Convention, Madison 
expressed pessimism about the proposed Constitution.  In his view, it retained too 
much State independence, and, thus, had left the system, as it was under the Articles,
with “the evil of imperia in imperio.”8  In the 1790s, however, Madison would not 
only oppose Hamilton’s policies, but, on two issues, Hamilton’s proposed National 
Bank and defense of Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation in his Pacificus essays, 
Madison would also debate him on constitutional grounds.  His departure from 
“nationalism” would reach its highest pitch with the drafting of the Virginia 
Resolutions in 1798 in which he defended the right of States to interpose on behalf of 
the people to contest the constitutionality of the policies of the national government.   
For his part, Hamilton claimed to be surprised by this apparent change in 
Madison, and initially attributed it to “personal and political animosity.”9  Later, 
however, Hamilton would decide that their disagreement was “indeed a war of 
principles.”  Though denying it was “a war between … monarchy and 
republicanism,” he would suggest that it was between radical French-style 
republicanism, the “tyranny of Jacobinism,” and “the mild reign” of traditional 
Anglo-American-style “rational liberty, which rests on the basis of an effici nt and 
well-balanced government, and through the medium of stable laws shelters and 
protects the life, the reputation, the civil and religious rights of every member of the 
community.”10  Madison, however, like Jefferson, would consistently affirm that his 
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disagreement with Hamilton was fundamentally about the principles of republican vs. 
monarchical government. 
Recent Scholarship:  Consensus and Dissensus 
Recent studies have offered a variety of accounts for the dispute between 
Madison and Hamilton.  Two issues divide the leading interpretations.  One debate is 
over the substance of their disagreement.  Was it simply a quantitative question over 
how much power the national government should exercise over the States, or were 
other more fundamental factors involved?  The other point of contention is over 
whether, or to what extent, Madison actually changed over time.  These studies are 
united, however, in denying that Madison’s claim of monarchical vs. republican 
principles provides a plausible explanation. 
Jack Rakove’s view, which is by far the most common, is that Madison started 
as a “radical nationalist in the late 1780s” (1990, 91) and, in the immediate aftermath 
of the Convention, “differed little” from Hamilton in his “judgment of the defects of 
the Constitution” (Rakove  1996, 196).  Where they did diverge initially was not over 
the republican structure of the national government, but rather in their “understanding 
of exactly how ‘subordinate’ or ‘inferior’ a jurisdiction the states should retain” (ibid. 
pp. 197-198).  That is, Hamilton initially preferred a greater level of State 
subordination than did Madison, and that explains Madison’s initial break.  This 
difference would become more pronounced over time, moreover, as Madison became 
more convinced of the propriety of States’ rights.  Forrest McDonald (1982, p. 108-
113), agreeing with this general assessment, has suggested that this difference of trust 
over national power was fundamentally rooted “in the innermost recesses of the 




“Hamilton trusted Hamilton, and Madison did not trust Madison.”  Thus, for 
McDonald, psychology, rather than core differences of theory or principle, may have 
induced Madison to rethink his earlier positions once it appeared to him that 
Hamilton was promoting too much national power. 
Richard Matthews (1995) also holds that that their essential disagreement was 
over trust in national power, and that Madison’s position on this altered over time.  
However, his explanation, unlike McDonald’s, is that it was rooted in Madison’s 
character as a liberal statesman who was always prepared to wield the sword of 
reason against the onslaught of (always potentially violent) human passions.  As a 
“constant liberal prince,” Madison would unscrupulously alter his political position  
whenever he thought rights were endangered by “changes in the sociopolitical 
environment.” (p. 24). 
Only one scholar, Colleen Sheehan (2004), has argued that Madison changed 
over time and that his increased opposition to Hamilton was fundamentally based on 
differences in republican principles.  However, she sees them as different theorists 
within the republican camp.  Their disagreement in the 1790s, she argues, “was 
propelled by a fundamental philosophic disagreement over the nature and role of 
public opinion in a republic” (405-406).  In her judgment, Hamilton is best 
characterized as “the chief American theorist of the modern commercial republic,” 
while Madison should be seen as “the philosophic architect of the politics of public 
participation and republican self-government” (p. 422).  A virtue of Sheehan’s 
interpretation of Madison is that she gives a plausible justification for believing 




theory.  As she has demonstrated, Madison’s changing views on the States coincided 
with his intensive study of modern and classical political theory in 1791 and 1792.  
Her persuasive reading of the product of those studies, a 100 page booklet entitled 
“Notes on Government,” gives strong reason to believe Madison became convinced 
that the States were essential for facilitating the process of enlightened opinion 
formation that became a core element in his republican vision (Sheehan  1992).  She 
also rightly argues that Madison became increasingly critical of the theory of the 
British constitution in the 1790s as he became convinced that the federal republic was 
the best constitutional structure yet devised for reconciling stability and security with 
the essential principles of free government and human equality.  Though I think she 
goes too far in downplaying the primacy of “safety”—i.e. comprehensive security of 
rights and liberty by and from government—in Madison’s project, I am much 
indebted to her reinterpretation of his republican thought.  However, I think her 
characterization of Hamilton’s views and intentions as “republican” is inaccurate. 
Read (2000), Rosen (1999), and Banning (1998) have all argued that Madison 
was more consistent than most scholars have claimed.  They all point to Hamilton’s 
and Madison’s different orientations toward constitutional theory, but they tend to 
emphasize issues of national power and, like Sheehan, stop short of claiming 
Hamilton’s constitutionalism departed from republican principles.  Read (2000, 25-
88) and Rosen (1999, 126-155) both detect a consistent principled difference over 
constitutional interpretation, and argue Madison, unlike Hamilton, embraced the 
Americans’ “revolution in the practice of the world,” which replaced the European 




granted by liberty.”11  Believing in the Lockean social compact principle of consent, 
Madison held that constitutions should be construed according to the original 
understanding of the parties of the compact.  This led Madison, they argue, to favor a 
greater level of States’ rights than he formerly endorsed because that was what 
constitutional fidelity, and thus liberty, required.  Hamilton, by contrast, was 
generally dismissive of the idea that enumerated powers were a means of restricting 
government.  He instead advocated something akin to Lockean prerogative:  with the 
government limited, not by its formally specified powers, but by natural limits placed 
on the means requisite for promoting and securing “the essential ends of political 
society.”12  For these scholars, Madison’s strict construction and Hamilton’s broad 
construal of national power were rooted in a theoretical difference over this 
revolutionary change in constitutionalism, rather than McDonald’s subconscious 
motives or Matthews’ flexibly applicable liberalism.  However, they view this 
constitutional debate, like Rakove, as essentially over national vs. State power, rather 
than over the long-term consequences of Hamilton’s construction for the nature and 
structure of the executive viz. a viz. the people and other branches of government.  
They do not entertain the possibility that Hamilton envisioned, and sought to induce, 
a developmental path whereby the effectual distribution of powers of the national 
government would evolve to become increasingly reflective of the British constitution 
and, thus, unreflective of the parchment powers written in the founding charter. 
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Banning (1998), while also emphasizing Madison’s consistent principled 
commitment to strict constructionism, has argued that an additional source of 
disagreement was that “Hamilton’s most cherished object was to build a modern 
nation state,” while Madison’s priority was “to nurture and defend a revolutionary 
order of society and politics, which he regarded as profoundly inconsistent” with 
Hamilton’s “economic nationalist” program  (p. 297).  Gordon Wood (2006), though 
denying that Madison did not significantly alter his specific constitutional ideas over 
time, has recently endorsed Banning’s contention that orientation toward the modern 
state was the core difference between Hamilton and Madison.  Wood cites Max 
Edling’s (2003) groundbreaking argument that the Federalists (including Madison 
and Hamilton, whose views Edling made no effort to distinguish) were engaged in the 
early modern process of state building as provoking his “thinking about Madison 
anew” (Wood  2006, n. 38).  Wood has argued, as does this study13, that Edling was 
mistaken in lumping Hamilton and Madison together as partners in modern state 
building.  While Hamilton did indeed seek to create “a modern war-making state,” 
Madison’s vision was inherently pacific.  Whereas Hamilton’s modern state would be 
designed primarily to employ the fiscal-military powers necessary for projecting 
strength in the international state system, Madison envisioned a national government 
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into hereditary monarchy to fulfill his full vision of “modern” state building.  Second, as is discussed 
in the next paragraph, Wood seems unwilling to abandon his nationalist assumption that disunion was 
a real threat and that Madison and Hamilton were equally concerned about preventing the process of 




that would be a “disinterested judge, a dispassionate umpire, adjudicating among the 
various interests in the society.” 
This emphasis by Banning, Edling, and Wood on modern state building is 
important to my discussion of the republican security dilemma.  But they all differ
from my treatment in two crucial respects.  First, by ignoring these founders’ fears of 
the consequences of disunion, none of them note Hamilton’s and Madison’s mutual 
commitment to preventing this process of modern state development among the 
States of North America.  Second, they do not consider that Hamilton’s embrace of 
the process of modern state development at the national center would have required a 
lack of aversion to the development of monarchy in North America. 
Karl Walling’s (1999) work stands-out for self-consciously seeking to break 
away of prevalent analytical constructs.  Walling proposes placing “two modern 
conceptions of political virtue, vigilance and responsibility” at the heart of the 
philosophical difference between Hamilton, on one hand, and Jefferson (and, by 
implication, Madison), on the other (p. 10).  Jefferson and Madison, as partisans of 
“vigilance,” placed a prime importance on the need for popular control over those 
wielding political power.  Hamilton, as a partisan of responsibility, believed it was 
vital for statesman to have the power to act on behalf of the public interest and to 
check excessive popular jealousy.  Walling’s stated intention was to move beyond the 
“Manichean terms” of the debate by providing a framework that “enables us to give 
each side its due” and “explain why each side believed its motives were just and 
honorable” (ibid.).  However, Walling seems to think that this requires giving 




reluctant to accept.  This leads to the biggest shortcoming of Walling’s otherwise 
impressive work, which is that he fails to notice that Madison and Hamilton both saw 
the need for mixing vigilance and responsibility in the regime, and their principal 
difference was in how they thought the virtues should be reconciled constitutionally.  
Hamilton believed it should be accomplished through the British constitutional 
strategy, with vigilance and responsibility confined to separate branches of the 
government.  Madison, on the other hand, believed vigilance and responsibility 
should be mixed within each office of government.  Hamilton’s ideal was to channel 
democratic vigilance into a single popular chamber of the legislature and externally 
balance it with separate chambers based on aristocratic and monarchical 
responsibility.  Madison’s ideal was for all officials to be ultimately accountable to 
the vigilant citizenry and to provide insulation, albeit to different degrees in different 
branches, for allowing them to develop, and act on, their own judgment of the public 
interest. 
Most of these scholars ignore the question of Hamilton’s monarchism, but 
those who do address it are dismissive of Jefferson’s and Madison’s view.  The 
biggest challenge for these scholars is what to make of Hamilton’s statements at the 
convention, where he expressed admiration for the British constitution, especially its 
hereditary monarch, and claimed that he doubted “much whether anything short of it 
will do in America.”14  Chernow’s (2004) explanation was that it was a fleeting 
moment:  Hamilton, being “headstrong,” “loose-tongued,” and “laboring under some
compulsion to express his inmost thoughts,” simply “blundered” into his 
                                                




controversial statements and then “never again uttered a kind word for monarchy” 
(232-235.)  However, as I point out in subsequent chapters, it was certainly not the 
case that Hamilton did not subsequently express kind words for monarchy.  Others 
emphasize that Hamilton himself admitted that he did not think the American people 
were ready to accept a return to monarchy.  Gerald Stourzh (1970, 45), for example, 
thought it was decisive that Hamilton did not “seriously envisage or think possible the 
introduction of hereditary elements into the Constitution of the United States.”  But 
this ignores the possibility that Hamilton sought, over the long run, to put the regime 
on a developmental path toward monarchy. 
James Read is among the most adamant in denying the possibility that 
Hamilton favored the adoption of the British balanced constitution.  He argues that 
Hamilton would not have sought to give the government stability with his economic 
program if Jefferson was right about his monarchical principles (2000, 59-61).  
Moreover, he cites the fact that Hamilton fought the same Revolution that Jefferson 
fought as prima facie evidence that Hamilton would not oppose the anti-monarchical 
aspirations of the Revolution (p. 158).  I demonstrate, however, that there is no 
evidence that Hamilton ever accepted the Thomas Paine-inspired anti-monarchical 
meaning of the Revolution and that pursuing his economic program was perfectly 
compatible with his seeking to put the regime on a developmental path toward 
monarchy. 
These and other (McDonald  1982, 103; Rahe  1994, 112-113; Karl-Friedrich 
Walling  1999, 99-100; Harper  2004, 37) active denials of Hamilton’s monarchism 




specialists has done little to dissuade scholars of Madison, Jefferson, and the founding 
era in general from dismissing the Virginians’ accusations of Hamilton’s monarchical 
principles as exaggerated if not delusional.  Bailey (2007, viii), for example, while 
noting that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Jefferson seems to have agreed with 
Hamilton on the need for a strong unitary executive, with their difference being 
primarily over how popular it should be, nevertheless felt obliged to say “Hamilton’s 
reputation as an opponent of democracy is perhaps undeserved.”  Elkins and 
McKitrick (1993, 270) argue that Madison was deluded by ideology.  His challenge 
to Hamilton’s anti-republican principles in his Gazette Essays (1792), they write, 
“had little to do with theory,” but rather were “undiluted polemic uttered by James 
Madison” a “partisan” who was nevertheless “unquestionably” sincere in believing 
that Hamilton favored monarchy.  And even Banning (1998), who committed 543 
pages to refuting the claim that Madison had abandoned his earlier political 
commitments by moving to oppose Hamilton in the 1790s, refrained from stating that 
Madison may have actually been right about Hamilton. 
The Progressive Origins of the Current Scholarly Co nsensus 
There are a variety of possible explanations for the current scholarly rejection 
of the possibility of monarchy during the founding era, but one likely reason is the 
enduring legacy of the Progressive historians of the early twentieth century.  The 
leading interpretive paradigms prominent among scholars today—pluralist, 
consensus, and republican synthesis—all are indebted to concepts and assumptions 
that were first introduced by those historians.  And these preconceptions have made it 
difficult to believe Hamilton sought to put the American regime on a developmental 




One important influence is Charles Beard’s Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States.  Although no scholar today endorses Beard’s crude 
economic determinist account—that the debate over the Constitution was reducible to 
bifurcated property conflict—two of his assumptions are still widely influential. 
First, prior to Beard, no one had considered Madison’s Federalist #10 to be 
reflective of the major impetus behind the founding of the Constitution.  Although it 
is fairly well established now that the essay’s reasoning at the time was in fact not 
influential (Kramer  1999; Gibson  2008), the essay, in conjunction with #51, 
continues to be the central focus of scholarly debate on the nature of the American 
founding, especially among political scientists.  Indeed, political scientists still often 
approach the essay through the terms of debate set by such scholars as Dahl (1956), 
Schattschneider (1942), and Diamond (1959) in the middle of the 20th century.  Their 
debate, and ours, centers around how democratic (as opposed to aristocratic) Madison 
was, and by implication, how democratic the Constitution is.  For the most part, his 
other writings are ignored and the full role of the essay’s reasoning in his attempt o 
preserve popular government from succumbing to the republican violent death is 
widely misunderstood.  Most importantly, it has obscured the fact that Hamilton and 
Madison both tended to think of the federal republic as an alternative to the British 
model as well as small direct democracies. 
Second, with few exceptions (Hendrickson  2003; Graber  2006; Deudney  
2007; P. S. Onuf  1983), most political scientists have not returned to the late 19th 
century understanding of the Constitution as originating amid a genuine crisis of the 




section-based confederacies.  The prevailing belief still is that the Federalist’s 
warnings about disunion, and thus the thrust of the argument in the first 36 Federalist 
essays—asserting that a government at least as energetic as the one prop s d was 
necessary to prevent disunion—were just clever propaganda.  Beard was responsible 
for this by shifting attention away from the F deralist’s emphasis on relations 
between the States and toward class conflict.15 
In general, Beard’s most enduring legacy was to emphasize the constraining 
role played by social conditions on the events of the era.  Hartz’s influential thesis 
(1991) explaining America’s consensus liberal tradition as due to a lack of experience 
with hereditary orders, is an obvious example of this.  Also, the pluralist’s (e.g. 
McDonald  1958; Dahl  1956) emphasis on interest group conflict is simply a debate 
with Beard on his own terms.  But even those scholars who have emphasized the role 
of political culture and ideas have not escaped Beard’s influence.  Gordon Wood 
explicitly acknowledged his debt to the Progressives, especially Beard, for providing 
the framework by which he developed his conclusion that the Constitution “was in 
some sense an aristocratic document designed to curb the democratic excesses of the 
Revolution” (Wood  1969, 626).  His work made no mention of the threat of disunion, 
and thus the republican security dilemma, and interpreted Madison as being alarmed 
by “democratic despotism,” which Wood claimed was a  “new political phenomenon 
unfolding in American experience that made nonsense of the traditional conception of 
politics” (p. 403).  He did not detect Madison’s many statements that indicated he was
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actually alarmed that excessive democracy would lead to a traditional form of 
despotism.  Underlying his interpretation, in other words, was the suspicion that 
Madison and other reformers were really driven by class interest, albeit one much 
more refined and intellectually sophisticated than Beard would have allowed.  This, in 
turn, would seem to make an aspiration for monarchy unlikely, given America’s 
existing social structures. 
One other Progressive-era work seems to have been influential in shaping 
subsequent interpretations of Hamilton:  Herbert Croly’s The Promise of American 
Life (1909).  Croly was the first to hold Hamilton up as a founder whose ideas were 
worthy of emulation.  In the 19th century, no one had claimed to be an heir to 
Hamilton; instead, all parties claimed to be upholders of true Jeffersonian principles.  
This was due in no small part to Hamilton’s reputation for being more monarchical 
than democratic, a reputation owing, albeit, to the triumph of the Jeffersonian 
Republicans in 1800.  Croly was convinced that the Americans needed a model for 
his vision of Progressive democratic nationalism, and he decided to hold Hamilton up 
as his model.  In so doing, however, he attempted to portray him as democrat as 
possible.  Though he criticized Hamilton for entrusting economic elites more than the 
will of the people, he praised him for his commitment to nationalism.  Jefferson 
represented the necessary democratic faith, but his democracy was too individualistic 
and local.  Croly’s ideal was a new synthesis based on the premise that  
The American Union was a novel and promising political creation, not 
because it was a democracy, for there had been plenty of previous 
democracies, and not because it was a nation, for there had been plenty 
of previous nations, but precisely and entirely because it was a 
democratic nation – a nation committed by its institutions and 




A closer look at Croly’s argument reveals many of the assumptions upon 
which current scholarship is predicated.  First, Croly’s criticism of Hamilton’s 
antidemocratic tendencies was limited to Hamilton’s attempt to build stability through 
the privileging of the wealthy few.  Notably lacking was a criticism of Hamilton’s 
monarchical ideas regarding the constitution of executive power.  In fact, his only 
mention of Hamilton’s monarchical reputation was to assert that Jefferson’s 
attribution of a “monarchic tendency [in] Hamilton’s” policies was “unjust” (p. 42). 
Second, though Croly detected an aristocratic streak in Hamilton, he explained 
it as largely due to his nationalist agenda.  Hamilton erred in seeking to give the union 
strength through the “interested motives of a minority of well-to-do citizens” (p. 
41)—or a “strong special interest” (p. 40)—when instead “he would have been far 
wiser to have frankly trusted its welfare to the good will of the whole people” (p. 41).  
So long as Hamilton’s ideas were purged of his ill guided attempt to risk plutocracy 
rather than ground American politics on the will of the people, he was a model 
statesman for modern Progressive politics. 
But Croly did not stop there.  Hamilton’s democratic deficiency was not 
rooted in his approach to democratic leadership.  His plutocratic policy was 
objectionable, but his elite style in office was sounder than Jefferson’s “meager, 
narrow, … self-contradictory,” and “inadequate” theory of democratic leadership (p. 
43.)  Croly spoke highly of government according to the will of the people, but he 
then went on to suggest that Jefferson misunderstood what this entailed.  For Croly, 
Jeffersonian democracy was to be “a government of and by the people, not a 




Hamilton, who held to “a high conception of the duties of leadership,” was “not afraid 
to incur unpopularity for pursuing what he believed to be a wise public policy,” 
Jefferson was an “equally impressive example of the statesman who assiduou ly and 
intentionally courted popular favor” (p. 45).  Croly, and essentially everyone who has 
followed, assumed that Hamilton was an advocate for “popular but responsible” 
government, looking perhaps at Federalist #72 rather than #71.  However, the latter, I 
will demonstrate, reflected Hamilton’s genuine view, which Madison and Jefferson 
correctly identified as inherently monarchical. 
The upshot is that the assumptions behind these schools generally ignore the 
relevant factors that could make monarchy seem like a feasible option.  My 
interpretation differs because I operate from a set of assumptions that suggest 
Hamilton would have had plausible reason to believe monarchy was nece sary in 
North America and that, in the long-run, it was achievable.  Those assumptions 
include: (1) these founders believed regimes naturally tend toward anarchy or 
despotism and, due to the theory of the republican violent death, if regimes tended too 
much toward anarchy, despotism would be the likely result; (2) for 18th century 
Anglo-Americans, including Madison and Hamilton, a primary question of political 
science was whether anarchy and despotism could be avoided through a regime type 
other than the British balanced constitution; (3) the success of the British imperial 
constitution at preventing anarchy between the colonies of North America and the 
apparent inability of the Articles of Confederation to prevent it between the Stat s 
raised the additional political scientific question of whether monarchy was nece sary 




horizon, regime direction could be (partly) controlled by institutional design, policy 
decisions, and opinion leadership.   
Interpretive Approach 
The argument developed in this dissertation is based in part on an original 
interpretation of these founders’ writings.  One reason this interpretation differs from 
previous readings is that it pays particular attention to their statements and arguments 
on the interrelated concepts and themes discussed above:  monarchy, executive 
power, republicanism, the republican violent death, the republican security dilemma, 
and the problem of preserving the union.  To gain an accurate view of how they 
converged and differed on these topics, it is best to take into account their complete 
corpus of writings.  However, reading through their complete works would be 
impracticable for a dissertation-length project.  To overcome this practical limitation, 
I acquired their digitized collections16, imported them into digital text analysis 
software, and used a variety of search techniques to identify text segments related to 
the topics and themes pertinent to my inquiry.  This proved extremely useful for 
gaining insights on relevant similarities and differences in their use of terminology, 
which in turn stimulated “hypotheses” about different values, priorities, 
conceptualizations, and/or possible rhetorical strategies.  Those hypotheses were then 
“tested” by probing deeper into the text to see if the terminological differenc s did 
indeed reflect something of underlying substantive significance. 
This approach, as with all methods, admittedly has certain disadvantages.  
One potential problem with a search-based approach is that it could encourage 
                                                




reading passages out of context.  However, I did not commit this error.  I always read 
pertinent passages in their full context, not only to interpret their meaning, but also in 
an attempt to discover additional relevant passages that may have been missed by the 
search expression.  I did the latter, however, to address a more problematic 
shortcoming of relying on a search-based method:  the problem of false-negatives.  
This problem emanates from the possibility that search expressions do not perfectly 
reflect a targeted concept.  Unless one can be certain that a search expression is 
perfect, there is always the possibility that one has missed a pertinent passage that 
disconfirms an important premise of the argument. 
Although the risk of false-negatives is admittedly a potential shortcoming of 
the method, two considerations may assuage concerns about its validity.  First, I did 
not rely exclusively on targeted search.  As was just mentioned, for passages 
discovered by search, I read the remainder of the document.  Also, I read the 
documents from the abridged Library of America collections of Hamilton’s a d 
Madison’s writings (Hamilton and Freeman  2001; Madison and Rakove  1999).  
Area specialists have determined that these are among their most repre entative 
writings.  Finally, I of course read all the passages quoted in the secondary liter ture.  
Since many of these secondary works were written by scholars who did read the full 
Madison or Hamilton collections, this further reduced the probability that I missed 
disconfirming evidence. 
The second consideration is that reading the full corpus runs its own risks of 
false-negatives, while targeted searching actually avoids those particular r sks.  




like to examine, it is quite possible she could develop a thesis from reading the full 
corpus having forgotten disconfirming evidence read months or years before.  Indeed, 
the well-known problem of “intra-coder reliability” in systematic content a alysis 
suggests that such lapses should be prevalent in large scale unsystematic interpretive 
studies (Given  2008, 445-446).  On the other hand, an advantage of the search-based 
approach is that it allows the scholar to go back and confirm/disconfirm a new 
hypothesis/theory that one develops at a relatively late stage of research.  In this 
respect, therefore, the search based approach actually avoids one source of false-
negatives while enhancing the capacity for systematic theory-building. 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 discusses the 18th century critique of republican governments 
presented by such leading political thinkers as Montesquieu, Hume, de Lolme, 
Rousseau, and Vattel.  This critique, as was discussed above, consisted of two distinct 
but closely interrelated problems:  “the republican violent death” and the “republican 
security dilemma.”  When combined, these concepts seemed to suggest that the 
British constitution presented the model of government most fit for durable liberty 
under modern conditions.  This chapter lays the groundwork for better understanding 
the theoretical basis of Hamilton’s and Madison’s political alliance and rupture. 
The heaviest burden of my argument is to establish, against scholarly 
consensus, that Hamilton believed the American regime needed to be set on a 
developmental path toward a replica of the British constitution and that his actions 
seem to have been directed toward that objective.  Consequently, Hamilton is the 




lenses of the republican violent death and republican security dilemma.  It 
demonstrates both why Madison was right about Hamilton’s monarchical principles 
and intentions and why this has eluded modern scholars.  Hamilton’s fears of 
disunion and anarchy, emanating from his fear of despotism, led him to believe both 
that the Americans needed a monarchical executive and that it was dangerous to 
speak about this publicly.  Consequently, Hamilton did not often admit to his 
monarchical views.  This, I suggest, is why his monarchism has been easy for 
scholars to downplay or ignore.  However, Hamilton also expressed hope that public 
opinion would change to reflect his way of thinking.  Consequently, I argue that a 
proper interpretation of his writings requires paying careful attention to his fear  of 
anarchy/disunion and his hopes that the public may come to accept a return to the 
British constitution.  At times, his fears would lead him to downplay his belief in the 
necessity of a monarchial executive.  At other times, his hope that public opinion 
could change led him to gently suggest that the Americans needed to adopt the British 
model of constitutionalism.  The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on my interpretation 
of his statements made at the Constitutional Convention and of passages discovered 
by targeted searching of his complete works.  As a basis of comparison, I also 
consider passages from Madison’s writings. 
Chapter 4 provides further evidence that the nature of Madison’s and 
Hamilton’s disagreement was over monarchical vs. republican principles.  The focus 
of this chapter is their views on the proper structure and purpose of executive power.  
Since Madison’s views on executive power seem to have conformed closely to 




power to writing, the chapter also compares Hamilton’s views to those of Jefferson.  
The chapter is structured as a commentary on Hamilton’s Federalist essays (#68-77) 
on executive power, but Jefferson’s and Madison’s views are juxtaposed throughout.  
Moreover, Hamilton’s arguments in that essay are contrasted to his statements at the 
Convention in order to develop an account of Hamilton’s rhetorical strategy.   
The analysis in this chapter contributes to the thesis of this dissertation in two 
ways.  First, it demonstrates that Hamilton’s theory of the structure and purpose of 
executive power is best described as monarchical.  Unlike Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
executive, Hamilton viewed executive power through the lens of the British 
constitution.  That is, he believed a primary function of the executive was to serve as 
an external counterpoise to factional conflict and thereby prevent the republican 
violent death and uphold the public interest.  Hamilton’s ideal executive would be 
completely insulated from popular electoral control.  Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
executive, by contrast, would balance the republican imperative of popular electoral 
accountability with the regime’s need for energetic executive power.  Second, the 
chapter provides evidence that Hamilton did indeed engage in opinion leadership with 
the hope of convincing Americans to accept the necessity of the British monarchical 
executive.  This is based on my interpretation of Federalist #71, which offers a much 
more persuasive case for the British model than that provided in the proposed 
Constitution.  Given Hamilton’s fears of failure to ratify and his proven capacity to 
write insincerely throughout the Federalist, I argue that this essay was a risky but 




Chapter 5 provides the final piece of this dissertation’s puzzle.  Even if 
Madison was right about Hamilton’s monarchical principles and intentions, that does 
not explain why Madison thought the federal republic provided an answer to the 18th 
century critique of republics.  The chapter thus considers how Madison sought and 
discovered mutually reinforcing “republican solutions” to the republican security 
dilemma and republican violent death.  Moreover, it explains his changing views on 
the States as emanating from this analysis.  Madison came to see the States not only 
as the principal republican disease to be remedied, but also as an integral part of his 
multifaceted republican cure. 
Chapter 6 concludes with a brief summary of the dissertation and an overview 
of how the deeper understanding of Madison’s and Hamilton’s prudential reasoning 
gained in this study can help us to better understand our present condition.  More 
specifically, it demonstrates ways that their ideas do and do not apply as we face three 
potential threats to republican government today:  bifurcated class structure, 





Chapter 2: The Eighteenth Century Critique of Republics 
The American Revolution began with an assertion of the natural rights of 
human beings.  When bound under a government that insufficiently protected their 
natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, men had the right “to 
institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing 
its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness.”  Though the Declaration affirmed certain principles on which 
government would need to be founded in order to “effect” the “Safety and 
Happiness” of the people, it was silent on the critical question of how to organize “its 
Powers in such Form” that would promote and secure those fundamental human 
aspirations.  But the potential answers to this question of course, did not exist in an 
historical vacuum.  Prior to the Revolution, 18th century Enlightenment political 
science had been nearly unanimous in its answer to this core question:  the British 
balanced constitution.  In Montesquieu’s (1752) judgment, the British nation was the 
only one “in the world that [had] for the direct end of its constitution political 
liberty,” and under that constitution “liberty [had] appeared in its highest perfection” 
(III:XI:VI). 
The Revolution, therefore, commenced not only with an affirmation of first 
principles, but also a negation of the conventional wisdom of modern political 
science.  If Jefferson’s Declaration was the official justification of the Americans’ 
break with England, Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776), published earlier in the 




would dispense with monarchy and adopt governments of their own as dictated by 
“the simple voice of nature and reason.” 
According to Paine, that voice clearly revealed that, as matter of both 
principle and prudence, “there is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition 
of Monarchy.”  With respect to the principles of natural right, the distinction between 
“KINGS and SUBJECTS,” is “against the equal rights of nature.”  From the 
standpoint of prudential constitutional design, Paine not only rejected the idea that the 
British monarch was essential for remedying the diseases incident to pure 
aristocracies or democracies, he also asserted that monarchy is the source of nearly 
every disease.  If it was true that “when Republican virtue fails, slavery ensues,” it 
was also true that monarchy was to blame for the loss of virtue:  “Why is the 
constitution of England sickly, but because monarchy hath poisoned the Republic?”  
Indeed, “The nearer any government approaches to a Republic, the less business there 
is for a King.”  And, if it was true that monarchs were better at waging wars, it was 
also true that before there were kings, “there were no wars,” for it is only “the pride 
of kings which throws mankind into confusion.”  
For our purposes, Paine’s specific judgments about monarchy are less 
important than the manner in which he reasoned about republican constitutional 
design.  For Paine, there was essentially no tension between abstract principles of 
natural right, on the one hand, and the human capacity to create and preserve popular 
political orders, on the other.  Good government was always within human reach.  If 
we suffer “miseries by a government,” then “our calamity is heightened by reflecting 




processes, or exogenous conditions, that limited or enabled the creation and 
maintenance of republics.  If only mankind would adopt simple popular governments, 
they would live secure in their natural rights because they would have rid themselv s 
of the real cause of degeneracy—monarchy—and therefore would enjoy governments 
that are “less liable … to be disordered.” 
This is what most distinguished Paine’s analysis from that of the European 
writers who defended the British constitution.  Their case for the British constitution 
was based on precisely the opposite assumptions.  Monarchy was not the source of 
despotism, but rather part of the remedy.  Indeed, in this concept of political 
dynamics, both monarchy and popular governments would lead naturally to 
despotism.  The genius of the British constitution, they argued, was that it mixed 
popular government with monarchy so that each would prevent the other from leading 
the regime into despotism. 
At that time, the conclusion that popular governments would lead to tyranny 
was common.  18th century Enlightenment political thinkers pointed to two natural 
processes that seemed to render republican governments likely to succumb to 
despotism.  I refer to the first process as the “republican violent death” and the other 
as the “republican security dilemma.”  The first resulted from what was argued to be 
the natural internal cycle of regimes:  absent monarchical control, republican 
governments would spark violent factional strife, degenerate into anarchy and then 
move quickly into despotism (“death”).17  The second emanated from the harsh 
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reality that the factors requisite for domestic republican liberty—such as 
decentralized executive power and a virtuous citizenry—can be undermined by the 
policies required for providing external security in international anarchy. 
Since Hamilton and Madison were united in accepting, contra Paine, that a 
fundamental purpose of constitutional design is to prevent these natural processes 
from subverting liberty, it is important to consider what their European teachers—
Montesquieu, Hume, de Lolme, Rousseau, Vattel, and others—had instructed.  Only 
then can we comprehend why Hamilton and Madison feared America’s experiment in 
republican government was at risk of degenerating into despotism, and why Hamilton 
could have believed monarchy was necessary for preserving liberty in North America.  
It also will allow us to better appreciate the innovations Madison made to 
conventional republican theory. 
This Chapter is divided into three sections.  In Section 1, I review the basic 
theory of the British constitution and the idea of the “republican violent death” as it 
pertained to the defenses of the British monarchy presented by Montesquieu, Hume, 
and De Lolme.  Section 2 is divided into two sub-sections.  I begin by reviewing the 
idea of the republican security dilemma.  Then I consider its role in the 18th century 
British Court-Country Party divide, which had a profound influence on American 
ideologies at the time of the Revolution and founding.  Finally, in the last section, I 
present the two problems as combining to form a set of specific trade-offs and 
dilemmas.  This serves as a guide in subsequent chapters for gauging how Hamilton’s 
                                                                                                                                          
than taking a generation to develop.  Second, and similarly, there was no kingship stage.  The regime 




and Madison’s ideas both converged and deviated from conventional European 
wisdom about the sustainability of republics under modern conditions. 
The British Constitution and the Republican Violent  Death 
The original theory of the British balanced constitution was drafted by 
Falkland and Colepeper on June 21, 1642 in an attempt to convince Charles I to 
declare England’s a mixed government in order to prevent civil war.  As Pocock 
(1975) has noted, although the theory of the balanced English constitution would be 
"endlessly celebrated throughout the eighteenth century," their memo was "less to 
offer a new and generally acceptable theory of the constitution than to warn 
Englishman that nothing but the balance of the three estates stood between them ad 
anarchy” (p. 364).  Falkland and Colepper argued that each social order possessed a 
“good” and an “ill” tendency.  The ills, they suggested, threatened to deliver either 
anarchy or despotism.  The ills of the few (faction and division) and the many 
(tumults, violence, and licentiousness) were associated with the state of anarchy.  Too 
much influence by either (or both) of those elements would run the risk of falling into 
that condition and, thus, civil war.  The ill of the monarch (tyranny), conversely, 
corresponded to the other extreme of despotism.  The theory held that by mixing the 
constitution with each element, the whole would gain from the good tendencies of 
each while neutralizing their deficiencies.  From the monarch the community received 
unification of the "nation under one head to resist invasion from abroad and 
insurrection at home;” from the aristocracy they received "conjunction of counsel in 




the constitution secured their "liberty,” the community gained from “the courage and 
industry which liberty begets.” 
Montesquieu is best known for attributing the liberty of the British 
constitution to its separation of functional powers, which he delineated as executive, 
legislative, and judicial.  “There would be an end of everything,” he wrote, “were th  
same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those 
three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of 
trying the causes of individuals” (1752, III:XI:VI).  In his view, the British 
constitution, achieved this superbly. 
Here then is the fundamental constitution of the government we are 
treating of.  The legislative body being composed of two parts, they 
check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both 
restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative 
(Ibid.). 
This separation of powers element was the part of Montesquieu’s explanation 
for British liberty most emphasized by Madison and Hamilton in the Federalist, and 
is consequently the best known.  However, part of Montesquieu’s case for British 
liberty that is less well known was based on the contention that while republics have 
admirable qualities, and may in a strict sense be considered the freest form of
government, their inherent tendency was to move into a state of anarchy and then, 
from there, quickly into despotism.  Consequently, his defense of the British 
constitution centered on three elements.  The first two were the mutual checks of 
power exercised by the Commons’ and Lords’ ability to prevent the monarch from 
becoming despotic and the monarch’s ability to prevent the violence of anarchy.  But 
critically, his argument was also informed by the monarch’s responsibility for 




Montesquieu’s case for the stabilizing role of the monarchy was somewhat 
subtle, and was strongly associated with his famous claim that “Virtue is th spirit of 
republics.”  While apparently a compliment to republics, the effect of his argument 
was to highlight their inherent instability.  Republics are animated by virtue, he 
argued, because they require it to avoid falling into anarchy.  “[I]n a popular state,” 
he wrote, “one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue.”  When there is a 
“corruption of the republic” and “virtue is lost” then there is effectively a “suspension 
of the laws,” leading to “the ruin of the state” (I:III:III). 
Elsewhere Montesquieu made it clear that he thought the virtue necessary for 
republics was possible only in a small, homogeneous community.  This effectively 
excluded republics as a modern alternative since, as will be discussed below, 
Montesquieu emphasized the necessity of moderate size for states to be secure from 
foreign threats.  Madison alluded to this in Federalist 14, arguing that he tactic of 
“celebrated authors” who “confined [republics] to a small spot” was to highlight the 
evils of ancient democracies and ignore the alternative of modern representative 
republics in order to make monarchy appear more attractive.  However, 
Montesquieu’s argument was actually nearly the opposite.  He actually held up the 
necessity of virtue for the successes of those ancient examples in order to suggest that 
purely popular government (whether direct or representative) could not survive in 
large, modern, heterogeneous societies.  His favorite example, like Hume, of the 
dangers posed by republics was not the ancient republics, but rather the British 
experience under Cromwell: 
A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent 




their ambition was inflamed by the success of the most daring of their 
members; as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the 
spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the  
people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a 
commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most 
violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very 
government which they had so wantonly proscribed. (ibid.) 
But the thrust of his argument in Spirit of the Laws was that this was a 
relatively happy outcome for the British, compared to what might have happened 
given their circumstances.  His most devastating critique was in the implication that 
the people would end up, not with a restored constitutional monarchy, but, rather, in a 
state of despotism.18  “In a republic,” he wrote, “the sudden rise of a private citizen to 
exorbitant power produces monarchy, or something more than monarchy” (I:II:II).  In 
a monarchy, he continued, “the laws have provided for, or in some measure adapted 
themselves to, the constitution; and the principle of government checks the monarch” 
(ibid.).  However, “in a republic, where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant 
power, the abuse of this power is much greater, because the laws foresaw it not, and 
consequently made no provision against it” (ibid.)  The conclusion to be drawn, 
therefore, was that freedom’s middle ground between the extremes of anarchy and 
despotism could be secured only in properly constituted monarchy. 
In his Constitution of England, De Lolme (1771) made essentially the same 
point.  It is “a peculiarity of the English Government, as a free Government,” tha  it 
has “a King” (II:I).  But, he argued, this fact actually had the effect of securing 
liberty:  "by making one great, very great Man, in the State, has an effectual check 
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been put to the pretensions of those who otherwise would strive to become such, and 
disorders have been prevented, which, in all Republics, ever brought on the ruin of 
liberty, and before it was lost, obstructed the enjoyment of it” (ibid.)  After ci ing 
ancient examples of usurpation (Pisistratus, Megacles, Marius, Sylla, Caesar and 
Pompey) and Machiavelli's analysis of the factional strife that had subverted liberty in 
Florence, he argued that “The English Constitution has prevented the possibility of 
misfortunes of this kind” (ibid.)  Liberty was secure “by diminishing the power, or 
rather the actual exercise of the power, of the People, and making them share in the 
Legislature only by their Representatives” (ibid.)  By this design, “the irresistible 
violence has been avoided of those numerous and general Assemblies, which, on 
whatever side they throw their weight, bear down every thing” (ibid.)  But, “as the 
power of the People, when they have any kind of power, and know how to use it, is at 
all times really formidable, the Constitution has set a counterpoise to it; and the Royal 
authority is this counterpoise” (ibid.) 
Hume’s analysis in Whether The British Government Inclines More To 
Absolute Monarchy, Or To A Republic (1752, 50-56) offered a more instructive 
lesson for constitutional leaders like Hamilton and Madison.  Here he spoke not of the 
virtue of the British constitution (for that was assumed), but of what kind of “death” 
to that constitution was least undesirable.  On balance, he proclaimed, “though liberty 
be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I should rather wish to see an 
absolute monarch than a republic in this island” (ibid.) Importantly, he made it clear 
that this was due to “the kind of republic [the English] have reason to expect,” not to 




more perfect than absolute monarchy, or even than [the British] constitution” (ibid.)  
Indeed, as is well known, he sketched such a government in his Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth (1752, 561-579), which Adair (1974) demonstrated was clearly a 
major influence on Madison’s idea about the extended republic.  Hume doubted, 
however, that his perfect Commonwealth, or any republican design, could in practice 
be realized in Britain because such an event would require a lawgiver, and “any 
single person [with] power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up a-
new, … is really an absolute monarch” (1752, 51).  Moreover, the British had learned 
from Cromwell the fact that “such a person will never resign his power, or establish 
any free government” (ibid.) Not being able to rely on a lawgiver, the British would 
have to let nature take its course, and either direction would culminate in absolute 
monarchy.  If the regime moved toward a republic, meaning if the balance of power 
tipped decisively toward the Commons, then the British would “suffer all the tyranny 
of a faction, subdivided into new factions” (1752, 55).  Finally, since “such a violent 
government cannot long subsist,” they would “after many convulsions, and civil wars, 
find repose in absolute monarchy” (1752, 56).  Since it “would have been happier … 
to have established [absolute monarchy] peaceably from the beginning,” tending 
more in that direction would lead to “the easiest death, the true Euthanasia of the 
BRITISH constitution” (ibid.) 
This image of republics tending toward anarchy and then despotism was 
behind Hamilton’s claims in the Federalist that “vigour of government is essential to 
the security of liberty”19 and, more specifically, that "Energy in the executive is … 
                                                




essential to ... the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, 
of faction, and of anarchy."20  It was also behind Madison’s statement to Jefferson 
that “[p]ower when it has attained a certain degree of energy and independence goes 
on generally to further degrees. But when below that degree, the direct tendency is to 
further degrees of relaxation, until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to 
an undue degree of power.”21  One of their principal tasks was to find a cure for this 
liberty-destroying process, but they would differ fundamentally over whether 
Montesquieu, Hume, and de Lolme were correct that this required an institution like 
the British hereditary monarch. 
Republican Security Dilemma 
The perception that republican government would lead inevitably to tyranny 
without the balance of a monarchy was not the only critique of republican 
government strongly held in European political thought.  The second major critique 
was the republican security dilemma.  By the phrase “republican security dilemma,” I 
mean to capture a variety of problems emanating from international relations that also 
led 18th century thinkers to believe republics were unsustainable under modern 
conditions.  Whereas the previous problem had to do with the susceptibility of 
republics to falling into anarchy and then monarchy or despotism, the republican 
security dilemma had to do with the pressures toward monarchy or despotism created 
by the condition of interstate anarchy.  In that condition, a republic must tend to its 
own security, not only in the sense of providing security from physical harm, but in 
the higher sense of avoiding becoming subject to the arbitrary will (domination) of 
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another state.  18th century writers would often use the phrases “give law” or “receive 
law” to express the loss of autonomy (literally giving law to oneself) that could result 
from living under the domination (enslavement) of another state, even if the 
dominating state did not engage in hostilities.  In other words, a primary concern for a 
republic was that its neo-Roman liberty could be lost from an imbalance of power 
among states in international anarchy. 
The fundamental idea behind the republican security dilemma is that the 
means regimes used to secure external liberty could threaten the bases—institutional, 
socioeconomic, and/or moral—of domestic liberty.  For our purposes, the most 
important of these problems was that the constitutive structures required for 
preventing domination from other states—those that enable the state to extract and 
refine the resources (e.g. revenue, weapons, soldiers) needed for waging war and to 
engage in effective strategic interaction (e.g. “secrecy and dispatch”)—ould be 
antithetical to the constitutive structures required for assuring a condition of non-
domination domestically.  Executive insulation from foreign or popular control, for 
example, might be strategically optimal for certain sorts of functions necessary for 
securing external non-domination.  For example, the tools of effective bargaining 
(and thus secrecy and fast-track authority) and/or the credible threat of quickly 
deploying military forces (and thus minimal procedural impediments to ordering the 
use of force) might be in tension with popular government.  An executive with such 
discretion might also be able to arbitrarily implement policies that undermine the 
rights and vital interests of citizens of the regime, and thus would (by definition) 




The republican security dilemma preoccupied Rousseau in his two major 
works on foreign affairs.  In his Plan for Perpetual Peace (1761), Rousseau captured 
the tragedy of the dilemma: 
No man can have thought long upon the means of bringing any 
Government to perfection without realizing a host of difficulties and 
obstacles which flow less from its inherent nature than from its 
relation to its neighbors. The result of this is that the care which ought 
to be given to its internal welfare has to be largely spent upon its 
outward security; and we are compelled to think more of providing for 
its defense against others than of making it as good as may be in itself.  
In his State of War (1758), he explained the problem as emanating from the 
“mixed state” of the human condition.  Human beings are, he said, simultaneously in 
two conditions:  a civil state and a state of nature.  As individuals, persons (whether 
perceived or not – or, more likely, because it is not commonly perceived) are 
constantly stretched and strained between the contradictory imperatives of these two 
conditions: 
The first thing I notice in looking at the state of mankind is a palpable 
contradiction which makes all stability impossible. As individuals, we 
live in the civil state, under the control of the Law; as nations, each is 
in the state of nature. And it is this which makes our position worse 
than if such distinctions were unknown. For, living as we do at once in 
the civil order and in the state of nature, we find ourselves exposed to 
the evils of both conditions, without winning the security we need in 
either. 
Two examples of the subversion of liberty emanating from foreign policy 
were prominent at the time.  One was the widely-held view (espoused by Machiavelli 
and Montesquieu) that Rome’s imperial overstretch ultimately undermined the virtu s 
and loyalties necessary for its republican constitution, opening the door finallyto 
Caesar’s usurpation.  The other, and that which Rousseau clearly had in mind, was 




by the institutions of what historians now call the “fiscal-military state” 22—the most 
important being peacetime military establishments—had given monarchs the pretext
for aggrandizing power at home.  This byproduct of international relations allowed 
them to rule by force and fear according to their own arbitrary will.  Madison 
referenced both examples in Federalist 41: 
It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation.…If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, 
ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific 
nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take 
corresponding precautions.…The veteran legions of Rome were an 
overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and 
rendered her the mistress of the world. / Not the less true is it, that the 
liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and 
that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few 
exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing 
force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a 
necessary, provision. 
If it was widely held that these forces drove Europe into despotism, the British 
were thought to have escaped this fate, in part, due to their fortunate insular 
geographic position.  However, the British people themselves were divided about the 
extent to which their constitution had truly been unscathed by foreign affairs.  
Division on this issue was central to the dispute between Court and Country Parties in 
18th century Britain that had such a profound ideological impact on the American 
Revolution and founding.  Let us consider more closely how these Parties, and 
European observers, perceived “the republican security dilemma” as it pertained to 
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the liberty of Britain, provided by its balanced constitution, and the liberty of Europe, 
maintained, in part, by Britain’s role in the European balance of power. 
Country vs. Court on the Balanced Constitution vs. Balance 
of Power 
As several historians (esp. Pocock  1975; Wood  1969; Banning  1998; Elkins 
and McKitrick  1993) have demonstrated, the galvanizing ideology of the American 
revolution was a brand of “republicanism” (due to its commitment to the neo-roman 
theory of liberty) associated with the Commonwealthmen of the late sevententh 
century, and the “Country party” of early- to mid-eighteenth century, England.  The 
set of ideas associated with the Country party were articulated by such writers as John 
Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, and Bolingbroke as they opposed what they saw as the 
corrupting effects of the policies and practices of Walpole’s “Court Party”.  The 
central issue dividing the Court and Country parties was what impact they thought 
several recent developments—the birth of the Bank of England, the rise of an 
elaborate new system of finance, the vast expansion of the bureaucracy, the increased 
power of the executive branch over the Parliament, the increased need for internal
taxation (mostly to pay war debt), and the advent of a standing army—would have on 
the balance of England’s constitution.   
The spokesmen for the Country party argued that the balance was tipping 
perilously toward the crown and “the men in the City whose wealth was based not on 
the real value inherent in land but on the ephemeral values of paper and credit” 
(Elkins and McKitrick  1993, 15).  While these men of the city were profiting from 
the financial system that was both leading the country into more wars and increasi g 




and virtue”—“landed property and freehold tenure”—“was being sapped by the 
power of money” (ibid.).  It was clear that the “unsleeping vigilance, virtue, and will” 
necessary for safeguarding liberty were in the process of subversion by the 
“disregard, luxury, and sloth” that historically led people to allow “their libert es to be 
plucked away and themselves brought under the rod of tyranny” (Elkins and 
McKitrick  1993, 6).   
The Court supporters, while conceding that these were all valid matters of 
concern, mainly relied upon arguments from foreign policy necessity to justify the 
direction in which the regime was heading.  They were, as Elkins and McKitrick put 
it, “as ready as anyone to deplore the burdens of war, to admit the possibility of the 
debt getting out of hand, to acknowledge that standing armies needed watching, or to 
concede that money, commerce, and virtue did not always go together” (p. 17).  
However, the manner in which their state was developing was a necessary 
consequence of the exigencies of the broader global power struggle in which they 
were inexorably embroiled: 
A far-flung network of overseas trade, a colonial empire, and a due 
weight in the power relations of Europe all required an active foreign 
policy and a professional military and naval establishment for giving 
effect to it.  Moreover, such commitments and responsibilities would 
scarcely even be thinkable without a dependable system of public 
finance to support them. (ibid.) 
The discovery of the prominence of this Country Party “civic-humanist 
republican” tradition in the early years of the federal republic has served as the central 
argument against the Hartzian (1991) claim of a consensus liberal tradition in 
American history (Bailyn  1992; Pocock  1975; Wood  1969).   Less appreciated (but 




republican thought would also permeate the thinking of the founding generation, and 
that its disposition was more favorable to the Court’s perspective than that of the 
Country’s. 
In the 18th century, the republican thinker and prominent theorist of 
international relations, Emmerich de Vattel, would argue in his Law of Nations (1760) 
that England had indeed exerted “a due weight in the power relations of Europe” by 
ratcheting-up monarchical power and joining the grand alliance in order (initially) o 
check French ambitions.  Justice, Vattel argued, allowed states to follow the dictat s 
of prudence and act preemptively when a neighboring state aggrandized power.  
Since “predominating powers seldom fail to molest their neighbors, to oppress them, 
and even totally subjugate them, whenever an opportunity occurs, and they can do it 
with impunity,” it is justifiable, even required, for states to prevent such a 
preponderance either by force of arms or, if possible, by forming “a confederacy of 
the less powerful sovereigns, who, by this coalition of strength, become able to hold 
the balance against that potentate whose power excites their alarms” (III:III:45-46). It 
is noteworthy that Vattel argued that the balance of power was instrumental to the 
republican liberty of Europe as a whole: 
The continual attention of sovereigns to every occurrence, the constant 
residence of ministers, and the perpetual negotiations, make of modern 
Europe a kind of republic, of which the members — each independent, 
but all linked together by the ties of common interest — unite for the 
maintenance of order and liberty. Hence arose that famous scheme of 
the political balance, or the equilibrium of power; by which is 
understood such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate be 
able absolutely to predominate, and prescribe laws to the others. 
(III:III:47) 
An implication of all this is that both the Country Party and the Court Party 




of the neo-Roman theory of liberty associated with “republicanism.”)  In the British 
context, the problem was how to reconcile the balanced constitution needed for 
domestic neo-Roman liberty with the balance of power required for liberty within the 
anarchical society of sovereign European states.  The Country Party saw clearly a 
change in the balance of the English constitution brought on by the military 
revolution.  The Court Party saw with equal clarity the threat to English liberty tha  
would be presented by an unchecked preponderance of French, Spanish, or any other 
state’s power.  And the most high minded among them would hope that the balance of 
power in Europe would sustain the conditions for a quasi-republican European 
regime. 
Interestingly, the two sides seemingly agreed at the conceptual level about the 
nature of this dilemma, and neither denied the importance of “maintaining balance” in 
both senses.  Their differences were mostly a matter of emphasis; and where they 
stood in this respect was conditioned by where they sat.  In his Wealth of Nations 
(1776) Adam Smith posited that Court supporters were too insulated from the 
financial burdens of England’s foreign exploits, and too easily amused by reading 
about them, to perceive the true cost of England’s foreign policy to its constitution 
and long-term prosperity.  In other words, they had little incentive to perceive the 
domestic consequences of pursuing their foreign policy objectives.  Similarly, for 
Bolingbroke and other Country critics, the problem was that England was over-
extended and making insufficient strategic use of their “detached” and “insular” 
position off the shore of the continental mainland.  He and other Country critics held 




by diminishing its continental commitments and relying principally upon naval 
supremacy. 
In the judgment of Vattel (and Montesquieu), by contrast, the balance of 
England’s constitution—which they assessed not in relation to an ideal (or historical) 
standard of balance, but rather in comparison to the much more highly centralized, 
autocratic, and militarized states on the continent—was still intact precisely because 
England’s insular position had allowed it to do as Bolingbroke apparently thought 
they had not sufficiently done.  Vattel argued that the liberties of the continental 
European states were the victims of what I’ve called the republican security dilemma, 
while the liberty of England, due to its location offshore, had escaped its snare 
relatively unscathed: 
It is true, however, that, if a sovereign continues to keep up a powerful 
army in profound peace, his neighbours must not suffer their vigilance 
to be entirely lulled to sleep by his bare word; and prudence requires 
that they should keep themselves on their guard. However certain they 
may be of the good faith of that prince, unforeseen differences may 
intervene; and shall they leave him the advantage of being provided, at 
that juncture, with a numerous and well disciplined army, while they 
themselves will have only new levies to oppose it? Unquestionably no. 
This would be leaving themselves almost wholly at his discretion. 
They are, therefore, under the necessity of following his example, and 
keeping, as he does, a numerous army on foot: and what a burden is 
this to a state! … The constant maintenance of numerous armies 
deprives the soil of its cultivators, checks the progress of population, 
and can only serve to destroy the liberties of the nation by whom they 
are maintained. Happy England! whose situation exempts it from any 
considerable charge in supporting the instruments of despotism (Vattel 
1760, III:III:50, italics added). 
The upshot is that observers at the time understood that the bite of the 
republican security dilemma was contingent upon geographic context.  Though the 
Court and Country Parties, as well as European observers, would disagree about the 




insularity was one reason Britain had not returned to absolute monarchy.  This would 
be one basis of agreement between Hamilton and Madison:  they believed, all things 
being otherwise equal, that the republican security dilemma would be in fuller forc 
between the States in the event of disunion than it would be for the national 
government in its relations with European powers.  The States would be at risk of 
military despotism, whereas the national government might remain a republic 
(Madison) or limited monarchy (Hamilton). 
Summary of Major Dilemmas and Trade-Offs 
The critiques of republican government described here—the inevitable 
descent into tyranny caused by factional strife and the collapse of republicanism 
under the weight of external security threats—were not considered on a stand alone 
basis.  Although the two political processes represented in these critiques were 
thought to exert independent influences on regime development, they were often 
analyzed as interacting dynamically.  Taken together, these forces can be seen as 
creating a set of dilemmas and trade-offs that structured and limited the realistic 
options available to prudent statesmen.  In this last section, I briefly summarize those 
dilemmas and trade-offs. 
Territory Size 
In Federalist 9 Hamilton quoted Montesquieu’s argument that “If a republic 
be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal 
imperfection” (Montesquieu, Cohler, B. C. Miller, and Stone  1752, I:IX:I).  As 
mentioned above, Montesquieu thought a republic could not survive in a large sphere 




would be, thus increasing the potential for conflict while reducing the likelihood of a 
strong virtue among the citizenry that would be required, absent monarchical 
superintendence, to keep that conflict from degenerating into anarchy and then 
despotism.  Second, increase in territory would lead to the threat of military 
usurpation due to a loss of loyalty by the generals/army and diminished capacity for 
monitoring the military by the civil authority.  Montesquieu explicitly proposed one 
solution to this problem:  “a confederate republic,” which “has all the internal 
advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical 
government” (ibid.)  In his judgment, if this form had not been invented, “It is very 
probable that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under 
the government of a single person” (ibid.) Of course, the British constitution also 
presented a model for how to combine republican liberty with monarchical strength.  
It is not unlikely that Montesquieu preferred the latter to the former. 
It is important to note that Montesquieu also thought there was a limit placed 
on the extent of monarchies.  The natural limit on state size was based on how long it 
would take any army to move from one border to another.  Therefore, he counseled: 
“To preserve a state in its due force,” it should have “a moderate extent, proportioned 
to the degree of velocity that nature has given to man, to enable him to move from 
one place to another” (I:IX:VI).  As a model, he argued that “France and Spain are 
exactly of a proper extent” (ibid.) Larger states would run the risk of becoming 
despotic and/or externally insecure. 
For his part, Hume made an important distinction between the fitness of a 




regime more or less likely to be founded, on the other.  In his Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth (1752, 561-579), he argued that the reason monarchies were typically 
found in large states was not because monarchy was the best fit for such conditions, 
but, rather, because it was more difficult to found a republic in a large state.  He 
actually thought his planned commonwealth would be more fit (i.e. stable) than a 
monarchical regime for a moderate sized territory.  It would overcome Montesquieu’s 
problem of virtue because it would manipulate passions and interests in manner akin 
to Federalist 10, rather than be dependent upon a restrained citizenry.  Therefore, if a 
virtuous founder could arise (Hume doubted one would), then the problem of large 
size diluting virtue to a breaking point could be overcome   However, one of the only 
weaknesses he saw with his Commonwealth was that it would suffer the fate of 
Rome:  that it would be too successful, be tempted into over-expansion, and then fall 
to military subversion. 
Institutions Conducive for External Strength vs. In stitution’s 
Pernicious to Republican Liberty 
Intrinsic Strength of Monarchs 
For the problem of size, monarchies were considered to have “external 
strength” because monarchies were most fit for a moderate sized territory that was 
itself conducive to strength.  However, it was also held that monarchies by their very 
nature were stronger, and that, therefore, republics would need to trade-off some 
external strength to remain a republic.  The reasons given typically had to do with the 
advantages of speed and decision monarchs enjoyed on account of being unitary 
actors.  Montesquieu argued that the powers of war and peace “ought to be in the 




better administered by one than by many: on the other hand, whatever depends on the 
legislative power is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person” 
(1752, II:XI:VI). 
There was also an older idea that (as I argue in Chapter 5) seems to have 
engaged Madison’s attention.  This was the case made by Thucydides in 
Peloponnesian War (400 B.C.) that popular governments actually have several 
advantages in foreign affairs emanating largely from their propensity to fight only 
wars that the people were willing to make sacrifices to win (1:140-1:145.)  However, 
he also noted that the people could become inflamed by passion, especially avarice, 
and consequently blunder into ruinous wars (e.g. Book 6).  So, by this account, it was 
an open question whether the mistakes of the people were greater than the potential 
for the monarchs to pursue wars for glory and honor at the ruin of the state.   
Financial Systems and Standing Armies 
As we have seen, the financial and military revolutions of the 17th and 18th 
century had made the creation of modern systems of war finance (funded debt, 
national banks, and extensive internal taxation) and standing armies imperatives for 
the external security of states on the European continent.  These institutions, however, 
had the effect of increasing executive power, thus threatening to change republics into 
monarchies and monarchies into despotisms.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed two distinct sociopolitical processes that European 
Enlightenment theorists argued could, if not properly tended to, lead regimes into 
despotism.  I refer to these as the republican violent death and the republican security




from direct executive aggrandizement, but also from excessive democracy leading to 
anarchy and violence.  This violence would lead the people, as Hume put it, to seek 
“repose in absolute monarchy.”  The second problem emanated from the 
developmental pressures exerted on regimes by their geophysical context.  Th  
fundamental problem was that the means used to secure external liberty could 
threaten the bases of domestic liberty.  Increasing territory size, raising standing 
armies, and adopting modern system of war finance could all eventually lead to 
executive domination by turning the military tools of external security on the practice 
of domestic governance.  Yet, under conditions with acute external security threats, 
regimes could face the harsh choice of adopting such policies or else becoming 
subject to the domination of external states.   It was widely believed in the 18th 
century that this structural logic was largely responsible for the advent of abs lute 
monarchies and despotic governments throughout Europe. 
A belief in these processes would inform both Hamilton and Madison as they 
contributed to the Americans’ effort to create “good government from reflection and 
choice.”  This common belief, and their mutual fear of despotism, would be the basis 
of their agreement on the need for a national government strong enough to prevent 
anarchy between the States and excessive democracy within them, and thereby 
preventing despotism.  They were united, in other words, in accepting the findings of 
European political science that Paine dismissed.  But Madison, unlike Hamilton, 
agreed with Paine in rejecting monarchy out of principle.  Madison’s project was, as 
he said in Federalist #10, all about finding “a republican remedy for the diseases 




that America’s republican experiment would work, never expressed support for the 
anti-monarchical purpose attributed to the Revolution by Paine, and always looked 
for an executive cure for the diseases of popular government.  His model was the 
British constitution and his writings and actions suggest that he never wavered from 
his “private opinion,” expressed in 1787, that nothing “short of it will do in 
America.”23  The following chapters make the case that this difference, at the level of 
principle and prudence, was the basis of Madison’s and Hamilton’s political rupture. 
                                                




Chapter 3: Hamilton, the Critique of Republics, and the Old 
Constitutionalism: The Necessity and Propriety of the British 
Form 
 
In early 1802, just two and half years before his untimely death and fourteen 
years after struggling for the ratification of the Constitution in 1788, a despondent 
Hamilton complained to a trusted friend that “Perhaps no man in the United States 
has sacrificed or done more for the present Constitution than myself; and contrary to 
all my anticipations of its fate, as you know from the very beginning, I am still 
laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric.”24  This statement captures well one of 
the most interesting and puzzling aspects of Hamilton’s constitutional leadership:  the 
fact that he did labor so much to “prop” the Constitution that he thought in many 
ways woefully inadequate.  Hamilton, after all, had been instrumental in bringing 
about the Constitutional Convention; was the only delegate from New York who 
voted for final passage of the Constitution; worked tirelessly to secure ratification, 
both by giving impassioned speeches at the New York Ratifying Convention, and by 
authoring a majority of the Federalist essays; and then, as the first Treasury Secretary 
and de facto leader of the Federalist Party in the 1790s, he had sought to give the new 
national government strength and respectability by providing it with a modern system 
of finance, forging better trade relations Britain and other European states, and 
building a national army and navy.  Even when he was out of office and politically 
defeated in his last years of life, he continued to promote the Federalist policies he 
believed were necessary for “propping” the American constitutional order.  Yet, 
                                                




despite all these efforts, he was always critical of the Constitution.  Before casting his 
vote at the Convention, he gave a short speech urging others to do so as well, but 
added “No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were known to 
be.”25  And in the last years of his life he belittled the Constitution as a “frail and 
worthless fabric.”  Clearly this founding father did not revere the Constitution he 
helped to establish. 
This raises several questions that must be answered if we are to understand the 
nature of Madison’s and Hamilton’s alliance and rupture.  After all, Madison, after 
also harboring reservations prior to the ratification campaign, would become an 
outspoken advocate for Constitutional “veneration.”26  Why did Hamilton seek to 
prop the Constitution that he did not revere?  To what end did he do this?  Was he 
only concerned with the power of the national government or was he, as he once 
claimed, “as zealous an advocate of liberty as any man whatever, and … as willing a 
martyr to it…”?27  If so, why did he think propping the constitution was necessary for 
liberty?  Finally, what did he mean by “propping” the constitution and what did he 
think was necessary for adequately achieving this? 
Previous scholars have clearly demonstrated that an important element in any 
response to these questions must center on Hamilton’s commitment to building a 
strong national government28.  That is, one of his objections to the Constitution was 
                                                
25 “Hamilton Speech at Federal Convention,” Sept. 17, 1787 (Madison’s notes) 
26 See Rosen (1999, 126-155) for a detailed discussion of Madison’s novel theory of constitutional 
“veneration” as a civic virtue. 
27 Speech, June 22, 1787. (Madison’s Transcript.) 
28 The secondary literature on Hamilton is vast and growing.  For this study, I benefited most from the 
following works, each of which acknowledges the centrality of nationalism to Hamilton’s project: 
Stourzh (1970), McDonald (1982, 1985), Flaumenhaft (1992), Walling (1995;  1999), Read (2000, 55-




that it left too much power to the States, and this undermined his aspiration of 
building a modern nation state with the fiscal-military powers he believed necessary 
for avoiding imminent financial collapse and for putting the country on a course to 
one day become a “great nation” that would “dictate the terms of the connexion 
between the old and the new world!”29  There is little question, therefore, that by 
“propping” the Constitution, part of what Hamilton had in mind was his effort as 
Treasury Secretary to endow the national government with these extra-constituti al 
fiscal-military powers.  As Forrest McDonald has demonstrated, Hamilton was highly 
influenced by Jacques Neckar’s teaching that in modern times an exceptional 
individual who covets the everlasting fame attendant upon founding or maintaining a 
great state should rely as much, if not more, on the tools of modern finance than on 
institutional design (McDonald  1982, 84-86).  The brilliance of Hamilton’s financial 
program cannot be overstated.  Diagram 1 summarizes the multifaceted set of 
nationalist objectives that Hamilton’s plans for the national bank and debt assumption 
sought to address.30 
                                                
29 Hamilton, “Federalist 11” 
30 The diagram is based on my readings of Hamilton’s trio of “State Papers” (“Report on National 
Bank,” “Report on Public Credit,” and “Report on Manufactures”) and the helpful discussions by 
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Scholars are less united on the question of whether Hamilton was also a 
“zealous … advocate of liberty.”  McDonald’s (1985) view is the most common.  He 
thinks Hamilton’s overriding concern was with the power of the national government 
and that it was essentially “a matter of indifference to him how … the government’s 
powers should be organized or what forms they should take” (p. 205).  In other 
words, Hamilton was a zealous advocate of power but not liberty.31  Two scholars, 
however, have gone much further and suggested Hamilton was actually an opponent 
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emphasize the primacy of foreign policy in Hamilton’s thought (but are silent on the consequences of 
his foreign policy views for structures of domestic liberty) and Flaumenhaft (1992) who emphasize 




of liberty.   John C. Miller (1959) argues that Hamilton’s proposal for an executive 
with life tenure at the Constitutional Convention proved that he had rejected the idea 
of “protecting the individual against the exercise of arbitrary power” (p. 161).  
According to Harold Kohn (1975), “Hamilton was the personification of American 
militarism” who throughout his career “exploited armies for political gain, … eagerly 
using force in the 1790s to enforce the law … and finally using the army as a vehicle 
to advance his own power” (pp. 272-273).  In his judgment, Hamilton, and other 
“militarist” Federalists, preferred to rule by “fear” and “force alone,” rather than by 
consent or “public opinion” (pp. 194-195).  In the view of these authors, in other 
words, Hamilton was an advocate for modern (Hobbesian) despotism. 
Two recent studies, however, have argued persuasively that Hamilton was 
indeed a committed advocate for liberty.  James Read (Read  2000, 55-88) points out 
that Hamilton always claimed to seek a constitutional balance between individual 
liberty and government power.  Much confusion has ensued, he demonstrates, from 
failing to recognize that Hamilton thought the States were both unnecessary and 
dangerous for the preservation of individual liberty and that much of his embrace of 
national power was directed at subordinating the States rather than individuals.  
Moreover, Hamilton always supported broad popular representation in the (national) 
legislature and was committed to trial by jury and other traditional civil rights and 
liberties.   
Karl Walling’s (1999) study demonstrates that Kohn’s charge of Hobbesian 
militarism is far off the mark.  Hamilton went to extraordinary lengths to find ways to 




things, his experience at Valley Forge had impressed upon how civil control over the 
military could be threatened by fiscally poor governments that inadequately clothe
and feed armies (pp. 37-39).  This was his original impetus for learning about modern 
finance and a leading motive throughout his career for promoting economic 
prosperity.  Hamilton even went so far as to invent a new model of military 
professionalism that was deliberately designed to reconcile the need for a 
knowledgeable and competent officer corps with the libertarian imperative of primary 
reliance on a non-professional militia (pp. 66-69).  Finally, although he believed a 
standing army was necessary for security on the Western border, and potentially for 
repressing unlawful rebellions by individuals or States, Hamilton endorsed the use of 
force, both internationally and domestically, only as a last resort and always with the 
stated objective of upholding rule of law (pp. 147-152-; 160-170; 212-221). 
Read and Walling have offered an important contribution to our understanding 
of Hamilton, but they, like all contemporary scholars, have offered an unsatisfactory 
answer to the question of central importance to this study:  If Hamilton was an 
advocate for liberty and a strong national government, then what was the theoretical 
basis of his and Madison’s political rupture?  After all, everyone knows that Madison 
also initially supported a strong national government, and no one denies that he was 
committed to some form of republican liberty.  If Madison changed his mind about 
the States, then why did not Hamilton?  As we have seen, all contemporary scholars 
deny that Madison’s explanation for their disagreement—that Hamilton and the 
Federalists stood for monarchical principles—was an accurate portrayal of 




Madison changed his mind about the States, while Hamilton did not.  But since my 
answer centers on the premise that Madison’s and Hamilton’s disagreement was 
fundamentally over monarchical vs. republican principles, I must first defend that 
premise.  In the next two chapters, therefore, I present the case that Madison was 
right, and all contemporary scholars have been mistaken, about Hamilton’s 
monarchial principles and intentions.  That is, I argue that Hamilton was convinced 
America would be better off adopting the British balanced constitution, complete with 
a hereditary monarch; never believed the Revolution was about republican principles; 
and, moreover, that his actions suggest he sought to put the regime on a monarchical 
path.   
This chapter asserts and defends five interrelated propositions about 
Hamilton’s constitutional project.  First, I argue that he genuinely believed America 
needed to pursue a developmental trajectory that would lead toward approximating, 
as close as possible, the British balanced constitution.  Second, he nowhere evidenced 
support for the anti-monarchical meaning of the Revolution provided by Thomas 
Paine.  Third, he analyzed America’s political situation through orthodox 
understandings of the republican security dilemma and the republican violent death.  
Fourth, this helps explains why he believed such a regime was necessary for 
preserving liberty in North America.  And, finally, fifth, this also helps explains why 
he was reluctant to admit this belief publicly, why he thought the Constitution was 





This is a difficult argument to make because the elements of the argument are 
interdependent.  I must interpret his writings to describe what he believed, but my 
explanation for why he believed those things also has implications for how one 
should interpret his writings.  More specifically, I argue that Hamilton favored 
monarchy because he feared without it, anarchy would ensue and trigger the 
republican violent death and or disunion (and, therefore, the republican security 
dilemma); but I present evidence that he believed admitting that he favored monarchy 
in public also ran the risk of raising alarm, igniting disorder, and thus also triggerin  
anarchy or disunion.  This means that there should be little obvious evidence of his 
monarchical beliefs because he would have been unlikely to write or utter many 
statements admitting this to be the case.  It might even lead him to disavow his 
statements from the Convention where he did claim to believe nothing short of the 
British constitution would do in America.  Thus, my argument relies in part on a 
careful reading of his statements that takes into account his admitted fear that 
complete candor could lead the republic toward his greatest fear: despotism.  
To develop this argument (amid these hermeneutical difficulties), I proceed in 
the following way.  First, I begin by reviewing with what he said in the privacy of the 
Constitutional Convention.  I argue that this is a reliable indicator of his genuin  
beliefs at the time since he had no incentive to be insincere in that context.  Then, I
point to shortcomings of previous scholars’ attempts to deny that Hamilton harbored 
monarchical intentions.  In general, I argue that scholars have paid insufficient 
attention to Hamilton’s views about regime dynamics, and the interpretive 




patterns in his and Madison’s statements about free government, monarchies, 
republics, and the republican violent death as revealed by targeted searches of their 
complete works.  The immediate purpose of comparing with Madison is to provide a 
standard of comparison for assessing Hamilton’s views.  However, it also contributes 
to this dissertation’s larger purpose of explaining the theoretical basis of Hamilton’s 
and Madison’s political alliance and rupture. 
Hamilton’s Republican Credentials:  A Critique of t he 
Scholarly Consensus 
No one disputes that Hamilton explicitly declared himself a proponent of the 
British constitution through several statements over a four day period at the 
Constitutional Convention.  During that time he “acknowledged himself not to think 
favorably of republican government”32 and professed to believe “the British 
government is the best in the world; and that [he doubted] much whether anything 
short of it will do in America.”33  In this, as with most important topics, Hamilton was 
careful to define his terms.  Unlike John Adams, whose unorthodox definitions 
allowed him to classify the British constitution as no less republican than those of the 
American States, Hamilton made it clear that he thought the key difference between 
republican and non-republican governments was the presence or absence of 
hereditary succession of office holders.34  His proposal at the Convention for an 
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33 Ibid. 
34 He would eventually settle on this pithy definition for a republic: “a perfect equality of rights among 
citizens, exclusive of hereditary distinctions” (“Catullus to Aristides #3,” September 29, 1792; he 
repeated close versions of this definition several times after 1792).  In his Defenses (1787), Adams 
argued that the dividing line between republics andnon-republics is whether or not they seek a balance 
among the classic social orders: the one, the few, and the many.  Oddly, he praised the American 
constitutions for doing just this, whereas, as Gordon Wood points out, most Americans were proud of 




executive with life tenure therefore pushed the outer limit of what “republican 
principles will admit.”35  However, he also made a point of stating that he thought 
even an executive with life tenure “would have, in fact, but little of the power and 
independence that might be necessary” for fulfilling its necessary purposes.36  H  
admitted to believing that, with respect to executive power,  
[t]he English model was the only good one on this subject. The 
hereditary interest of the king was so interwoven with that of the 
nation, and his personal emolument so great, that he was placed above 
the danger of being corrupted from abroad, and, at the same time, was 
both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled to answer the 
purpose of the institution at home.37  
These and many similar statements at the Convention present the best 
evidence of Hamilton’s belief in the superiority of the British constitution.  To 
support the case that Hamilton was a committed republican, scholars have had to 
ignore or downplay their relevance.  In this section I argue that these statements are a 
reliable indication of Hamilton’s genuine views and that scholars have erred by not
considering closely what they reveal about Hamilton’s long-term regime vision.  
As was discussed in the introductory chapter, the current scholarly consensus 
that Hamilton was a committed republican is probably traceable to Herbert Croly’s 
Promise of American Life (1909).  However, in recent years, scholars have routinely 
                                                                                                                                          
forms (1998, 567-592). Hamilton was like Adams in co tinuing to praise the British constitution, but 
departed from him by asserting the more orthodox view that the presence or absence of hereditary 
distinctions is what distinguishes republics from non-republics, and therefore the U.S. from Britain. In 
his judgment, the Americans had created a wholly popular “representative democracy:”  one giant 
House of Commons with a separation of functional powers.  Indeed, he thought this was precisely what 
was wrong with it.  One can only wonder what Hamilton must have thought of Adams’ argument. Not 
only was it politically disadvantageous for Adams, but also (in Hamilton’s view) theoretically flawed; 
two sins Hamilton worked diligently to avoid (albeit with mixed success).  I also wonder if Hamilton 
was so explicit at the Convention in part because he thought Adams’ influential work had created 
undue definitional / theoretical confusion.   






cited Gerald Stourzh’s (1970) Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican 
Government as presenting an authoritative case for Hamilton’s republican credentials.  
Stourzh’s argument was actually quite nuanced, much more so than most of what has 
followed, and despite his conclusion that Hamilton was in fact a republican (38-75), 
he would also admit later in his book that Hamilton held certain “obsolete” ideas that 
led to his “favoring monarchy” and having a negative “appraisal of republican 
regimes” (107-108).  This leads one to wonder if even Stourzh himself truly believes 
Hamilton to be a friend of republican government.  Nevertheless, since his conclusion 
affirming Hamilton’s republicanism has been so influential, we should begin by 
reviewing the case he made. 
Based upon his vast knowledge of the history of political thought and of the 
writings of the founding generation in general, Stourzh laid-out six criteria for 
defining republican government:  lack of heredity, plurality of voters, majority rule, 
representation38, rule of law, and government informed by the principle of virtue.  Of 
these, Stourzh argued that the first is the most undeniable criterion:  “From the rise of 
medieval communes and city-states to the present day, the absence of a heredit ry 
monarchy has been regarded as one, if not the single, distinguishing feature of 
republican government” (45).  For assessing Hamilton’s republican conviction based
upon this criterion, Stourzh made a three part argument.  First, he acknowledged that, 
especially at the Convention, Hamilton evidenced an “attachment to Great Britain’s 
mixed government, including its hereditary components, King and Lords.”  Second, 
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was justifiable.  Indeed, Madison himself understood well conventional definitions.  Prior to writing 




by implication, he suggested that it matters not what Hamilton’s professed 
convictions may have been; all that matters is that he did not “seriously envisage or 
think possible the introduction of hereditary elements into the Constitution of the 
United States.”  Third, as evidence supporting the second premise, he noted that the 
closest thing to the British mixed constitution that Hamilton ever proposed—a 
“sketch of a ‘high toned’ government including life tenure for the President as well as 
for the Senate”—was “put forward in the secrecy of the Federal Convention;” did not 
(even in Hamilton’s estimation) “have any real chance of being adopted;” and, by 
excluding hereditary elements, was, strictly speaking, republican (46).   
Considering how many subsequent scholars have deferred to this conclusion, 
it is somewhat surprising how thin the argument actually is.  I accept the first premise 
and reject the reasoning of the second and third.  The main reason to accept the first 
premise is that, as discussed above, Hamilton clearly stated this to be the case at the 
Federal Convention.  I’ll discuss further reasons for believing it below, but first we 
should turn to Stourzh’s second premise, which is the crucial part of his argument. 
The second and most essential premise of Stourzh’s argument is that we 
should not pay attention to Hamilton’s sincerest preference, but, rather, should 
consider only that which he thought was politically possible.  It seems to me that this 
is a mistaken starting point.  When characterizing a person’s constitutional vision, it 
makes little difference what she thinks is possible to achieve politically.  That 
Hamilton did not think it possible to introduce hereditary elements into the U.S. 
Constitution in 1787-88 does not mean he did not think it desirable or even necessary.  




in the world,” but also that he “doubt[ed] much whether anything short of it will do in 
America.”39  That he thought it both necessary and politically impossible did indeed 
complicate things for him, but I see no reason to privilege the latter fact over the 
former.   
This is the case especially if we consider that he seemed to think that it would 
someday be politically possible to Anglicize the American constitution.  This is 
supported by a statement he made a few moments later in the same speech.  Her  he
suggested that public opinion was slowly moving closer to his way of seeing things 
and that, by implication, he might one day be able to see his true preference come to 
fruition: 
I hope gentlemen of different opinions will bear with me in this, and 
beg them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which has 
taken place, and is still going on …. The members most tenacious of 
republicanism are as loud as any in declaiming against the vices of 
democracy. This progress of the public mind leads me to anticipate the 
time when others as well as myself will join in the praise bestowed by 
Mr. Neckar on the British constitution, namely, that “it is the only 
government in the world which unites public strength with individual 
security.” 
If Hamilton thought something close to the British constitution would one day 
be politically achievable in America, then we should not dismiss his admission that he 
thought this would be a welcome development.  It suggests, in fact, that we should 
entertain the possibility that Hamilton understood his task as a constitutional leader to 
require both saving America’s republican “experiment” from degeneration into 
democracy and anarchy while laying the groundwork—institutionally, socio-
economically, and culturally—for its eventual transition into something (he thought 
                                                




to be) much better.  If this is true, then Hamilton’s speech, far from being a “eulogy” 
of the British constitution, as Rahe argued (1994, 112-113), was in fact an attempt to 
sway elite opinion toward supporting his longer term objective of reviving the old 
constitution in America. 
It is for this reason that I also find the third prong of Stourzh’s argument 
unconvincing.  To point out that Hamilton’s proposal conformed to republican 
principles is merely to acknowledge that Hamilton faced insurmountable political 
obstacles to implementing hereditary monarchy in 1787-88.  Again, if we think 
sincere preferences are the most relevant consideration in characterizing a person’s 
constitutional commitments, then we should pay particular attention to that which he 
said and wrote in the secrecy of the Convention.  It is difficult to imagine a situation 
more likely to reveal true preferences.  His audience, after all, while not likely to be 
predisposed to think his vision wise, either in the ideal or political sense, was also not 
likely to use his statements to kindle fear and distrust of the Convention’s objectives 
and thereby undermine the constitutional reform that most of the delegates supported.  
Hamilton knew well that there were limits to what the Convention could seriously 
consider. Whatever they drafted would need to be acceptable to the great mass of
citizens.  They could not “shock the public opinion,” as he put it, and face the 
possibility of failing to ratify and thus remaining in the much worse status quo.   
It is important to consider that Hamilton believed a failure to ratify would 
have disastrous consequences.   For our purposes, the most important anticipated 




sparking the republican security dilemma.  For example, in a private memo40 he wrote 
to himself just prior to the ratification campaign, he stated that failure to ratify might 
“produce civil war” and “[s]hould this happen, whatever parties prevail, it is probable 
governments very different from the present in their principles will be established.”  
Even without civil war, a “dismemberment of the Union” would be likely and this 
would lead to “monarchies in different portions of it.”  In interpreting Hamilton, it is 
important to note that, with his peculiar terminology, by “monarchy” he normally 
meant pure monarchies or despotisms rather than a mixed regime like Great Britain’s.  
So, the implication here was that disunion would bring about the republican security 
dilemma, which would transform the States from republics to despotisms.   
A final problem with Stourzh’s argument is that he claimed not only that 
Hamilton’s proposal was for an executive to serve merely “on good behavior,” but 
also that “hereditary succession was not in his mind (Stourzh  1970, 52).”  The record 
shows, to the contrary, that hereditary monarchy clearly was on Hamilton’s mind.  In 
the speech he gave in proposing his plan, for example, he was full of praise for the 
institution.  Quite telling was this statement: 
As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could 
be established on republican principles. Was not this giving up the 
merits of the question; for can there be a good government without a 
good Executive? The English model was the only good one on this 
subject. The hereditary interest of the king was so interwoven with that 
of the nation, and his personal emolument so great, that he was placed 
above the danger of being corrupted from abroad, and, at the same 
time, was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled to 
answer the purpose of the institution at home.41 
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Even more telling is that in his notes for the part of his speech where he 
discussed his actual plan, he wrote (although refrained from actually saying aloud)
that the executive “ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power, that it will not 
be his interest to risk much to acquire more.”42 
Skeptical and Critical, But Not Subversive 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that Hamilton sought to subvert America’s 
experiment with the self-limiting republic—in the sense of conspiring to install a 
monarch or stage a coup—or even that he wanted to see it fail.  Many of his defenders 
seem to think this is the only alternative to affirming his republican faith.  Read’s 
(2000, 59-61) defense of Hamilton’s republicanism, for example, seems to be 
predicated upon the assumption that Hamilton had to be either a committed 
republican who supported America’s republican constitution or a monarchist who 
hoped for the republics’ failure: 
The fact that Hamilton had greater doubts than most of his 
contemporaries about the future prospects of republican government 
does not mean he wanted it to fail.  (Had he wanted it to fail, his 
efforts as treasury secretary to give a fledgling republican government 
secure fiscal foundations would have been counterproductive.) (ibid. 
59) 
The problem with this is that it ignores the possibility that Hamilton both 
feared that the republican government would fail andhoped (or thought necessary) 
that it could eventually become a constitutional monarchy.  If such is the case, it 
would be quite possible that he would pursue measures he thought would 
simultaneously help to prevent what he feared and promote, or at least not impede, 
the development of what he believed was most necessary.  His fiscal policies, to use 
                                                




Read’s example, would have the effect of increasing both national and executive 
power at the expense of the States, the Congress, and (indirectly) the people.  This, in 
his view, would both compensate for problems with pure federalism and 
republicanism and place the regime on a road to greater future augmentations of 
relative power by the national executive.  Moreover, he predicted that his policies 
would create a bifurcation in society between the few (rich and wellborn) and the 
many.  As he put it most forcefully at the New York Ratifying Convention: 
As riches increase and accumulate in few hands, as luxury prevails in 
society, virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful 
appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from 
the republican standard. This is the real disposition of human nature … 
It is a common misfortune that awaits our State constitution, as well as 
all others.43 
In his notes at the Constitution Convention he indicated that this would lead to 
the need, in order to prevent the republican violent death, for not only a bicameral 
legislature, with the few permanently separated (i.e. insulated by hereditary 
succession) from the many, but also “a mutual check.”  This check, he wrote, “is a 
monarch.”44  In other words, he thought his policies were not only about propping the 
republic; he also thought that, in the long run, they would heighten the need for a non-
republican mixed constitution. 
Another way to put this is that Hamilton accepted the orthodox view of Hume 
and Montesquieu, that all regimes are in motion toward either the extreme of purer 
republicanism—and thus the threat of anarchy and then despotism—or toward 
absolute monarchy.  The question, then, was in which direction along the continuum 
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America was to move.  If Hamilton accepted Hume’s and Montesquieu’s assessment 
that the British constitution was the best model of durable liberty, then he would have 
good reason to seek to push the regime in that direction, especially if bought into the 
idea of the republican violent death.  By this reasoning, Hamilton would have had a 
clear sense that the Constitution of 1788 represented movement in the right 
direction—away from pure republican and toward the mixed constitution—by 
introducing much-needed proto-monarchical/aristocratical elements in the form of the 
President, Senate, and Supreme Court.  However, in his judgment, it was far from 
complete.  The Constitution was still wholly popular and, thus, excessively 
democratic and deficiently aristocratic and monarchical.  The Constitution was still 
out of balance.  Although he thought there was much progress to be made, he 
certainly did not want to risk moving in the opposite direction, which, in his view, 
was the likely result of the failure of the republican Constitution. 
Hamilton’s Problematic Disavowals 
Another reason to trust Hamilton’s statements from the Convention is that his 
disavowals after the fact often included demonstrable falsehoods, thus calling into 
question his sincerity and indicating he knew he had something to hide; were actually 
quite modest in their endorsement of republicanism; and were silent on the demerits 
of the British constitution.  It is important to note that Hamilton had public spirited 
reasons for being less than genuine in his disavowals.  One of his overriding fears, 
even after ratification, was that insufficient energy in the national government would 
create anarchy or disunion.  If Jefferson’s account can be trusted, Hamilton allegedly 
told him in the early 1790s that “I own it is my own opinion, though I do not publish 




ends of society, by giving stability & protection to it’s rights, and that it will probably 
be found expedient to go into the British form.”45  He said this as he was explaining 
why he disapproved of John Adams’ publication of Discourses on Davila, which 
lauded certain aspects of the British constitution.  Hamilton criticized Adams’ 
decision to publish the work because it might undermine the Americans’ attempt to 
demonstrate that republican government “can be obtained consistently with order.”  
Consequently, “whoever by his writings disturbs the present order of things, is really 
blameable, however pure his intentions may be.”  In other words, Hamilton thought it 
was irresponsible to publicly express admiration for the British constitution because it 
could incite the disorder (1) to which he suspected all republican governments were 
susceptible and (2) that he privately suspected only the British constitution provided 
an adequate remedy.  Thus, Hamilton’s fears of the republican security dilemma and 
of the republican violent death both led him to believe the British constitution was 
necessary for preserving American liberty and to be unwilling to publicly express that 
belief!  This is one reason why he would have felt justified distorting the record from 
the Convention. 
In five surviving documents—two private letters, an internal governmental 
memo, and two party paper essays—Hamilton defended his republican credentials 
against charges that he and perhaps the Federalist Party sought to lead the new 
republic toward the British form of government.46  Some of his responses were 
simply fallacious, such as when he wrote in the “Amicus” essay (1792) that the claim 
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that he “opposed the Constitution in the Grand Convention, because it was too 
republican, and advocated the British monarchy as the perfect standard” was “a 
gross misrepresentation” since he, after all, was “the only member from the State to 
which he belonged who signed the Constitution.”  All the evidence, of course, from 
his notes and the transcripts by both Madison and Yates, suggests that the accusation 
was in fact accurate, except for the relatively minor point that he “supported the 
Constitution” in the sense of voting for it.  As was discussed above, however, that he 
voted for (and wished well the success of) the Constitution is perfectly compatible 
with his having thought it fell well short of “the perfect standard.” 
Also unpersuasive were his arguments that he “never made a proposition to 
the Convention which was not conformable to the republican theory” and that “the 
highest-toned of any of the propositions made by him was actually voted for by the 
representation of several States.”47  The problem with this is that his “highest toned” 
statements on behalf of the Anglican and against the proposed Constitution were not 
part of his formal proposal.  So while it is technically true that he did not officially 
propose anything inconsistent with “the republican theory,” it does not mean he 
didn’t make many statements denouncing that theory nor, indeed, that he did not 
admit “himself not to think favorably of republican government.” 
Hamilton offered a more subtle distortion in his letter to Timothy Pickering of 
September 18, 1803.  Here he argued that his proposed plan 
was predicated upon these bases: 1. That the political principles of the 
people of this country would endure nothing but republican 
government. 2. That in the actual situation of the country, it was in 
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itself right and proper that the republican theory should have a fair and 
full trial. 3. That to such a trial it was essential that the government 
should be so constructed as to give all the energy and stability 
reconcilable with the principles of that theory. 
The first assertion is merely a restatement of what we have already 
established:  Hamilton well understood that any proposal that deviated from 
republican principles could not be ratified.  The second assertion, however, insofar as 
by “in itself right and proper” he meant “desirable or necessary” for America, 
contradicts the thrust of what he actually said at the Convention.  There he argued 
plainly and vehemently that while the people were too prejudiced against monarchy 
to accept anything other than a republican constitution, he himself “doubt[ed] much 
whether anything short of [the British constitution] will do in America.”  More 
importantly, it is noteworthy that in this statement he does not claim that his political 
principles will “endure nothing but republican government.” 
In fact, the second and third propositions reflect a common theme in all of his 
statements wherein he disavowed his alleged anti-republican views.  Hamilton 
consistently spoke of republicanism as a metaphorical defendant on trial and/or a 
theory or hypothesis to be tested in the laboratory of North America.48  His attitude 
was not exactly that of a detached observer, but rather more that of either a judge
maintaining order and procedural fairness in the court or a scientist attempting to 
carefully control the conditions of experimentation.  Like a good judge upholding the 
due process rights of the accused, or a good scientist employing the Cartesian m thod 
of methodological doubt, Hamilton withheld judgment about republican government 
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until all the facts were in.  “Whatever might be his theoretic doubts,” he wrote of 
himself anonymously in the third person in 1792, he believed republican government 
“merited his best efforts to give success to it in practice … [and] that hitherto, from 
an incompetent structure of the government, it had not had a fair trial, and that the 
endeavor ought then to be to secure to it a better chance of success by a government 
more capable of energy and order.”49 
This skeptical, scientific, juridical posture—however sincere it may have 
actually been—helped Hamilton to turn the tides against his opponents and claim he 
was the best friend of republican government in America (without disavowing 
support for the British constitution) while the self-proclaimed “Republicans” were its 
true enemies.  It just so happened that, as the last quote above hints toward, the 
factors required for giving republican government a fair trial (or properly controlled 
experiment) were the very factors neglected by the Americans’ insufficient inclusion 
of aristocratic and monarchical elements in their Constitution:  energy, order, 
stability, firmness, durability, efficiency, permanence, and wisdom.  As he told 
Pickering, a “fair trial” for the “republican theory” would be one where the 
“government [is] so constructed as to give all the energy and stability reconcilable 
with the principles of that theory.”  The great thing about this, of course, is that is 
failsafe for someone who favors the balanced constitution:  If the republic fails under 
these controlled conditions, the good news is that those very conditions (strength and 
independence in the President, Senate, and Judiciary) are a step in the right direction 
toward a constitutional monarchy. 
                                                




If there is any doubt that Hamilton continued to hold the Anglican constitution 
up as his yardstick of good government, one should take notice of the language he 
used when admitting to Carrington that he harbored doubts about the future success 
of the “republican theory:” 
I said that I was affectionately attached to the republican theory. This 
is the real language of my heart, which I open to you in the sincerity of 
friendship; and I add that I have strong hopes of the success of that 
theory; but, in candor, I ought also to add that I am far from being 
without doubts. I consider its success as yet a problem. It is yet to be 
determined by experience whether it be consistent with that stability 
and order in government which are essential to public strength and 
private security and happiness.50 
The trial of the republic, in other words, was a question of whether it would 
meet the high standard of Neckar’s assessment of the British government that 
Hamilton quoted at the Convention:  that “it is the only government in the world 
which unites public strength with individual security.” 
The flipside of this was that those who threatened to disrupt order by rallying 
public fear against the policies of the government, or whose policies were intnded to 
diminish the constitutional energy and firmness of the government, were standing in 
the way of a fair trial for republican government.  “The truth unquestionably is,” he 
wrote in a memo,  
that the only path to a subversion of the republican system of the 
country is by flattering the prejudices of the people, and exciting their 
jealousies and apprehensions, to throw affairs into confusion, and 
bring on civil commotion. Tired at length of anarchy or want of 
government, they may take shelter in the arms of monarchy for repose 
and security.51 
Similarly, to Carrington he wrote: 
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On the whole, the only enemy which Republicanism has to fear in this 
country is in the spirit of faction and anarchy. If this will not permit 
the ends of government to be attained under it, if it engenders 
disorders in the community, all regular and orderly minds will wish for 
a change, and the demagogues who have produced the disorder will 
make it for their own aggrandizement. This is the old story. If I were 
disposed to promote monarchy and overthrow State governments, I 
would mount the hobby-horse of popularity; I would cry out 
"usurpation," "danger to liberty," etc., etc.; I would endeavor to 
prostrate the national government, raise a ferment, and then "ride in 
the whirlwind, and direct the storm."52 
In other words, Hamilton assessed the politics of the 1790s through an 
orthodox understanding of the republican violent death.  Criticizing the Washington 
Administration ran the risk of undermining the authority of the national government, 
which could disenable that government from preventing the regime from slipping into 
anarchy, disorder, and, eventually, “monarchy.”53  This should not be dismissed as a 
mere rationalization for purely partisan motives.  As the discussion above of his 
condemnation of John Adam’s Discourses on Davila suggests, Hamilton was capable 
of criticizing members of his own party for making public statements that could alarm 
the people and potentially ignite the republican violent death. 
Comparison with Madison Based on Passages Discovere d 
Through Targeted Searching of their Complete Works 
So far this revisionist interpretation of Hamilton’s constitutional ideas and 
intentions has been based on applying different assumptions toward the interpretation 
of a relatively small collection of documents.  In this section I report the most 
relevant results from my effort to apply those assumptions toward a large set of 
textual passages discovered through targeted searching of Hamilton’s and Madison’s 
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complete works.  Four findings in particular are highlighted:  (1) key differences i  
how they discussed and proposed resolving the republican violent death; (2) 
Hamilton’s propensity to distinguish between “free” and “republican” governments, 
which suggests (a) that he held to the older (pre-Revolutionary) idea that monarchical 
governments can be free and that (b) he sought to subtly lead public opinion back to 
the older way of thinking; (3) the fact that Hamilton, unlike Madison, apparently did 
not associate republicanism with the principles of the Revolution; and, finally, (4) 
opposite propensities between the two in statements they made pertaining to the 
relative superiority of republican vs. monarchical governments. 
The Cure for The Anarchy – Violent Death Problem 
Madison:  Non-Executive Cures 
One of the most interesting and pertinent differences between Hamilton and 
Madison was in how they discussed and proposed resolving the republican “violent 
death” problem.  Both of them incessantly repeated their fear that both too much and 
too little “power” will eventually lead to despotism.  However, Madison, unlike 
Hamilton, always spoke of this need for “power” in the context of arguing for a firm 
Senate, not a firm executive.  This statement, for example, is representative of his 
general tendency:: 
A Senate for six years will not be dangerous to liberty, on the contrary 
it will be one of its best guardians. By correcting the infirmities of 
popular Government, it will prevent that disgust agst that form which 
may otherwise produce a sudden transition to some very different one. 
It is no secret to any attentive & dispassionate observer of ye pol: 
situation of ye U. S., that the real danger to republican liberty has 
lurked in that cause.54 
                                                




Moreover, in the many other instances when he spoke of the danger of faction 
leading to despotism, he sought the cure, not in “power” but in his well-known 
endorsement of the complementing mechanisms of an extended sphere (muffling the 
violence of faction) and the natural aristocratic “filter” of representation.  Overall, his 
emphasis was upon preventing factional violence by preventing unjust, mutable, and 
imprudent legislation.  This was intended to prevent the need for coercion to repress 
the threat that the spirited group conflicts that are a necessary consequence of liberty 
(see Federalist 10 and 51) will degenerate into violence, anarchy, and then 
despotism. 
Madison on the “Energy” vs. “Stability” Distinction 
This tendency corresponded with a distinction he consistently made between 
“energy” and “stability.”  Madison associated “energy” with the executive and 
“stability” with legislation.  When he spoke of instability threatening anarchy and 
then despotism, he thus looked for a preventive cure through stability in legislation. 
Madison’s tendency to distinguish energy in the executive from stability in the 
legislature was evident in Federalist 41, where he stated “Among the difficulties 
encountered by the convention, a very important one must have lain in combining the 
requisite stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to 
liberty and to the republican form.”  Then when he specified the (apparent) requisites 
for liberty and republicanism (popular control, short duration, and plurality in the 
executive), he specified the requisites of “stability” and “energy” in the following 
way:  
Stability … requires that the hands in which power is lodged should 
continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will 




measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in government 
requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by 
a single hand. 
In a letter to Jefferson describing the work of the Convention, he made this 
association explicit:  “This ground-work being laid, the great objects which presented 
themselves were 1. to unite a proper energy in the Executive, and a proper stability in 
the Legislative departments, with the essential characters of Republican 
Government.”55 
When the First Congress debated the removal power, Madison made it clear 
that stability in the executive branch was antithetical to a proper functioning 
republican government.  Requiring Senate approval for removal, would, he argued,  
give a stability to the Executive department … which is more 
incompatible with the genius of republican Governments in general, 
and this Constitution in particular, than any doctrine which has yet 
been proposed. The danger to liberty, the danger of mal-
administration, has not yet been found to lie so much in the facility of 
introducing improper persons into office, as in the difficulty of 
displacing those who are unworthy of the public trust. If it is said that 
an officer once appointed shall not be displaced without the formality 
required by impeachment, I shall be glad to know what security we 
have for the faithful administration of the Government?  Every 
individual, in the long chain which extends from the highest to the 
lowest link of the Executive Magistracy, would find a security in his 
situation which would relax his fidelity and promptitude in the 
discharge of his duty.56 
It should be added that, when he spoke of the “highest” vs. “lowest” link, he 
specified later that it was “the people” that he thought of as the ultimate authority: 
Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the President, and you 
abolish at once that great principle of unity and responsibility in the 
Executive department, which was intended for the security of liberty 
and the public good. If the President should possess alone the power of 
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removal from office, those who are employed in the execution of the 
law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be 
preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will 
depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the 
community. The chain of dependence therefore terminates in the 
supreme body, namely, in the people, who will possess, besides, in aid 
of their original power, the decisive engine of impeachment.57 
Hamilton: The Executive Cure 
Hamilton, by contrast, while also favoring “stability” in legislation as part of 
the cure for the problem of republican violent death, typically considered this as a 
secondary measure to the primary need for “energy”  and “stability” in the executive.  
Indeed, throughout his writings Hamilton evidenced a belief that the principal cure 
for the threat of faction in a free government was executive “counterpoise” (to use De 
Lolme’s phrase).  As we saw above, for example, one of Hamilton’s most common 
arguments was that the republican “experiment” could be given a “fair trial” only if 
given “a better chance of success by a government more capable of energy and 
order.”58 
Most famously, in Federalist 1, for example, he argued 
that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask 
of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding 
appearances of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. 
History will teach us, that the former has been found a much more 
certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter. 
Similarly, in one of his anonymous pamphlet defenses in the 1790s, he wrote, 
I mistake him, if his [i.e. Hamilton’s] measures proceeding upon the 
ground of a liberal and efficient exercise of the powers of the national 
government, have had any other object than to give it stability and 
duration: the only solid and rational expedient for preserving 
republican government in the United States.  It has been pertinently 
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remarked by a judicious writer, that Caesar, who overturned the 
republic, was the Whig, Cato, who died for it, the Tory, of Rome. 
Most important of all, however, was this famous statement in #70: 
Energy in the executive is essential to the protection of the community 
against foreign attacks: it is not less essential to the steady 
administration of the laws… to the protection of property against those 
irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the 
ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the 
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.  Every 
man, the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that 
republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single 
man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues 
of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions 
of whole classes of the community, whose conduct threatened the 
existence of all government, as against the invasions of external 
enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome. 
The relevance of this passage is not that he was promoting the Roman dictatorship.  
Hamilton never expressed admiration for that institution, and for understandable 
reasons.  Ever since Locke’s (1978) defense of the prerogative power, the 
conventional understanding had been that the institution most fit for the emergency 
function was the British monarch.  As will be noted in the next chapter, this was a 
shrewd rhetorical move by Hamilton.  After all, the standard treatises on government 
typically associated this list of functions with the British monarch, and so his reade  
would have been expecting a different example at that point in the paragraph.  This 
explains the awkwardness of the paragraph.  Why else would he employ the dictator 
when the beginning of the paragraph made a point of highlighting the “steady 
administration of the laws,” which seemed like a different connotation for “energy” 
than Madison had implied in #41, was associated with the administrative apparatus of 




“Not Only Republican, but All Free Governments” 
Another pertinent discovery from my distant reading was that Hamilton often 
made a point of distinguishing between, on the one hand, “free government” or “the 
principles of civil liberty,” and “republican government,” on the other, at times where 
it was not in his narrow political self-interest to do so.  I take this as evidence of his 
effort at long-term opinion leadership.  Consider, for example, his draft for 
Washington’s Farewell Address where he wrote  
T is essentially true that virtue or morality is a main and necessary 
spring of popular or republican governments. The rule, indeed, 
extends with more or less force to all free governments. Who that is a 
prudent and sincere friend to them, can look with indifference on the 
ravages which are making in the foundation of the fabric…? (emphasis 
added) 
Washington was wise enough to alter this statement so that it did not imply he was
contrasting “republican governments” to the leading alternative model of the day: 
It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of 
popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force 
to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it 
can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of 
the fabric? (emphasis added) 
Also, in Federalist 9, he subtly nodded to the conventional wisdom that the 
British model was superior to republics for securing durable liberty.  There he wrote:
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics, the 
advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the 
forms of republican government, but against the very principles of 
civil liberty. They have decried all free government, as inconsistent 
with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious 
exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, 
stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have 





Whereas Madison would attempt to distinguish “republican” from 
“democratic” governments in the next essay, in this one Hamilton followed 
Montesquieu (whom he quoted extensively in that essay) in distinguishing between 
republics, other “free governments,” and despotism.   
The Principles of the Revolution 
I noticed in my distant reading that Madison frequently insisted that 
abolishing monarchy was a core principle of the revolution.  This prompted me to 
search all paragraphs where “principle*” and “revolution*” co-occurred.  I found that 
Madison never implied otherwise, that Hamilton never implied that it did, and that at 
least once he implied that it was not about the abolition of monarchy. 
Madison’s best known statement espousing this view was in Federalist 39, 
where he wrote: 
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and 
aspect of the government be strictly republican? It is evident that no 
other form would be reconcileable with the genius of the people of 
America; with the fundamental principles of the revolution; or with 
that honourable determination which animates every votary of 
freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of 
mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, 
be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must 
abandon it as no longer defensible. 
Of course, Hamilton poured cold water on this claim in #70 by stating: 
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous 
executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. 
The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at 
least hope, that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they 
can never admit its truth, without, at the same time, admitting the 
condemnation of their own principles. . . . A feeble executive implies a 
feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another 
phrase for a bad execution: and a government ill executed, whatever it 




It is also important to compare Madison’s statement to Hamilton’s disavowals 
discussed above.  Hamilton’s typical refrain was that the his proposed plan 
was predicated upon these bases: 1. That the political principles of the 
people of this country would endure nothing but republican 
government. 2. That in the actual situation of the country, it was in 
itself right and proper that the republican theory should have a fair and 
full trial. 3. That to such a trial it was essential that the government 
should be so constructed as to give all the energy and stability 
reconcilable with the principles of that theory. 
The people’s political principles, not his would only endure republican government.  
While he often declared himself a well-wisher of republican government, Hamilton 
never went so far as to declare it as one of his principles, nor as the true principle 
fought for in the Revolution. 
Hamilton was not unlike the other members of his generation when, in a pre-
1776  pre-revolutionary essay, he felt compelled to defend himself against the charge 
that his espoused principle that receiving law without representation violated his 
natural right to liberty was a republican principle (and thus treasonous).  “I am a 
warm advocate for limited monarchy,” he declared in The Farmer Refuted (1775), 
“and an unfeigned well-wisher to the present Royal Family.”  Going further, he 
wrote: 
You are mistaken when you confine arbitrary government to a 
monarchy. It is not the supreme power being placed in one, instead of 
many, that discriminates an arbitrary from a free government. When 
any people are ruled by laws, in framing which they have no part, that 
are to bind them, to all intents and purposes, without, in the same 
manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are, in the strictest 
sense, slaves; and the government, with respect to them, is despotic.  
Great Britain is itself a free country, but it is only so because its 
inhabitants have a share in the legislature. If they were once divested 
of that they would cease to be free. So that, if its jurisdiction be 
extended over other countries that have no actual share in its 




those checks and controls which constitute that moral security which is 
the very essence of civil liberty. 
However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the publication of Paine’s 
Common Sense and Jefferson’s “Declaration” firmly established in the minds of most 
Americans that the Revolution was a republican revolution.  It is therefore 
noteworthy that in one of his few statements post-war where he discussed the 
principles of the revolution, he declared precisely the same principle he had arguein 
1775 (note: the italics are his, not mine): 
A share in the sovereignty of the State … is that right by which we 
exist a free people; and it certainly, therefore, will never be admitted, 
that less ceremony ought to be used in divesting any citizen of that 
right than in depriving him of his property. Such a doctrine would ill 
suit the principles of the Revolution, which taught the inhabitants of 
this country to risk their lives and fortunes in asserting their libe ty; or, 
in other words, their ight to a share in the government.59 
The upshot is that there is no evidence that he ever accepted the anti-
monarchical meaning of the revolution provided by Thomas Paine. 
Prudential Arguments on the Relative Superiority of  Republican 
vs. Monarchical Governments 
A final bit of evidence supporting this thesis is a stark asymmetry in the types 
of prudential arguments Hamilton and Madison made regarding the relative 
advantages of republics vs. monarchical governments.  One salient finding is that 
Hamilton never gave an explicit reason for believing republics are inherently more 
just than monarchies, while Madison often repeated various versions of the following 
claim: 
The difference so far as it relates to the superiority of republics over 
monarchies, lies in the less degree of probability that interest may 
                                                




prompt more abuses of power in the former than in the latter; and in 
the security in the former agst an oppression of more than the smaller 
part of the Society, whereas in [monarchies] it may be extended in a 
manner to the whole.60 
Similarly, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5, Madison came to believe 
that the extended federal republic was not only more conducive to liberty and justice
than monarchies, but also that it facilitated better governance due to its capacity to 
mobilize information.  This quote is his most concise statement representing tha 
belief: 
In monarchies there is a two-fold danger—1st, That the eyes of a good 
prince cannot see all that he ought to know—2d, That the hands of a 
bad one will not be tied by the fear of combinations against him. Both 
of these evils increase with the extent of dominion; and prove, contrary 
to the received opinion, that monarchy is even more unfit for a great 
state, than for a small one, notwithstanding the greater tendency in the 
former to that species of government.61 
For his part, Hamilton exhibited precisely the opposite tendency.  For 
example, he frequently offered reasons to believe monarchies (of the British mold) 
facilitate free government by creating a balanced tension monarchical power and 
vigilant party opposition.  Consider, for example, this statement from his draft of 
Washington’s Farewell Address: 
There is an opinion that parties in free countries are salutary checks 
upon the administration of the government, and serve to invigorate the 
spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is true; and in governments 
of a monarchical character or bias, patriotism may look with some 
favor on the spirit of party. But in those of the popular kind, in those 
purely elective, it is a spirit not to be fostered or encouraged.62 
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This, of course, was essentially an admission that he believed the British 
balanced constitution was proven model for preserving durable liberty from 
succumbing to the republican violent death.   
Also unlike Madison, Hamilton expressed the belief that a monarchical 
national government would be superior for cementing the union. 
No man, I believe, but will think it probable, however disadvantageous 
the change in other respects, that a monarchical government, from its 
superior force, would ensure more effectually than our present form 
our permanent unity as a nation…63 
In addition to this, his most frequent criticism of republics was that they are 
more susceptible than monarchies to foreign corruption.  This statement is 
representative of what appears to have been one of Hamilton’s gravest worries:  
“Foreign influence is truly the Grecian horse to a republic. We cannot be too careful 
to exclude its entrance.”64 
Conclusion 
Hamilton has been aptly described as “America’s most elusive founding 
father” (Ambrose and Martin  2006).  In this chapter, I have argued that the reasons 
Hamilton believed the Americans needed a hereditary executive in order to preserve 
liberty—his fears of the republican violent death and the republican security 
dilemma—also help explain why the centrality of this belief to Hamilton’s political 
views has eluded contemporary scholars.  I have presented evidence that suggests
Hamilton feared inadequate national executive authority could result in disunion (and 
thus the republican security dilemma between the States) and/or an outbreak of 
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factional violence that would lead to anarchy (and thus the republican violent death.)  
Since Hamilton was, as he once claimed, “as zealous an advocate of liberty as any 
man whatever,”65 he feared that each process would result in despotic, as opposed to 
limited and balanced, monarchical power.  Hamilton, unlike Madison, always looked 
to strong executive power to prevent disunion and the degeneration of the republic 
into anarchy.  At various times, moreover, he explicitly admitted that he thought only 
a hereditary executive could provide adequate preventive medicine for those 
republican diseases.  However, he also admitted that he was reluctant to speak 
publicly about this belief because he feared doing so al  could spark anarchy and 
disunion by inflaming the citizens’ fears and hatreds of monarchy and by 
undermining their confidence in the national government.  Therefore, Hamilton’s 
fears of the republican security dilemma and republican violent death also explain 
why his monarchism has eluded scholars:  he was careful not to explicitly admit this 
belief in his public writings and speeches. 
Nevertheless, he apparently did not always resist the temptation to speak 
candidly about his belief in monarchism and thus statements scattered throughout his 
collected writings provide the evidence upon which I have based this revisionist 
interpretation.  The argument developed in this chapter was supported in part by 
defending the assumption that his statements in the privacy of the Federal Convention 
are a more reliable indicator of his genuine views than contradictory statements he 
made later.  I also supplemented a careful reading of those statements with a 
comparative interpretation of pertinent text passages discovered through targeted 
                                                




searches of Hamilton’s and Madison’s digitized collected writings.  Paying close
attention to this evidence suggests that Madison was certainly justified in believing 
Hamilton harbored monarchical principles and intentions.  Not only did he believe, 
unlike Madison, that monarchy was necessary for preventing the republican security 
dilemma and republican violent death, he also apparently did not share Madison’s 
belief that the Revolution was based on a principled rejection of monarchy.  
Moreover, Hamilton’s Convention statements reveal that he believed monarchy 
would become increasingly necessary as the United States developed into the modern 
industrial fiscal-military power he would seek to build as Treasury Secretary.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, at the Convention and elsewhere he expressed the 
hopeful belief that public opinion was becoming more accepting of a return to the 
British constitution.   
The latter point deserves special emphasis, for it is a critical element in my 
argument that Hamilton actively sought to lead the regime toward a monarchical 
executive.  The fact that he expressed a hope that the people could one day agree with 
his way of thinking would have given Hamilton reason to seek to gently nudge public 
opinion in that direction.  This chapter provided preliminary evidence that Hamilton 
did indeed engage in this form of opinion leadership.  At times, it will be recalled, he 
seems to have gone out of his way to draw a clear distinction between “free” and 
“republican” governments as though he was seeking to remind his audience that, 
contra Paine, the British model was also conducive to liberty.  The next chapter 
argues that Hamilton used his Federalist essays on executive power not only to win 




power was superior to the republican model proposed in the Constitution.  It also 
reinforces the argument developed in this chapter, which is that Madison was correct 
that his and Hamilton’s primary basis of disagreement was over monarchical vs. 





Chapter 4: Selling the Monarchical Executive: A 
Reinterpretation of Hamilton’s Theory of Executive Power and 
Federalist Essays on the Presidency, Considered in Contrast to 
Madison’s and Jefferson’s Theory of the Energetic Republican 
Executive 
 
To fully assess Madison’s belief that his and Hamilton’s disagreement was 
fundamentally over monarchical vs. republican principles and intentions, it is 
necessary to closely consider their respective views on the proper structure and 
purpose of executive power.  After all, the British constitution placed the executive 
power firmly in the hands of the monarch, and the leading justifications for that 
constitution argued that a strong monarchical executive was essential for prese ving 
liberty amid the twin threats of the republican security dilemma and republican 
violent death.  Although we have already encountered strong evidence that indicates 
Hamilton agreed with, and Madison rejected, this conventional wisdom of 18th 
century political science, we have not fully established the theoretical basis of th  
difference between the two founders.  More specifically, we have not determined why 
Hamilton believed a hereditary monarch was structurally superior to a republican 
executive and we have not considered the role and structure Madison envisaged for 
this vital function of the constitution.  Finally, the case has not yet been fully 
developed that Hamilton engaged in opinion leadership to lead the regime on a 
developmental path toward monarchy.  This chapter fills-in these missing pieces of 




This chapter is structured as a commentary on Hamilton’s Federalist essays 
on the Presidency (#67-77), but it differs from previous readings66 in three respects.  
First, the commentary is framed to focus on how Hamilton’s views on the proper 
structure of executive power compared and contrasted with those of Madison and 
Jefferson.  Jefferson is brought into this discussion for three reasons.  First, Jefferson 
simply wrote more about executive power than did Madison.  Second, since Madison 
seems to have agreed with the essential elements of Jefferson’s theory of executiv  
power, we can safely infer Madison’s unstated positions by looking to Jefferson.  
Finally, bringing Jefferson into the discussion allows us to complete the revisionist 
work recently begun by Jeremy Bailey (2007).  Bailey has argued persuasively that 
Jefferson, contrary to conventional opinion, favored a strong unitary executive.  This 
study is indebted to Bailey’s interpretation, but it seeks to answer an important 
question that Bailey’s work leaves unresolved.  If Jefferson and Madison, like 
Hamilton, favored a strong unitary executive, then what distinguished their views on 
executive power from Hamilton’s? 
The second reason this commentary differs from previous ones is that it seeks 
to give an account of Hamilton’s genuine views on executive power as distinguished 
from that which he might have wrote in the F deralist for rhetorical reasons.  I do this 
by comparing his arguments in the F deralist with the arguments he made in other 
contexts, especially the Federal Convention, where he was more likely to express his 
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genuine views.  In this respect, this commentary builds upon the foundation laid in 
the previous chapter. 
Finally, third, I seek to demonstrate that Hamilton’s “rhetoric” was intended 
for something more than merely winning ratification.  I try to establish that the 
deviations between what he wrote in these essays and what I argue to be his genuine
views are best explained as part of his long-term effort to lead the regime in a more 
monarchical rather than more republican direction.  He sought to do this in two ways.  
First, he offered arguments that strongly implied that the proposed President was 
dangerous rather than conducive to liberty and the public good because it was much 
too popular in constitution.  He had to be subtle about this, however, because he did 
not want to play into the Anti-Federalist’s hands and thereby risk failure at 
ratification.  His second tact was much more failsafe because it involved flattring he 
republican prejudice of his audience in order to imbue one of the least republican 
elements of the Constitution, the perpetual re-eligibility of the President, with a 
republican justification.  I base this judgment on the facts that the tone and thrust of 
his argument for re-eligibility (#72) contradicted that of his previous essay (#71), and 
that the latter, rather than the former, conformed to the views expressed elsewhere 
that I take to be more reflective of his genuine beliefs.  Moreover, prevailing (Whig) 
theory at the time, as expressed by Jefferson, suggested that re-eligibility, wha ever 
its merits (especially when in the hands of Washington), ran the risk of the office 
evolving into a hereditary institution (once Washington retired.)  This strategy was 
“failsafe,” not only because it assisted rather than jeopardized ratification, but also 




standards of conduct by the officeholder, which Hamilton certainly hoped, though 
doubted, would be the case before the more reliable hereditary alternative evolved. 
This chapter is thus also a response to Epstein (2007), who, in his excellent 
study of the Federalist, argued that the work 
seems to doubt the feasibility and even the desirability of quieting 
men’s political impulses.  The Federalist rejects Hobbesian absolute 
monarchy, but it also departs from other liberal predecessors who 
defined limited or mixed monarchy. Even if Locke and Montesquieu 
were correct in thinking that a mixed government like England’s could 
secure men’s safety and protect men’s interests, such a government 
offends the spirit of political self-assertion which the Federalist 
recognizes and even admirers. The Federalist’s attachment to ‘wholly 
popular’ government, even if a bow to prejudice, is a theoretically self-
conscious bow; that is, the popular prejudice for popular government 
is not a circumstance which prevents action according to theory, but is 
a manifestation of a fact of political life which theory can understand.  
(p 7) 
I argue, to the contrary, that Hamilton’s essays are only a limited bow to 
prejudice. His arguments logically push toward acceptance of the British balanced 
constitution as well as toward the proposed Constitution.  Needing ratification, he 
bowed a bit to prejudice, but as his long-term aspiration was for the constitution to 
become more monarchical, he took the Federalist as an opportunity to lead public 
opinion gently toward greater acceptance of the British model.  Madison’s essays 
may be a different story, but that will have to wait for another project. 
Defending the Republican Character of the Proposed 
Executive: #67& 69 
Hamilton began his defense of the Presidency in Federalist #67 by lambasting 
its critics who sought to manipulate “the aversion of the people to monarchy” and 
mislead them into viewing the institution “not merely as the embryo, but as the full-




“detestable,” but only something “detested” by “the people.”  And he did not express 
indignation at the suggestion that the Convention might have liked to propose a 
monarchy; his outrage was only at the Anti-federalist’s demagogic practice of 
dishonestly stirring-up the people’s (not his) jealous disdain for monarchy to attain 
their objectives. 
It is not clear, from this passage alone, whether Hamilton thought or hoped the 
proposed executive would be “an embryo” of monarchy, but he did make it clear that 
he believed it was far from being the “full-grown progeny.”  In #69 he explained 
exactly why this is.  The “real character of the proposed executive” consisted in its 
being popular and limited and thus republican and constitutional.  It was significantly 
more limited in formal power than the British monarch and, unlike that detested 
institution, the proposed President would be held accountable to the people through 
regular election, subject to impeachment, and, afterward, “liable to prosecution and 
punishment in the ordinary course of law.”  Of course, only the popular electoral 
element rendered the executive republican.  The limitations on the executive’s formal 
powers, and his liability to impeachment and arrest, could at least in principle be 
incorporated within a constitutional monarchical framework.  They were neverth less 
conducive to the security from arbitrary executive power that republicans seek. 
The net effect of these two essays was to establish, as a matter of taxonomy, 
that the proposed president was in fact republican and much more limited in its 
constitutional powers, privileges, and immunities than the British monarch.  Notably 




monarchial executive, and negative arguments denouncing the intrinsic worth of a 
monarchical alternative. 
Why the Electoral College was an “Excellent” Mode o f 
Selection: #68 
The first opportunity for this came in the middle essay, # 68, where he made 
the mode of electing the president his topic of focus.  Although he praised this aspect 
of the institution’s design—“If the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least 
excellent”—his analysis was hardly amounted to a ringing endorsement of the 
republican element in the procedure for executive selection.  While stating that “It
was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to 
whom so important a trust was to be confided,” he did not say why this was 
desirable—desirable for the regime? or desirable for assuring ratification?—and he 
demonstrated no embarrassment over the fact that “the sense of the people” would 
operate only in the selection of other “men most capable of analyzing the qualities 
adapted to the station.”  (As will be made clear from the discussion below, Hamilton 
will imply later that a hereditary magistrate would be preferable.)  His formal 
proposal at the Convention, however, was similar to the Electoral College of 1788, 
which suggested that he found something intrinsically, not just politically, worthy, 
about the latter, even if it was not the best in his view.  Just like the proposed 
President, the chief magistrate under Hamilton’s Convention proposal would not be 
selected by the national legislature.  His proposal differed only in that there would be 
two, rather than one, set of electors, and he would have mandated property 




legislatures.  However, on the crucial issue of popular vs. legislative selection, 
Hamilton’s plan was in agreement with the Constitution’s.   
Jefferson and Madison also preferred some form of “popular” election to 
dependence upon the national legislature.  Madison’s Virginia Plan had actually 
called for a unitary executive selected by the Senate and limited to a single seven year 
term.  However, this was not the product of serious reflection:  he admitted to 
Washington soon before the Convention that the executive was one institution to 
which he had put little thought.67  Especially after the Great Compromise turned the 
Senate into something very different from what he had envisioned, Madison became a 
proponent for direct election (eventually the Electoral College) rather than 
dependence on the Congress.  However, the Virginians differed from Hamilton on 
how popular they thought it should be.  Although they would not object to the 
Electoral College in 1787-88—for it was more conducive to the functional separation 
of powers than legislative selection—they would come to champion the 12th 
Amendment for allowing the President to be more directly selected by a national 
majority.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Madison endorsed the idea of a chain of 
accountability running from the community at the top, to the community’s executive 
agent (the President), on down to the President’s appointed officers.  Jefferson, 
moreover, championed a view of the executive that had a special role in the national 
government on account of his “seeing the whole ground,” as he put in it in his First 
Inaugural.  However, this was within the framework, as we shall see below, of an 
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executive who would constantly need to gain his legitimacy and energy from the 
judgment of the people. 
In general, Hamilton’s praise for the Electoral College in this essay was 
directed at its tendency to overcome the problems he associated with direct popular
elections.  One desirable counter-popular tendency of the Electoral College was that it 
would allow the President to be selected by electors with greater “informati n and 
discernment” than “the general mass.”  Moreover, by only allowing the people to 
choose electors, and by confining deliberations among electors to separate States, the 
republic would escape the “tumult and disorder” that should be expected if the “heats 
and ferments” of the people were focused directly on the choice of the magistrate.  
Furthermore, “this detached and divided situation” of the electors would combine 
with “their transient existence” to immunize the Electoral College from the “most 
deadly adversaries of republican government”:  the “cabal, intrigue, and corrupti n” 
that are “expected to make their approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly 
from … foreign powers.”  Finally, Hamilton praised the Electoral College for its 
tendency to fill the office of the Presidency with “characters pre-eminent for ability 
and virtue” rather than those with “talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of 
popularity.”  The latter, of course, would be expected under a more popularly elected 
magistrate.  
Thus, in the first essay to evaluate the merits of this principal republican 
element, popular accountability, of the proposed Presidency, Hamilton refrained from 
stating why the republican principle of popular control was preferable to life tenure 




selection was beneficial because it would overcome what he thought were several
shortcomings of popular control.  Of course, Hamilton would be preaching to the 
choir by explaining why popular control was desirable.  Remarkably, however, 
Hamilton nowhere in his Federalist essays gave a positive argument for the intrinsic 
merit of popular control of the executive, but he did, as we shall see, defend life 
tenure and hereditary succession both explicitly and implicitly. 
The Bad, the Good, and the Best Regime 
Although Hamilton refrained from offering a direct argument justifying the 
Convention’s choice of a republican as opposed to monarchical executive, he did 
conclude #68 by offering an independent standard against which to judge forms of 
government.  While he would not endorse the “heresay” that the best form of 
government was “[t]hat which is best administered,” Hamilton did think it is safe to 
say “that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a 
good administration” (emphasis added.)  Hamilton did not say what distinguished the 
merely good from the best regime.  He only offered that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a regime to be considered good (rather than bad) was its “aptitude and 
tendency to produce a good administration.”  We have to look at his other writings to 
infer what he had in mind by the best versus the good. 
As was discussed in the last chapter, Hamilton thought the best form of 
government, or at least the best in the world in his day, was the British balanced 
constitution.68  However, we also know that he was an admirer and student of the 
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systems of administration created by the autocratic European states (see 
esp.Flaumenhaft  1992).  Perhaps the difference between the merely good and the 
best was that which distinguished the continental monarchies from the British 
constitutional monarchy:  the liberty of subjects?  Another possibility is that Hamilton 
thought a republican regime, even if poorly executed, is still good because it is at 
least directly committed to liberty.  However, as if to assure readers that this was not 
his intended meaning, he would repeat his claim in Federalist #70 (substituting “good 
execution” for “good administration”), but this time stating explicitly that a republic 
must meet the standard of good administration/execution to be considered merely 
good.  The “enlightened well wishers” of republican government had better hope it is 
untrue that “a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican 
government,” he argued, because “a government ill executed, whatever it may be in 
theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.” 
This ordering of emphasis should not be surprising.  After all, in Federalist #1 
Hamilton argued that “vigour [or “firmness and efficiency”] of government is 
essential to the security of liberty.”  Moreover, in his explanation of Federalist 
principles in 1801, Hamilton argued that “the mild reign of rational liberty” is 
predicated upon “an efficient and well-balanced government” and achieved “through 
the medium of stable laws.”69 This implies that “liberty” requires “executive energy” 
in the form of a “steady administration of the laws.”  Although security of liberty was 
necessary for a government to be the best, good execution was necessary, among 
other things, to secure liberty, and so one could not have the former (and thus the 
                                                




best) without the latter (which is sufficient for mere goodness).  Crucial premises of 
Hamilton’s constitutional judgment, therefore, were his contentions made at the 
convention that “you cannot have a good Executive upon a democratic plan” and that 
the “British Executive … is placed above temptation[,]… can have no distinct 
interests from the public welfare [and that] … nothing short of such an executive can 
be efficient.”70  Taken together, these statement suggested that Hamilton thought that 
(1) a republic is not good in itself, but, rather, must be well executed if it is to be 
considered good; (2) a republic probably cannot be well executed and therefore 
probably cannot be good (let alone the best); (3) a well administered absolute 
monarchy should be considered a good (but not the best) regime; and (4) the best 
regime, exemplified by the British balanced constitution, is one that is well executed 
(and thus monarchical) and provides for the individual security traditionally 
associated with republics (and therefore is balanced, limited, and constitutional).   
This means that, with respect to the crucial question of executive power, 
Hamilton thought security of liberty, but not republicanism, could survive the 
fundamental problem of liberal republican constitutionalism.  It was for this reason, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, that he thought the Constitution was highly 
inadequate.  Nevertheless, since the Constitution was at least a right step in th  
counter-republican direction, his primary task with the Federalist had to be to win 
ratification.  On this assumption, I interpret his major essays (#70, 71, 72) as his 
attempt to explain how the proposed Constitution would overcome the inherent 
tendency of republics to be poorly executed, and therefore to be incapable of 
                                                




achieving one of their principal aspirations: securing liberty.  However, as we shall 
see, despite the fact that his immediate audience feared that the proposed executive 
was inadequately republican, Hamilton would barely conceal the fact that he thought 
the Constitution was, as he said 16 years later, “frail and worthless” precisely because 
it was wholly popular and thus improperly balanced for providing the executive 
energy essential to any good regime.  It seems, therefore, that Hamilton’s ambition 
with these essays was not merely to win ratification, but also to begin (re-)convin ing 
his republican revolutionary audience that their rights and interests would be better 
secured by a mixed and balanced, rather than wholly popular, regime.  And by 
introducing “good execution,” rather than conformity to republican principles, as the 
standard of good government (which was the opposite of the tact taken by Madison in 
#41), he had laid the groundwork for that argument. 
The Meaning of “Executive Energy” and “Safety in th e 
Republican Sense” 
In #70, Hamilton seemingly acknowledged the tensions of liberal republican 
constitutionalism by juxtaposing the constitutional “ingredients” required for an 
“energetic executive” with those ingredients required for “safety in the republican 
sense.” The constitutional ingredients necessary for executive energy were “unity; 
duration; an adequate provision for its support; [and] competent powers,” while the 
constitution of “safety in the republican sense” consisted of “due dependence on the 
people; [and] a due responsibility.”  He then prodded the reader to ask whether those 
ingredients are compatible and, if so, whether they are combined adequately within 




Before considering this aspect of his arguments, it is important to consider 
what he meant by “executive energy” and “safety in the republican sense.”  Although 
both phrases present considerable ambiguity, commentators have offered little 
analysis of the meaning of the “energetic executive”71 while paying almost no 
attention to the intended meaning of “safety in the republican sense.”  As the lawyerly 
Hamilton was perfectly capable of precision when he wanted his meaning to be 
clearly understood, it is important to consider closely what meanings he implicitly 
associated with these crucial but inherently nebulous phrases. 
The Multiple (Conflicting?) Meanings of Executive E nergy 
Hamilton did not offer a direct definition of “energetic execution,” but he did 
use it interchangeably with “vigorous execution” and contrasted it with a “feeble 
execution” which, he claimed, “is but another phrase for a bad execution.”  
Elsewhere, moreover, he associated it with “firmness” and “efficiency.”  The former 
had a specific meaning in the F deralist: the fortitude to stand against popular 
opinion.  However, throughout his essays on the executive he spoke of several values 
that are not reducible to mere strength, firmness, or efficiency.  As Mansfield (1993) 
has noted, although “energy” is a term from Newtonian physics, it most certainly was 
not value-neutral (p. 267). 
Hamilton’s meaning is best inferred by considering what he thought to be the 
executive’s necessary functions, and what qualities of character were necessary for 
fulfilling their purposes.  He provided a list of necessary functions in the first 
paragraph of #70.  “Energy in the executive,” he stated, 
                                                




is … essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks: it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; 
to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed 
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; 
to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of 
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.  Every man, the least conversant 
in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take 
refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title 
of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who 
aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the 
community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, 
as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the 
conquest and destruction of Rome. 
The executive, therefore, was essential for protecting the tranquility and 
liberty of the regime both in normal times—administering and enforcing the laws—
and in times of domestic and international emergency.  As was noted in the previous 
chapter, this marked a deviation from both Madison’s implied meaning in #37 and the 
traditional functions associated with the Roman dictator.  We will discuss Madison’s 
and Jefferson’s views on “energy” below, but it is important to reiterate that 
Hamilton’s rhetorical strategy here seems to have been to find a way to bring “steady 
administration” into the definition of the executive’s function without creating alarm 
in his audience that he envisioned a robust replica of the British monarch.  Shocking 
them with the dictator was safer rhetorically because it was at least recognized as a 
republican institution.  He will move more gradually toward making the case for a 
non-republican executive in later essays. 
Energy in the Executive as Essential for Foreign Affairs 
By saying that the executive, like the emergency Roman dictator, was 
“essential,” first and foremost, “to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks,” Hamilton followed Montesquieu in collapsing Locke’s federative, executive, 




that the federative power is an essential function for a regime.  As long as a regime is 
in anarchy in its relations with other regimes, and geophysical  or other fortuitous 
circumstances do not render it immune from conquest, it must meet this purpose, 
depend on the (uncontrolled) protection of another regime, or stand at risk of harm if 
not annihilation.  Hamilton implicitly assumed the regime was not immune to attack 
and chose “self-help” over vulnerability or subservience.  Moreover, he took it for 
granted that this was an “executive” function.   
What is the “energy” required for performing this function?  Put another way, 
what qualities must the executive have to fulfill this purpose?  Part of the answer 
must include the capacity to effectively and skillfully command the military and act 
strategically when attacks are immanent, including “decision, activity, secrecy, and 
dispatch” (# 70).  However, ever the Machiavellian statesman, Hamilton undoubtedly 
also meant the capacity to proactively shape events to the regime’s strategic 
advantage.  As astute scholars of Hamilton have empasized, a key insight into 
Hamilton’s outlook was provided by a quote by Demosthenes that he copied onto the 
cover his school notebook: “As a general marches at the head of his troops, so ought 
wise politicians, if I dare use the expression, to march at the head of affairs; insomuch 
that they ought not to wait the event, to know what measures to take; but the measures 
which they have taken, ought to produce the ev nt.” (Karl Walling  1995; Harper  
2004; Stourzh  1970) 
Throughout the essays he also emphasized the importance of sound and 
uncorrupted judgment about the public interest.  So “energy” here also included the 




proper level of independence from corrupting domestic and foreign influences.  
Indeed, this was one way that he found liberty to be at one with “energy.”  As he 
would write in his draft of Washington’s Farewell Address, foreign corruption was a 
threat to the liberty of the people as it can cause “the true policy and interest of our 
own country to be made subservient to the policy and interest of one and another 
foreign nation, sometimes enslaving our own government to the will of a foreign 
government” (August, 1796).  So, when, in #75, he would suggest that the president 
had an inadequate level of the “duration” ingredient of “energy” to be reliably 
incorruptible from foreign powers, he had in mind that “energy” as insulation from 
foreign corruption, and thus as virtue, is also necessary for liberty. 
Here it is important to note that Jefferson and Madison were equally 
appreciative of the importance of “energy” in the form of fast, decisive, and (when 
necessary) secretive action, as well as concerned about the susceptibility of republics 
to foreign corruption.  However, Hamilton in his Pacificus (1793) essay would 
articulate a vision of executive independence quite different from Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s.  His aim in that essay was to legalize by constitutional construction 
extensive Presidential independent authority in foreign affairs, thus brining the 
President as close as the written text would allow to the legal authorities of he British 
monarch.  For Jefferson72, any federative actions deemed necessary for the 
fundamental liberal republican public interest by the President, even if 
constitutionally questionable, should be taken by the executive.  In justifying his 
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unilateral action in the Louisiana Purchase, for example, Jefferson thought it was 
“absurd” to think fidelity to the Constitution overrides actions necessary for the 
public interest: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high 
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, 
of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of 
higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to 
written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property 
and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing 
the end to the means.73 
However, for both Jefferson and Madison it was imperative than any such 
actions be fully admitted as illegal by the President, and that he then “throw himself” 
upon the people for their judgment.74  Hamilton, on the other hand, argued against 
this on the grounds that it was dangerous to openly legitimate extra-constitutional 
action.  The logic of his position, however, ran the danger of legitimizing actions that 
ran counter to the principles of propriety held by the people.  He was well aware of 
this, but a hallmark Hamiltonian constitutional interpretation was the principle that 
where a power could be necessary, and especially where it appeared the extant 
balance of structural power militated against its effective use, it was better to stretch 
its legal authority as far as possible rather than err on the side of too much 
(additional) constraint on its effectual power.75 
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74 Ibid. “An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one who should do it in cases for 
which they were not intended, and which involved the most important consequences. The line of 
discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, 
and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.” 
75 Hamilton admitted that his reason for favoring a “liberal construction of the powers of the national 
government,” insofar as it was “consistent with constitutional propriety,” was due to his judgment that 
the extant balance of power between the States and n tional government heavily favored the former. 
(Hamilton to Colonel Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792.)  A similar calculus was apparently involved 
in his construction of the President’s federative power viz. a viz. Congress. For an excellent analysis of 




As for foreign corruption, my distant reading revealed that this was the 
problem with republics of which Hamilton most frequently spoke.  Although he 
always addressed it in reference to the advantages of monarch’s permanence, he 
vacillated throughout his life between trusting the greater duration of the Senate or 
the unity of the (and potentially future more monarchical) President.  Madison never 
articulated a solution for this, but Jefferson raised it as one of his objections to the re-
eligibility of the President.  In his view, a President without perpetual re-eligibility for 
reelection would not be a likely target for foreign intrigue. 
In addition to the need for unrestrained action in times of war or crisis, 
Hamilton, although he would not emphasize it in this essay, would elsewhere discuss 
the importance of the executive for conducting and maintaining regular relations w th 
other regimes, particularly in the area of treaty negotiations and interpretation (#75, 
Pacificus).  Here again, the virtue and incorruptibility of the executive was important, 
but the particular qualities required for fulfilling this function were different.  Unlike 
the qualities necessary for being an effective commander in chief of the military in 
times of war, here “energy” in the executive consisted of the credibility and 
trustworthiness necessary for inspiring the confidence and respect of foreign power in 
the good faith of the regime as a contractual partner.  Put another way, he pointed to 
the necessity that the executive assure foreign powers that the regime has th
character becoming of an upright member of international society. 
Energy in the Executive as Essential for Domestic Governance 
Beyond the federative responsibilities of the executive, Hamilton pointed to 
essential domestic purposes.  Although he introduced the Roman dictator as a model, 




(prerogative) of the executive, but also of functions needed in normal times.  For 
example, the “steady administration of the laws” implied that “energy” included 
stability and consistency.  Here, “energy” was the opposite of “ruinous mutability” (# 
72).  This is quite different from the extraordinary and temporary office of the 
dictator, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, was something Madison implicitly 
acknowledged by speaking of “energy” and “stability” as two different desiderata of 
government in Federalist # 37.  Yet, according to Hamilton, the executive must 
perform the crisis-resolving functions of the Roman dictator as well.  That is, he must 
suppress insurrections (“those irregular and high-handed combinations which 
sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice”) and protect liberty from 
domination or anarchy ignited by “ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny” 
or “the seditions of whole classes of the community.”  This means that “energy” 
required the ability and inclination to act swiftly, boldly, and skillfully to a preserve a 
condition liberty.  This would require discernment, political cunning, well-timed acts 
of repression or mercy, and, ultimately (if not to be self-defeating) self-restraint. 
In Federalist #72, Hamilton mentioned a final purpose that is related to but 
distinct from both steady administration and flexible crisis management:  to “plan and 
undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit.”  Like the function 
of steady administration, this was not necessarily a response to crisis and, indee , 
would often be directed at preventing crisis.  But, like crisis management, the 
“energy” required for this executive purpose consisted of extraordinary skill and 
dedicated exertion directed at promoting the public interest.  And it was here that 




most concerned to harness for the public interest:  “fame, the ruling passion of the 
noblest minds.”  As Douglas Adair (1974) has noted, perspectives on this passion 
defined the political orientation of the statesmen of the day.  For our purposes, it is 
important to note what Adair said about Jefferson and Hamilton, but also what he 
failed to notice about Madison’s views on this passion with respect to the executive 
power.  Adair emphasized the dinner debate between Jefferson and Hamilton, where 
the former argued, following Voltaire’s hierarchy, that Newton, Bacon, and Locke 
were the greatest men (most deserving of fame) who had ever lived, while the latter, 
following Bacon’s hierarchy, considered Julius Caesar the greatest.  Adair rightly 
noted that this reflected a Hamilton’s deeper, and more classical, valuation of great 
political deeds than Jefferson.  Stourzh (1970) and McDonald (1982), in turn, 
connected this to his vision of the constitutional need for heroic political leadership.  
But none have noticed Madison’s statement in the fourth Helvedius, where he, in his 
implied hierarchy of values, advocated subordinating all the “strongest passions and 
most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast,” including “the honourable or 
venial love of fame,” to the “desire and duty of peace.”  Madison, it seems, was 
willing to construct a regime with a little less honor in order to avoid not only 
venality, but also the wars that the “noble minds” might wage.  We will consider this 
further in the next chapter. 
So, for Hamilton, “executive energy” seemed to consist of several distinct 
abilities and virtues that (1) the good regime requires for self-preservation, 
advantageous and just external relations, steady administration, general obedience of 




improve the general welfare and increase the regime’s future capacity to meet 
contingencies, and (2) the best regime requires for maintaining its essential character 
as defined by its definitive commitment to liberty.  We see here the enormous 
responsibility that would fall upon the shoulders of Hamilton’s executive, and the 
“energy” he would require to fulfill these responsibilities, but this emphasis on energy 
did not fully address how the best regime—one that is not merely secure, orderly, 
stable, and well administered, but that is also committed to durable individual 
liberty—can be safe from an imperious executive office that is captured by a faction 
or individual that seeks to use it for ruling according to their own arbitrary will. As 
we shall see, his association of executive virtue and incorruptibility with “energy” 
addressed this problem, but this alone did not fully address how the two “republican 
necessities,” whose antagonistic relationship constitute the fundamental problem of 
liberal republican constitutionalism, could simultaneously be resolved through the 
constitution of the executive. 
The Meanings of “Safety in the Republican Sense” 
Hamilton entered this terrain by invoking the notion of “safety in the 
republican sense.”  By this he seems to have meant institutional mechanisms intended 
to enable the people to exert control over, and thereby keep themselves safe from, the 
executive.  It is therefore both an aspiration (security from executive oppression) and 
a mechanism (institutionalized popular accountability.) This is made clear by the only 
paragraph (the final paragraph) in the remaining seven essays in which he explicitly 
addressed the question of whether the Constitution adequately provided for 
“republican safety.”  (This was a not-so-subtle indication of the priority he placd on 




held-up as most distinguishing the proposed Presidency from the British monarch in 
#69) by which “safety in the republican sense” would be promoted: ”…the election of 
the president once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the people for that 
purpose; his liability, at all times, to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, 
incapacity to serve in any other, and to the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent 
prosecution in the common course of law” (#77). 
As we shall see, this is not all he had to say on the question of constraints on 
the executive power, but it makes his general meaning clear.  However, it is not clear 
what he meant to imply by associating negative control over the executive with the 
phrase “safety in the republican sense.”  To what other “sense” of “safety” was he 
contrasting that which was distinctively “republican”?  Was he referring to a 
distinctively republican conception of “danger” or to a distinctively republican 
approach to attaining safety from that danger?  More specifically, did he mean to 
imply republicans are indifferent or blind to threats to their safety other than that of 
unchecked executive power?  That is, was he suggesting that republicans do not 
understand that executive energy is necessary to keep them safe from internal and 
external threats to their rights, interests, and liberty?  Or was he suggestin  that there 
are different, perhaps even better, mechanisms, other than popular control, such as 
those provided in the British balanced constitution, by which the people can be kept 
safe in this narrow sense of protection from arbitrary executive rule?  There is 
evidence that he had a combination of both meanings in mind.   
At times he seems to have meant “republican” strictly in an aspirational se se: 




evidence for this is the fact that he included “due responsibility” with “due 
dependence on the people” to his list of ingredients necessary for “republican safety.”  
By the latter he seems to have meant electoral control, whereas by the former he 
meant control by other branches of government.  Strictly speaking, only control 
through election is necessarily a republican mechanism since, in principle, an 
aristocratic legislature or judiciary could be the sole source of “due responsibility” for 
the executive.  This means two of the three elements of the Constitution that he held-
up in #77 as provisions that provide republican safety—liability to impeachment and, 
thereafter, criminal conviction and punishment—could be achieved, in principle, 
through a constitutional monarchical framework. 
Another example illustrating that he meant to specify a particular aspiration, 
as opposed to mechanism, by speaking of “republican safety” are the statements he 
made pertaining to the susceptibility of republics to foreign corruption.  Consider, for 
example, this statement he made in Federalist #75: 
However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive 
magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power 
of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust 
that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration. It has been 
remarked, upon another occasion, and the remark is unquestionably 
just, that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his 
people, has personally too much stake in the government to be in any 
material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. 
Here, the “safety” aspired for was different from safety rom the executive, 
and thus, presumably, was safety in a on-republican sense.  Foreign corruption 
threatens the regime, and thereby its citizens, by jeopardizing its autonomy (de facto 
political independence) and making it more vulnerable to foreign attack.  This was 




to be an essential element of “executive energy,” andthat he saw energy as necessary 
for liberty.  However, this argument suggests that the danger of foreign corrupti n 
could be avoided best by having an hereditary monarch.  Yet this solution, he fully 
admitted, would actually diminish the people’s protection from executive abuse since 
“an hereditary monarch … [is] often the oppressor of his people” (# 75).  
Consequently, this suggests not only that he thought “republican safety” was distinct 
from other forms of “safety,” but also that the constitutional means of providing for 
the two forms of safety could stand in pure conflict with one another.   
At other times, however, he seemed to suggest that the people can 
simultaneously enjoy the security provided by an executive while living secure from 
arbitrary executive coercion insofar as they live under a balanced constitutional 
monarchy of the British mold.  In other words, by qualifying “security” in a 
“republican sense” he seems to have meant not only that republican theory is myopic 
about sources of insecurity—always choosing one form even when it conflicts with 
another—but also that republican theory is myopic in its understanding of how best to 
provide the one form of security about which republican theory is concerned.  
Consider, for example, his statement at the Federal Convention that, while similar, 
differs crucially from the above statement by claiming that, while, like all hereditary 
monarchies, the British monarchy is free from foreign corruption, it is also 
“sufficiently controlled … at home” and therefore (presumably) not oppressive to his 
people: 
As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could 
be established on republican principles.… The English model was the 
only good one on this subject. The hereditary interest of the king was 




great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from 
abroad, and, at the same time, was both sufficiently independent and 
sufficiently controlled to answer the purpose of the institution at home. 
One of the weak sides of republics was their being liable to foreign 
influence and corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great 
power, become easily the tools of intermeddling neighbors. 
(6/18/1787, Madison’s notes, emphasis added) 
Presumably, he meant that the checks exerted by the Commons and Lords 
were sufficient to keep the executive from exercising arbitrary control.  This was a 
non-republican mechanism for achieving the republican aspiration of liberty from 
arbitrary executive oppression. 
Another telling example was the language he used in #70 to make his case that 
a unitary executive is more easily controlled than a plural executive.  Afterstating 
that the idea of a plural executive “has been derived from that maxim of republican 
jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a 
single man,” he suggested that “the species of security sought for in the multiplication 
of the Executive, is unattainable” by those means.  He thus distinguished republican 
security, in the sense of controlling executive power, as merely one “species” of 
security, and he argued that a preferred republican mechanism for achieving that 
security, plurality in the executive, was inadequate. 
As we will soon see, careful consideration of his remaining essays cast doubt 
on the possibility of reconciling the ingredients of executive energy with those of the 
principal republican mechanism—popular control through election—for attaining the 
republican aspiration of individual liberal.  However, he did not necessarily think this 
meant the death knell for liberty as individual security.  Unlike Madison, who set-up 
the problem in Federalist #37 as one of how to combine “the requisite stability and 




republican form,” and, later “the genius of republican liberty,” Hamilton typically did 
not put “liberty” on the “republican form” side of the ledger.  When “liberty” 
appeared, it was considered to be compatible with, if not dependent upon, the 
ingredients necessary for executive energy.  But those ingredients were not always 
compatible, and sometimes would be portrayed as undermining, republican liberty.  
This seems to have been an additional part of his re-education of his “republican” 
audience.  
Hamilton’s defenses of unity in the executive in #70 and for re-eligibility in 
#72 appear on their face to contradict this contention.  In those essays he asserted 
principles of constitutional design that suggest a compatibility of energy, liberty, and 
popular control over the executive.  However, a careful juxtaposition of those essays 
with his arguments for “duration” in # 71 reveals a contradiction.  In light of his other 
writings, it appears, moreover, that he more sincerely believed his arguments 
pertaining to duration, for creating popular insulation, than those contradictory 
arguments claiming unity and re-eligibility to be beneficial for improving popular 
accountability.  These essays both reflect the key difference between Hamilton and 
the Virginians, and embody his most explicit act of opinion leadership. 
Unity and the Reconciliation of “Energy” and “Safet y”: #70 
In #70, Hamilton offered his famous defense of a single unitary executive, as 
opposed to two or more co-equal executives, like the two consuls of the Roman 
constitution, or a single executive controlled in whole or partly by a committee of 
counselors, as with the contemporaneous constitutions of New Jersey and New York.  




of energy, but also that it better promotes republican safety—individual liberty 
through popular control over the executive—than does plurality in the executive.76  It 
thus defied one of the classical trade-offs of liberal republican constitutionalism.  
Recall that Montesquieu’s case for placing executive and federative powers in a 
monarch was the advantages of speed and decision that institution had on account of 
its being unitary.  This argument by Hamilton, which was fully embraced by 
Jefferson and Madison, demonstrated that a republic could safely enjoy that 
advantage typically provided by monarchs.  
To support this thesis, he advanced and supported the following principles of 
constitutional design: 
1. An energetic executive must act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and 
despatch,” and these qualities will more likely be found in one man than a 
greater number, and will be diminished in direct proportion as the number of 
men is increased. 
2. Plurality in the executive inevitably leads to disagreement.  This 
disagreement could “impede or frustrate” the administration of the 
government or split the community into contending factions.  So, unity in the 
executive also promotes “energy” (and liberty) in the form of stability and 
efficiency. 
3. In a “free government,” it is necessary that a unitary executive be 
counterbalanced by a numerous legislature.  The legislative branch benefits 
from disagreement and slowness of decision, as these things promote 
deliberation and circumspection and better allow it to perform its vital 
functions, among which are “to conciliate the confidence of the people, and to 
secure their privileges and interests.”  But these things are undesirable in the 
executive branch as they undermine energy (for reasons given in 1 and 2). 
4. Republican safety is better promoted by having a unitary executive than a 
plural executive.  Contrary to “that maxim of republican jealousy which 
considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men, than of a single 
                                                
76 This essay is often cited by contemporary adherents of the “unitary executive theory” to support 
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Congressional approval or even against Congressional proscriptions) due to, among other things, their 




man,” it is in fact “far more safe there should be a single object for the 
jealousy and watchfulness of the people.”  Plurality “tends to conceal faults 
and destroy responsibility,” as it allows the “blame … of a pernicious 
measure, or series of pernicious measures” to be “shifted from one to another 
with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public 
opinion is left in suspense about the real author.” 
It is important to note, first, that Hamilton’s first two principles can apply to 
any kind of regime—republic, constitutional monarchy, or absolute monarchy—while 
the third can apply to either a republic or constitutional monarchy and the fourth can 
apply only to a republic.  It is also important to note that, in this form, the republican 
benefit of unity is seen solely in negative terms:  the ability of the people to blame
and punish executive incompetence or malfeasance.77  It is only in #72, where he 
made the case for re-eligibility, that he suggested the responsibility promoted by unity 
can serve the positive function of allowing the people to reward, and thereby 
encourage, beneficial executive actions on behalf of the public interest..  But, as will 
be seen below, even in that essay Hamilton articulated a very different relationship 
between popular will and presidential action than did Jefferson and Madison.  The 
latter two genuinely believed in, as Madison put it, “the great principle of unity and 
responsibility [i.e. electoral accountability] in the Executive department, which was 
intended for the security of liberty and the public good.” (April 9, 1789, proceedings 
of first Congress)  I believe Hamilton thought unity, to the contrary, was necessary 
but not sufficient for promoting the energy necessary for securing liberty and 
promoting the public good, and that he thought “responsibility” in Madison’s sense of 
electoral control would undermine, not support, liberty and the public interest. 
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But even in #70 Hamilton sought to teach his audience that executive energy 
must take precedence over republican safety.  Near the end of the essay, after 
attributing the idea of a plural executive to “that maxim of republican jealousy which 
considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man,” he 
submitted that, if that maxim were (counterfactually) true, in his judgment “the 
advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages” for 
energy that plurality would create.   
The biggest problem with Hamilton’s republican arguments in support of 
unity (in #70) and re-eligibility (#72) is that his case for duration in #71 called into 
question the desirability of allowing the people to exert any kind of electoral 
control—positive or negative—over the executive.78  Hamilton made it clear, to the 
contrary, that the duration of the executive’s tenure in office necessary for energy, 
and thus a good regime, was at odds with popular control over the executive, and, 
thus, the distinctively republican mechanism for providing safety.  Importantly, 
however, his argument for duration was compatible with the first three principles, and 
thus the requirements of his merely good regime (well executed monarchy) and his 
best regime (energetic and free constitutional monarchy). 
Duration, “Energy,” and “Republican Safety”: #71 an d 72 
Jefferson and Madison on Duration, Energy, and Safe ty 
The key contribution of Bailey’s (2007) reinterpretation of Jefferson’s views 
on executive power is that Jefferson was in fact a proponent of a “strong” or 
“energetic” executive.  Importantly, Jefferson’s well known support for termlimits on 
                                                




Presidents was not merely about “republican safety.”  He had only two objections to 
the proposed Constitution in 1787: its exclusion of a bill of rights and the perpetual 
re-eligibility of the President.  On republican safety grounds, he stated a fear that re-
eligibility would effectively amount to life tenure, which would easily evolve into 
hereditary succession.  However, Bailey’s astute observation is that Jefferson also 
thought limited duration in office was an important component of executive energy.  
The reason for this was that Jefferson thought too much time in office would lead to 
“servile inertness,” whereas the office required the “firmness,”79 “vigor and 
enterprise”80 that is found only in “younger heads.”81  Consequently, although 
Jefferson—a natural aristocrat who believed, like Madison, in the superiority of 
representative to direct democracy82—thought executives need to be temporarily 
removed from the people and, especially, the legislature, in order to competently 
discharge their duty to the people, he thought duration in office past a certain point 
would diminish both republican safety and energy. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, moreover, Madison, in his principled 
commitment to protecting republics from the problem of violent death through 
institutions compatible with republican principles, relied primarily on representation, 
the extended sphere, and a firm upper legislative chamber with long duration.  The 
latter, as we saw, was his preferred source of “power” for dealing with the problem 
that not only too much, but also too little power can lead to despotism.  As he argued 
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in Federalist 63, “history informs us of no long lived republic which had not a senate. 
Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, are, in fact, the only states to whom that character can be 
applied.”  We have also seen that Madison made a clear distinction between energy in 
the executive and stability in the legislature, and he, unlike Hamilton, looked only to 
“stability” (less mutability, but also greater justice and prudence) in leg slation to 
prevent the factional violence that would lead the republic into anarchy and then 
despotism.  Although Madison’s writings do not indicate that he put nearly as much 
thought as Jefferson into the problem of reconciling executive energy with republican 
principles, it is certain that he agreed with Jefferson’s basic contention that, while an 
energetic executive required a lengthy duration, after a certain point (around seven 
years) both energy (firmness, vigor, and enterprise) and republican safety would be 
diminished. 
Hamilton on Duration and Energy 
Hamilton’s theory of the relationship between duration and “energy,” as 
espoused at the Convention, and, as we shall soon see, in Federalist 71, defied this 
reasoning.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Hamilton’s definition of a republic 
heavily emphasized the distinction between hereditary and non-hereditary succession 
of office holders.  A republic, he stated repeatedly, should be defined as a regime 
based on “an equality political rights, free of hereditary distinctions.” When he stated 
at the Convention, therefore, that “we ought to go as far, in order to attain stability 
and permanency, as republican principles will admit,” he was referring to the creation 
of a Senate and executive with life tenure.  When “all the magistrates are appointed 
and vacancies are filled by the people, or by a process of election originatin with the 




be considered monarchical only once the line is crossed into hereditary succession.  
Moreover, Hamilton made it clear that he thought “executive energy” in the form of 
“firmness,” “independence,” “stability,” and “permanency,” would be adequately 
achieved only by a monarchial, and therefore hereditary, executive.  Under the 
Virginia Plan for an executive of seven years duration he argued that 
the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be ambitious, 
with the means of making creatures, and as the object of his ambition 
would be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of war he 
would avail himself of the emergency to evade or refuse a degradation 
from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting 
his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. 
However, he argued that even an executive with life tenure, as he proposed, 
“would have, in fact, but little of the power and independence that might be 
necessary” for meetings the regime’s functional needs.  So Hamilton, unlike the 
Virginians, saw a linear relationship between “energy” and duration.  
Purposes for “Energy” and Strategies for “Safety” 
At root, this difference between Hamilton and the Virginians was not a 
technical disagreement over the effects of duration on the “power” or “strength” of 
the executive, as Bailey (2007, 2008) has suggested.  The crucial difference was in 
(1) the role they envisaged for “firmness” in the executive’s composition, and (2) how 
they thought “republican safety” (as an aspiration) should be secured. 
For Hamilton, “firmness,” or the will to take a principled stand against 
corrupting forces, was a direct function of the executive’s insulation from electoral 
control.  Elections could corrupt for two reasons:  foreign intrigue or public opinion.  
As we have seen, he (and Jefferson) were deeply concerned about the former, but in 




emphasized the latter.  In that speech, he listed factional strife, and the degeneracy 
into anarchy and then despotism, as one reason for firm government.  However, his 
emphasis was on the “unreasonableness of the people”:   
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and, 
however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not 
true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge 
or determine right … Can a democratic Assembly, who annually 
revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the 
public good?83 
Since they could not, “[t]here ought to be a principle in government capable of 
resisting the popular current,” and “[n]o periodical duration will come up to this.”  
Consequently, a hereditary upper legislative chamber and monarch were essential.  
For the regime to be free, and thus the best, it was essential that the government be 
partially in the hands of the many.  There must be a “vigorous defense of the people.”  
But their influence must be contained within a single legislative chamber so that the 
government can meet the minimal requirements of mere goodness (as well as 
escaping republican violent death).  If “a republican government does not admit a 
vigorous execution,” then it “is therefore bad; for the goodness of a government 
consists in a vigorous execution.”  Those “Gentleman [who] say we need to be 
rescued from the democracy” are correct, but their proposed means “will not be equal 
to the object” and therefore “the end [securing effectual rule on behalf of the public
interest] will not be answered.”84  
With respect to firmness and safety, Jefferson and Madison shared two things 
in common with Hamilton.  They did think it important for the executive to be “firm” 
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against legislative encroachments, and they did think that it was essential to liberty 
that the people enjoy the protection of independent courts.85  And Madison, of course, 
shared Hamilton’s concern about excessive popular influence leading to despotism.  
However, they differed in these crucial respects.  First, they thought firmness against 
the legislature was not equivalent to firmness against the people.  The “mother 
principle,” Jefferson told Samuel Kercheval, is that “governments are republican only 
in proportion as they embody the will of their people, and execute it.”  The problem 
with legislatures was that they could be parochial and unreflective of the will of the 
people.  The reason Jefferson and Madison both supported the 12th Amendment was 
because they genuinely believed that the President should embody the will of the 
whole people.  And this was in no small part because they both believed in the 
efficacy of the extended sphere for reducing the role of faction in that national 
majority.  Moreover, they thought the popular base of the executive was a 
legitimizing resource to use against legislative encroachment (Bailey  2007, 1-28) 
Third, on republican safety grounds, the Virginians were the opposite of 
Hamilton in how they prioritized popular voice in the legislature vs. popular 
accountability of the executive.  We have seen Madison’s insistence on the 
importance of the great chain of responsibility emanating ultimately from the people.  
Jefferson actually went further by stating: 
Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in 
the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave
them out of the Legislature. The execution of the laws is more 
                                                





important than the making them. However it is best to have the people 
in all the three departments where that is possible.86 
By stating “all three branches,” Jefferson was assuming popular influence 
over the properly “executive” branch in addition to the “Judiciary department” 
implied here.  But, the more pertinent point is that by saying it was “more important” 
for the people to have control in the judiciary than in the legislature, Jefferson meant
that “safety” was more threatened from arbitrary executive law enforcement than by 
arbitrary legislation.87 
In sum, duration in the executive was the critical bone of theoretical 
contention among these founders because it went to the heart of the purpose of the 
executive.  Hamilton’s executive, like Madison’s Senate, was to be fundamentally a 
counter-democratic institution.  Jefferson’s and Madison’s executive, by contrast, 
would be temporarily removed from electoral control (through moderate term 
duration) so as to bolster independence and firmness, but it would also ideally be 
elective both to secure the rights of the people (safety) against arbitrary executive 
power and to induce it to reflect and carry out the will of the people. 
Hamilton’s “Rhetoric” in #71 
In general, the constitution of the President as proposed by the convention 
would have been fairly easy to defend as striking a reasonable balance between 
energy and safety.  Hamilton could have argued that duration, while necessary for 
firmness, becomes dangerous past a certain point and so the framers prudently drew 
the line at four years, with re-eligibility.  Instead Hamilton chose to give a quasi-
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defense of the proposed institution that, in reality, amounted to a restatement of his 
genuine principles.  At the heart of this essay was a careful defense of his 
(monarchical) principle of duration, which would have done nothing to ease the anti-
federalist’s apprehension about the “sinister” motives of the framers (Storing  2006).  
Hamilton would moderate his anti-democratic language, in contrast to his statements 
at the convention, but that was a minimal rhetorical accommodation to the republican 
prejudice of his audience.  The thrust of the argument given, however, was a direct 
challenge to that prejudice.  Consequently, I argue this essay should be interpreted as 
Hamilton’s attempt to begin persuading his audience to accept the necessity of a 
monarchical rather than the proposed republican executive. 
There were two elements in his effort at re-education.  First, he would 
establish his scientific-sounding, but inherently monarchical principle that “energy in 
the executive”—which, here he taught really meant “the personal firmness of the 
chief magistrate … [and the] stability of the system of administration”—is directly 
proportional to duration in office.  Second, he sought to establish (gently) that a 
properly constituted executive primarily serves a counter-democratic function in a 
good regime.   
Hamilton asserted his “scientific” principle in the first paragraph: the “longer 
the duration in office,” he argued, “the greater will be the probability of obtaining 
[the] important … advantage[s]” of “personal firmness” and “stability in 
administration.”  (The remainder of this essay was devoted to firmness, and then he 
discussed stable administration at the beginning of #72.) Why was there a simple 




rooted in human psychology:  “a man will be … less attached to what he holds by a 
momentary or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a title durable or certain.”  If 
an executive knew he “must” [Hamilton’s emphasis] leave office at a stated time, then 
he would be “too little interested … to hazard any material censure or perplexity” that 
would result from the “independent exertion of his powers” or standing up against 
“the ill-humours, however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a 
considerable part of the society itself [i.e. the people], or even in a predominant 
faction in the legislative body.”  In other words, the term-limited chief magistrate 
would be too apathetic to enact or execute necessary but unpopular (or politically 
inconvenient) measures.  This was fairly hard-edged, but essentially anticip ted the 
case for re-eligibility that he would make in #72.  But then he went further.  To assure 
his reader’s that he literally meant that there was an unqualified linear relationship 
between duration and firmness, he asserted that a magistrate who merely knew he 
“might” [Hamilton’s emphasis] need to step down “unless continued by a new 
choice” would also fail to serve the public interest when necessity, but not the 
popular current, dictated it because “his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would tend 
still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or debase his fortitude.”  In other words, 
any kind of electoral accountability would diminish the personal firmness of the chief 
magistrate.  But not only that, it would do so “more powerfully” than in the term 
limited magistrate.  The upshot was that “feebleness and irresolution must be the 
characteristics of” any executive who is term limited or forced to face reel ction. 
After this powerful opening, rather than moderate his claim, Hamilton 




directed by a “servile pliancy … to a prevailing current, either in the community, or 
in the legislature.”  Hamilton could have offered his oft-repeated claim about too little 
firmness leading to anarchy and then despotism.  Instead, he chose to assert the 
counter-democratic principle.  Those persons who advocate such servile pliancy 
“entertain very crude notions” about “the purposes for which government was 
instituted … [and] the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted.”  
Bowing a bit to prejudice, Hamilton did not repeat his belief expressed at the 
Convention that government is instituted due to the “unreasonableness” of the people.  
Instead he immediately turned to giving an (unorthodox) account of what ”the 
republican principle demands” with respect to the relationship between popular will 
and executive power.  Seemingly acknowledging the necessary role of popular 
opinion in a republic, he stated that the republican principle demands that “the 
deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they 
intrust the management of their affairs.”  However, in a gentle manner, he asserted 
that the demos would not often be the correct judge of the community’s “deliberate 
sense.”  Although “the people commonly intend the public good,” they do not 
“always reason right about the means of promoting it” (emphasis in original).  This 
was not, as he otherwise indicated at the Convention, due to anything innate about the 
people.  Rather, the problem was that they were commonly deluded by demagogues:  
by “the wiles of parasites and sycophants; by the snares of the ambitious, the 
avaricious, the desperate; by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more 
than they deserve it.”  Yet, it will be noticed, by implication the people were often not 




Hamilton then instructed his audience that, as a consequence of the people’s 
susceptibility to manipulation by demagogues, it was necessary to insulate officials 
from the people in anticipation of those situations where “the interests of the people 
are at variance with their inclinations” and their agents must fulfill their “duty … to 
be the guardians of those interests.” 
After making this explicitly counter-democratic argument, he acknowledged 
that his republican audience may still “insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the 
executive to the inclinations of the people.”  So next he would apparently show a little 
complaisance himself and seek common ground with his audience.  Everyone, 
republicans and non-republicans alike, he suggested, should agree (echoing Madison 
in #’s47-51) that the “personal firmness” of the executive is at least necessary for 
maintaining an effective separation of (functional) powers, which, in turn, is essential 
to both parties’ conception of the “fundamental principles of good government.”  So, 
duration is important because firmness (defined by popular electoral insulation) is 
necessary to protect the people from their elected legislators: 
[The legislature] may sometimes stand in opposition to the [people]; 
and at other times the people may be entirely neutral. In either 
supposition, it is certainly desirable, that the executive should be in a 
situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigour and decision. 
If “both the executive and the judiciary are so constituted, as to be at the 
absolute devotion of the legislative,” then, he argued, the separation of powers “must 
be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established” 
Since this part of his argument was intended to dampen the counter-
democratic thrust of his initial rationale, Hamilton had to explain why electoral 




(as opposed to the people themselves.)  “It may perhaps be asked,” he admitted, “how 
the shortness of the duration  in office [i.e. any form of electoral accountability] can 
affect the independence of the executive on the legislature, unless the one were 
possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the other?”  He gave two reasons.  
One was “drawn from the principle already mentioned,” that a man will have “slender 
interest … in a short-lived advantage, and little inducement … to expose himself, on 
account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard.”  But his second reason 
was essentially a restatement of his contention that the people could be easily 
deluded.  However, here, instead of the delusions emanating from demagogues, they 
would come from “the circumstance of the influence of the legislative body over the 
people; which might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by an 
upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself 
obnoxious to its resentment.”  This, of course, would apply to any executive facing 
re-election, including the proposed President. 
So now, Hamilton, realizing this, started a quasi-defense, in the penultimate 
paragraph, of the actual institution under consideration, rather than that which he 
hoped the people would eventually come to accept.  Here he anticipated and 
addressed the objection that his argument seemed to imply that the four year duration 
of the proposed President would inadequately “answer the end proposed” (i.e. energy 
as “personal firmness”).  The hypothetical objection went further, stating that if four 
years was not enough for firmness, perhaps it was long enough to threaten the public 
liberty, and that, therefore, rather than have the worst of both worlds, it would be 




He began addressing the first part of the objection by admitting that he 
doubted the proposed executive would have adequate firmness to perform its counter-
democratic function.  “It cannot be affirmed,” he stated, “that a duration of four years, 
or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed” (emphasis 
added).  Indeed, he had spent the previous five paragraphs forcefully affirming the 
opposite.  But then, in the next sentence, he would moderate the claim by stating four 
years duration would nevertheless “contribute towards [firmness] in a degree which 
would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the government.”  
This was hardly confidence-inspiring assertion, however, since the question was 
“How much degree of influence would four years’ duration have on firmness?”  His 
answer was that after election and before re-election (or termination), “there would 
always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of an annihilation would be 
sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man endued 
with a tolerable portion of fortitude.”  Such a man, moreover, “might reasonably 
promise himself, that there would be time enough before it arrived, to make the 
community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue.”  
Although “it be probable that, as he approached the moment when the public were, by 
a new election, to signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his 
firmness, would decline;” Hamilton argued it was possible that a President “might … 
with prudence, hazard the incurring of reproach, in proportion to the proofs he had 
given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and 




He then addressed the second part of the objection—that four years might be 
long enough to threaten the public liberty—by making a remarkably audacious 
argument based on a comparison with the British constitution.  The effect of this 
argument, moreover, was to go well beyond his claim that life tenure would be 
necessary to endow the institution with requisite firmness.  So far were Americans 
from having grounds for fear that the proposed executive with four year terms would 
threaten their liberty, he argued, even the British monarch was, if anything, in greater 
danger of becoming inadequately firm than of becoming a threat to British liberty: 
If a British house of commons, from the most feeble beginnings, … 
have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown, and the 
privileges of the nobility, within the limits they [though not 
Hamilton?] conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free 
government, while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence 
of a co-equal branch of the legislature; if they have been able, in one 
instance, to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy, and to 
overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the church as state; if 
they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make the monarch 
tremble at the prospect of an innovation attempted by them; what 
would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years 
duration, with the confined authorities of a president of the United 
States? What but that he might be unequal to the task which the 
constitution assigns him? I shall only add, that if his duration be such 
as to leave a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a 
jealousy of his encroachments. 
It should be noted that Madison made a similar argument about the Senate in 
#63 by noting the encroachments made by the Commons on the Lords as an example 
of how formidable popular assemblies can be.  However, as we have seen, this was 
hardly equivalent in its audacity.  The revolution had repudiated monarchy, not 
bicameralism. 
In sum, this essay, far from being a bow to prejudices for short-term 




republican executive.  Since this would, if anything, imperil ratification, I interpret 
this essay as an example of Hamilton’s long-term effort at swaying public opinion to 
his way of thinking. 
The Sudden Appearance of a Competent Demos : Hamilton’s 
Problematic Case for Re-Eligibility (#72)   
Hamilton would change his tone and tactics considerably in #72 as he made 
the case for re-eligibility.  Through this essay he would introduce propositions and 
principles that sat uneasily with, and at times flatly contradicted, the arguments he 
made in #71.  Compared to the previous essay, this one exhibited far greater optimism 
about the likelihood that popularly accountable executives would have the “courage 
and magnanimity” to fulfill their duty “to serve [the people] … at the peril of their 
displeasure” (#71).  More precisely, in this essay he generally disregarded the conflict 
between the people’s “inclinations” and their true “interests” and emphasized instead 
(1) the benefits to the community to be gained from allowing deserving executives to 
earn re-election and (2) the dangers to free government and the public interest crated 
by preventing avaricious or ambitious executives from seeking re-election.  In this 
section I review his argument and note how the major principles asserted in this essay 
contradicted those of the previous.  Then I conclude with an explanation for why he 
took this tact. 
Before addressing re-eligibility, Hamilton devoted the first paragraph to the 
other advantage, besides “personal firmness,” to be gained by duration: “stability of 
the system of administration.”  For a variety of reasons “every new president [will 
tend to] promote a change of men to fill … subordinate stations,” and the result of 




government.”  Consequently, there was an “intimate connexion between the duration 
of the executive magistrate in office, and the stability of the system of 
administration.” 
Then he turned to the essays main topic, which, he argued was closely 
connected to that of the last: “With a positive duration of considerable extent, I 
connect the circumstance of re-eligibility.”  He then gave a slightly different account 
of why duration was “necessary.”  Instead of “firmness,” duration now gave “the 
officer .. the inclination and the resolution to act his part well.”  These could be seen 
as equivalents, but then he offered a very different image of the people.  Duration, he 
posited, would also give “the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of 
his measures and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits.”  The 
voters, who in the previous essay were incurably manipulatable, were now expected 
to carefully estimate the tendency of the executive’s measures.  With re-eligibility, 
moreover, the people would be “enable[d], when they [saw] reason to approve of his 
conduct, to continue [the magistrate] in the station, in order to prolong the utility of 
his talents and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of permanency 
in a wise system of administration.”  Of course, he had said in the previous essay that 
“the people commonly intend the public good … [but they do not] always reason 
right about the means of promoting it.”  He was thus careful to say here that they 
would estimate the “tendency” of measures, rather than the measures themselves.  But 
he also now expected the people to evaluate “conduct” and have enough sense to 
reelect those who have demonstrated “talents and virtues.”  This was also a departure 




to prolong his duration, would most likely have his “integrity” “corrupt[ed]” and his 
“fortitude” “debased.”  The implication before had been that chief magistrates would 
not seek reelection through good measures, but, rather by a “servile pliancy … to a 
prevailing current … every sudden breeze of passion … to every transient impulse 
which the people may receive from the arts of men.”  Any magistrate, he had just 
argued, who was forced to seek election would be highly unlikely to have the 
“courage and magnanimity enough to serve [the people] at the peril of their 
displeasure.” 
For the rest of the essay, Hamilton proceeded to argue for re-eligibility by 
arguing against exclusion.  This also was a departure from the previous essay.  There, 
as we saw, he argued that the corrupting and debasing influences of non-life-tenure 
would operate “more powerfully” in the executive seeking reelection than in theone 
merely excluded from the opportunity for reelection.  Here, however, he gave several 
reasons why the community would benefit more from the former than the latter.  
Let’s consider a few of these reasons. 
One was already implied.  Exclusion, he argued, would lead to “a diminution 
of the inducements to good behaviour.”  With re-eligibility, he implied, executives 
would be allowed to “entertain a hope of obtaining, by meriting, a continuance of 
office” [Hamilton’s italics.]  Again, he had previously given every reason to believe 
they would not seek “continuance” in this way.  Now he even suggested that 
magistrates seeking reelection might be animated by “the love of fame, the ruling 
passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake 




that for this to work, the people would have to reward, or refrain from punishing, the 
meritorious acts of executives, but, as we saw, Hamilton suspected that the people 
would often be poor judges of merit. 
Also, whereas in #71 he posited that an executive ineligible for reelection will 
be too apathetic to fulfill his duty to resist popular opinion, in this essay he warned of 
avaricious or ambitious men whose vicious passions would lead them to threaten the 
public good, if not the public liberty, if they were excluded from the opportunity for 
reelection.  In the previous essay he argued that a term-limited office would be 
relatively uninteresting to such characters, while here he refers to the office as “the 
summit of his country's honors” and something they would reluctantly part with.   
Re-eligibility, moreover, could lead to experience, which was “the parent of 
wisdom.”  This could have easily been a part of his argument in the previous essay.  
As we saw, at the Convention, but not in the previous essay, he argued for a life term 
(in this case, for Senators) on the grounds that “duration should be the earnest of 
wisdom and stability.”  But, again, why should we expect the wise to be reelected? 
Finally, in case of emergencies—when a “nation” faces the “absolute 
necessity of the services of particular men in particular situations; perhaps … to the 
preservation of its political existence”—exclusion can be a “self-denying ordinance” 
that “serves to prohibit a nation from making use of its own citizens in the manner 
best suited to its exigencies and circumstances.”  At times, such citizens could be 
needed due to their “personal essentiality,” but at other times a “change of the chief 
magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, even of 




substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and set afloat the 
already settled train of the administration.” 
Why This Rhetorical Tact? 
It is impossible, after having read the dreary analysis of #71, to not find the 
heroic image of the executive (and the electors) in #72 somewhat heartening.  
Mansfield (1993) interprets #72 as indicating that the republic was designed to 
“employ [the] … preeminent virtue and abilities” of “extraordinary men” in “order to 
become great” (270).  Certainly, this essay envisioned unusually high conduct by 
officeholders and by voters.  The electoral mechanism was transformed in this essay 
from its traditional liberal republican purpose of negative protection against executive 
abuse (safety), and from its corrupting influence portrayed in #71, to a positive 
inducement for officials to conduct great deeds. 
I have sought to demonstrate, however, that Hamilton’s endorsement of the 
monarchical principle in #71 reflected his more sincere beliefs about constitutional 
necessity, as well as the likelihood of greatness.  That principle strongly suggested 
that more ill than good would come from electoral accountability in the executive, at 
least in contrast to the hereditary alternative.  So why did Hamilton proceed in this 
way? 
I think it was likely a combination of two things.  First, it is not unlikely that 
Hamilton expected (and hoped) the institution would evolve in the manner Jefferson 
expected (and feared) it would.  The latter wrote that he thought re-eligibility would 
amount to life tenure and that “the recent instance particularly of the Stadtholder of 




inheritances.”88  Hamilton may have put this institution in a favorable light in order to 
encourage this natural tendency to develop.  This implied that Hamilton had reason to 
believe that the people would continue men in office for long duration regardless of 
whether they acted, or even because they did not act, meritoriously.  This would be 
fine for Hamilton, however, because his monarchical principle was not based on a 
trust in the essential virtue of the person who happened to be the monarch.  It was 
based, instead, on the positive benefits that would emanate from the (even vicious) 
passions to be expected from a person of ordinary character placed within the 
extraordinary circumstances of that institution.  So long as the institution was placed 
within a balanced constitutional framework, the regime would benefit from the 
virtues of the institution, not the person.  When he wrote in his convention speech 
notes that an executive “ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power that it 
won’t be in his interest to sacrifice much to acquire more,” he was concurring with 
the justification for monarchy given by Montesquieu and De Lolme.  It was about the 
manipulation of passions and interests, not the reliance on virtue.  In a statement at 
the New York Ratifying Convention, he exhibited this moral psychological 
orientation: 
Experience has by no means justified us in the supposition that there is 
more virtue in one class of men than in another. Look through the rich 
and the poor of the community; the learned and the ignorant. Where 
does virtue predominate? The difference indeed consists, not in the 
quantity, but kind of vices, which are incident to the various classes; 
and here the advantage of character belongs to the wealthy.89 
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The second reason, however, is that Hamilton had every reason to hope, even 
if he did not expect, that the republic would benefit from fame-seeking men and high 
minded electors.  He had nothing to lose by raising the possibility in this essay, and 
perhaps it would actually inspire some to live up to its high standards.  Consequently, 
the rhetorical tact he took in this essay was completely failsafe.  As it wafar more 
flattering to the people’s prejudices than the previous essay, it was effectiv  for 
ratification purposes.  Beyond this, he could have hoped that it would bolster support 
for an institution he had reason to believe was a road to monarchy.  Finally, in the 
meantime, he had presented a standard of conduct that, if followed, would make the 
republic more stable and fit for survival (or perhaps even greatness) as it developed 
along its expected path to monarchy. 
Summary of the Two Theories of Executive Power 
In this chapter we have considered several points of convergence and 
divergence in Hamilton’s theory of executive power, on the one hand, and that of 
Madison and Jefferson, on the other.  Let’s briefly review these findings. 
There were three crucial elements in Hamilton’s theory executive power.  
First, as good execution was his standard of good government, he sought to assure 
that the President had the independent formal authority to capably execute the office.  
Second, to assure that the power was used for the public interest, he sought to give the 
institution as much insulation from corrupting (foreign and domestic) forces as 
possible.  Third, since the best regime would mix good execution with liberty, he 
sought to find ways to make necessary executive power compatible with liberty.  Fo  




substantial functional independence (i.e. unilateral constitutional authority) and the 
insulation from foreign and domestic corruption afforded by hereditary succession.  
Moreover, following 18th century conventional wisdom, Hamilton thought a 
hereditary monarch protected liberty by preventing the republican violent death.  On 
the last point, of course, the monarch alone was insufficient for creating and 
preserving liberty.  There had to be a true separation of powers and the people needed 
to have due weight within that scheme:  full legislative power in one chamber and 
ability to defend their customary rights and liberties through independent courtsand 
trial by jury.  Hamilton’s emphasis on the need for executive “energy” was thus due 
to his concern for securing the mere goodness of the regime and based on his belief 
that the non-monarchical elements necessary for liberty (and thus the best regime) 
were already in place. 
I have argued that Hamilton sought to give more power to the executive not 
only to meet the functional needs of the time, but also to put the regime on a 
developmental path toward monarchy.  All regimes were in motion; the only question 
was in which direction.  If they moved in the more republican direction, they would 
suffer quick death.  If they moved in the monarchical direction they could enjoy a 
time under the best regime before passing on to absolute monarchy.  And, as his 
teacher (Hume) had instructed him, going directly from mixed monarchy to absolute 
monarchy was the easier road to despotism.  So the monarchical direction was the





But, and this is crucial, Hamilton always had reservations about giving the 
American president formal unilateral authorities while it was still a republican 
executive.  This emanated from the second element in his thought:  the need for virtue 
in the institution that (he believed) could only result from its insulation from 
corrupting forces.  Recall that at the Convention he said that under the Virginia Plan 
for an executive of seven year duration, “the Executive ought to have but little 
power.”  Whereas those holding that office “would be ambitious” and thus would be 
likely to act against the public interest, his proposed “Executive for life [would not 
have] this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of 
power.”90  Also, in Federalist 75, he would argue that it is “proper or safe[,] …. 
where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire 
power of making treaties,” but “it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that 
power to an elective magistrate of four years duration.”  He continued: “The history 
of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue, which 
would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a 
kind … to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a 
president of the United States.”  Though Hamilton would eventually endorse 
extensive Presidential authority in foreign affair in his Pacificus essays (1793), I have 
argued that, given his principles, this only made sense because he believed the 
institution would evolve in a less democratic direction over time.  Indeed, as was 
discussed above, Hamilton had a tendency to favor granting expansive formal 
authority as a means of enabling an institution to acquire greater effectual power. 
                                                




Madison and Jefferson were in agreement with Hamilton on certain principles.  
They all favored a strong unitary executive.  Moreover, they all believed in the 
necessity of independent courts for protecting rights against executive abus .  They 
also all saw a need for executive “firmness” against legislative encroachments.  
Finally, they all believed that unilateral executive action according to the executive’s 
best judgment of the public interest could be justified under certain conditions. 
Madison and Jefferson envisaged an executive whose authority emanated 
from electoral will of the national people.  Hamilton, by contrast, would insulate the 
institution as much as possible from electoral pressure.  For this reason, he favored a 
life tenure if not hereditary succession for the chief magistrate, while the Virginians 
believed that a duration of around seven years was optimal for both republican safety 
and “energy.”  Part of their disagreement was based on how they conceived of 
“energy.”  The Virginians viewed it as youthful vigor that diminished past a certain 
duration, while Hamilton equated it with firmness, stability, and experience, all things 
he thought would increase with duration in office.  Moreover, while the Virginians  
thought of “firmness” against legislative encroachment as part of the executive’s duty 
as agent of the people, Hamilton tended to equate it with control over the people (i.e. 
as a counter-democratic mechanism.)  Finally, Jefferson, and probably Madison, 
thought prerogative actions should be admitted as illegal and brought before the 
people to judge, while Hamilton thought this ran the danger of legitimizing illegalty 
and thus efficacy of rule of law.  He thus favored a broad interpretation of the 
executive’s formal power in order to uphold the integrity of the law by legalizing any 





The comparative analysis provided in this chapter provides further evidence 
that Madison was correct in attributing monarchical principles and intentions to 
Hamilton’s constitutional project.  I have argued that Hamilton’s theory of executive 
power is most accurately described as counter-democratic and monarchical.  
Madison’s and Jefferson’s theory, by contrast, was genuinely republican, as it sought 
to reconcile republican safety, popular rule, and executive energy.   
Moreover, I have argued that the contradictions between F deralist #71, on 
one hand, and #70 and #72, on the other, are best explained with reference to 
Hamilton’s multiple rhetorical objectives in the F deralist.  The case for duration in 
#71 amounted to a far more persuasive case for the British monarch than for the 
proposed Presidency.  Its central message was that the regime required an electorally 
insulated executive who would stand above factional conflict to prevent the 
republican violent death and act firmly against popular will to promote the public 
interest.  By contrast, #70 heralded the unitary structure of the proposed executive for 
reconciling energy and “safety in the republican sense.”  Similarly, #72 spoke 
favorably of the re-eligibility of the President because it would provide positive 
inducements for the executive to serve the public interest by “meriting” reelection.  
The contradiction could not be clearer:  in the latter two essays Hamilton spoke 
optimistically about electoral accountability, while in #71 he strongly suggested that 
electoral insulation was necessary for an adequately energetic excutive.   
I argued that #71 reflected Hamilton’s genuine views and was an example of 




constitution.  His support for #70, by contrast, was largely due to his immediate 
rhetorical objective of earning ratification.  His argument for re-eligibity in #72, 
however, served three objectives.  First, it helped assure ratification:  since it implied 
a competent electorate, it was flattering to his audience.  Second, Hamilton had 
reason to believe the institution would result in life tenure and, therefore, would take 
the regime closer to hereditary succession.  Third, and finally, Hamilton could have 
written it in hopes that it would inspire high standards of conduct in office holders.  
However, his general orientation toward executive power suggests that he thought 
this was highly unlikely. 
Now that the case has been made that Madison was justified in believing 
Hamilton harbored monarchical principles and intentions, we have one remaining 
task for understanding the basis of Hamilton’s and Madison’s political alliance and 
rupture.  As a prudent statesman, Madison was no more inclined than Hamilton to let 
abstract principles of natural right cloud his judgment about what was politically 
achievable.  To support the federal republic on the basis of prudence as well as 
principle, Madison would need to confront the 18th century critique of republics.  




Chapter 5: Republican Remedies: Madison vs. the 18th Century 
Critique of Republics 
 
Federalist #10 is famous for explaining how the American regime was 
designed to avoid the “violence of faction” that had hitherto “been the mortal diseases 
under which popular governments … every where [had] perished.”  Against the 
orthodox axiom of republican theory—most famously articulated by Montesquieu 
and Rousseau, and routinely recited by anti-federalists (Storing  2006)—that 
republican government requires direct popular participation in power within small 
homogenous communities, Madison followed David Hume (Adair  1974) in asserting 
the opposite.  For Madison and Hume, the only cure for faction consistent with 
republican principles—and thus the only hope for durable republican government—
was to combine the mechanism of representation with a large pluralistic population 
extended over a large territory in order to improve the deliberative quality of 
lawmaking (and thus the prudence and justice of the laws) and, more importantly, to 
make majorities less inclined and/or less able to execute measures antithetical o 
private rights and the public good.  As the proposed Constitution adopted these 
principles, Madison argued, it presented “a republican remedy for the diseases most 
incident to republican government.” 
Although Madison did not emphasize it in this essay, the extended sphere 
served as a simultaneous remedy for two “diseases most incident to republican 
government”: faction and external insecurity.  As was discussed in Chapter 2, by 
Montesquieu’s analysis the problem of size stood at the intersection of the republican 




the only republican remedy for the disease of faction, but civic virtue could not be 
sustained in a large modern commercial society.  This created a republican security 
dilemma for Montesquieu, however, because he believed a territory the size of 
contemporaneous France of Spain presented the optimal extent for external security.  
Montesquieu presented two possible solutions to this republican security dilemma, 
confederacies and the British constitution, but he evidenced a clear preference for the 
latter.  The idea that the extended sphere presented a republican remedy for the 
republican violent death thus presented a theoretical alternative to Montesquieu’s 
preferred solution to the republican security dilemma created by the problem of size.  
This is just one of many examples of how Madison confronted the 18th century 
critique of republics in order to find republican remedies for the diseases most had 
concluded were best treated by the British constitution.   
This chapter seeks to complete my interpretation of the theoretical basis of 
Madison’s and Hamilton’s political alliance and rupture by demonstrating how 
Madison, unlike Hamilton, came to believe the federal republic presented a 
simultaneous solution to multiple manifestations of the republican security dilemma 
and republican violent death.  I demonstrate, first, that the core basis of their 
agreement in 1787-88 was over their mutual fears over disunion.  They were united, 
among other things, in fearing that the republican security dilemma would manifest 
among the States in the event of disunion. 
Second, I also demonstrate that the basis of Madison’s and Hamilton’s rupture 
was already evident by the qualitative differences in their “nationalist” vi ions.  




highlighting the difference between Hamilton’s aspiration for a strong fiscal-military 
state and Madison’s more pacific vision.  While not disagreeing that this was 
important, I also point to differences in the degree of popular control over State and 
national power in their official proposals at the Convention.  In this respect, their 
principled difference over monarchical vs. republican government was the most 
salient difference in their nationalist visions. 
Finally, third, I point to two theoretical innovations Madison made in the early 
1790s based on his more mature thinking on the republican security dilemma.  One of 
these innovations helps to explain why he changed his mind about the importance of 
partial State sovereignty.  Although it is well known that he came to see the Staes as 
essential for checking an undue aggrandizement of power in the central government, I 
demonstrate that he also came to see the States as necessary for mobilizing support in 
times of war.  In other words, he concluded that extending the sphere alone was not 
sufficient for providing external security.  Thus, the States became necessary for this 
element of his effort to resolve Montesquieu’s republican security dilemma.   
His second innovation in 1790s had to do with the strategic logic of modern 
war finance.  As was discussed in Chapter 2, it was widely believed in the 18th 
century that systems of taxation and borrowing were necessary for national security, 
but this also had the unhappy consequence of allowing executives to engage in 
unnecessary wars and aggrandize power domestically.  Madison, I will demonstrate, 
turned this logic upside down by suggesting fiscally restrained republican regimes 
will be more externally secure.  In arguing this, moreover, he also found a remedy for 




committing themselves to ruinous war out of momentary passion.  These two 
innovations, I argue, help explain why he came to the conclusion that the federal 
republic was not only a remedy for the violent death and republican security dilemma 
among the States, but also that it was the most externally secure regime yt devised. 
This chapter is organized into four sections.  The first section briefly 
overviews Madison’s beliefs in the last years of his life about the intrinsic virtues of 
the status quo “partly federal, partly national” political association that he had done so 
much to help build.  I demonstrate that he saw it as a complex solution for multiple 
manifestations of the republican security dilemma and republican violent death.  The 
task of the next two sections is to explain how he came to this conclusion that defied 
the orthodox 18th century critique of republics, which Hamilton accepted.  The second 
section focuses on his views at the time of the Convention and the third section 
discusses his innovations in the 1790s.  Finally, in the fourth section, I point to the 
one source of pessimism in Madison’s assessment of the viability of the antebellum 
constitutional order.  The union had been so successful at providing external security, 
he came to believe, that it had eliminated a credible external threat.  The problem 
with this was that Madison believed a moderate external threat was necessary for 
cementing the union.  
Madison’s Prudential Defenses of the Status Quo 
Constitution During the Nullification Crisis 
Amid the controversies surrounding the nullification crisis—and particularly 
Calhoun’s appropriation of the Virginian and Kentucky Resolutions to defend 
nullification, coupled with his direct assault on Madison’s theory of dispersed 




defending the status quo constitutional order.91  Part of his defense relied upon 
clarifying his legal theory of the constitution.92  However, for our purposes, the most 
important aspect of his defense was his insistence on the intrinsic liberal repub ican 
goodness of the political system itself.  Nullifiers, and anyone harboring thou hts of 
secession, were not only mistaken in their account of constitutional legitimacy; they 
were also imprudent for pursuing a set of policies that defied the dictates of their self-
interest in sustaining a stable popular government that secures life, liberty, and 
property and thereby promotes their happiness. 
The central part of his prudential argument was negative:  vindicating the 
system of divided sovereignty under a presumptively supreme federal authority by 
contrasting it to the anticipated consequences of the “wholly federal” (confederation, 
by our modern terminology) arrangement implied by the doctrine of nullification.  
Without presumptive federal judicial supremacy over constitutional disputes, he could 
not see how “the Constitution itself could be the supreme law of the land; or that the 
uniformity of the Federal Authority throughout the parties to it could be preserved; or 
that without this uniformity, anarchy & disunion could be prevented.”93  Indeed, 
Madison had not wavered from the conclusion he had drawn from his review of 
ancient and modern confederacies in 178794, which was that confederal systems “tend 
rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head.”95  His great hope 
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since the ratification of the Constitution had been that the States would be adequately 
subordinated to national authority to prevent their succumbing to this pathology of 
pure confederacies.  He thus would typically argue against the doctrine of 
nullification by reciting the liberal republican parade of horrors that he always 
believed would result from disunion. 
It is, he wrote in 1833, “the obvious consequences of disunion, by which the 
value of Union is to be calculated.”96 The image he portrayed of the consequences of 
disunion was essentially a recap of the Federalists 2-14 portrayal: 
The positive advantages of the Union would alone endear it to those 
embraced by it; but it ought to be still more endeared by the 
consequences of disunion, in the jealousies & collisions of Commerce, 
in the border wars, pregnant with others, and soon to be engendered by 
animosities between the slaveholding, and other States, in the higher 
toned Govts. especially in the Executive branch, in the military 
establishments provided agst external danger, but convertible also into 
instruments of domestic usurpation, in the augmentations of expence, 
and the abridgment, almost to the exclusion of taxes on consumption 
(the least unacceptable to the people) by the facility of smuggling 
among communities locally related as would be the case. Add to all 
these the prospect of entangling alliances with foreign powers 
multiplying the evils of internal origin.97 
For our purposes, the most important of these claims was his reference to “the 
higher toned Govts. especially in the Executive branch, in the military establishments 
provided agst external danger, but convertible also into instruments of domestic 
usurpation.”  Madison believed, in other words, that disunion would thrust individual 
Americans into the republican security dilemma, with the internal structure of th ir 
domestic governments designed, not for a durable reconciliation between popular 
government and liberal rights, but, rather, to achieve security from external “aliens, 
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rivals, enemies” whom had hitherto been “fellow citizens of one great, respectable, 
and flourishing empire.”98  Madison first made reference to this consequence of 
disunion at the Convention and would repeat it throughout his life when describing 
the scene he foresaw in that event.  If consistency is a portal to a man’s soul, it 
appears this was one of Madison’s gravest concerns.   
In 1833, in a telling letter to Henry Clay, Madison impugned the nullifiers, not 
for legal infidelity, but, rather, for imprudently assuming political separation would 
make them safer from Northern oppression than would continued association in the 
federal republic: 
[W]hat madness in the South, to look for greater safety in disunion. It 
would be worse than jumping out of the Frying-pan into the fire: it wd. 
be jumping into the fire for fear of the Frying-pan. The danger from 
the alarm is that the pride & resentment exerted by them may be an 
overmatch for the dictates of prudence and favor the project of a 
Southern Convention insidiously revived, as promising by its Councils 
the best securities agst grievances of every sort from the North.99  
In other words, nullifiers had misperceived a threat of sectional domination 
presented by the North in addition to failing to see that, even if there were such a 
threat, disunion would create sources of domination at least as bad.  Put another way, 
their conflicts of interest would not change, only the mode of adjudicating them 
would:  from an imperfect political process to an even more imperfect diplomatic 
mode.100 
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As far back as 1821 Madison had suggested that it was an open question “[w] 
hether the Constitution, as it has divided the powers of Govt. between the States in 
their separate & in their united Capacities, tends to an oppressive aggrandizement of 
the Genl Govt or to an Anarchical Independence of the State Govts.”  Although from 
the 1830s forward he rarely spoke of the former, from the early 1790s to the early 
1820s he often expressed a belief that consolidation of the States would “naturally 
lead to a dangerous accumulation in the Executive hands;”101 or, more dramatically, 
that it was “a high road to monarchy.”102  Indeed he seems to have genuinely 
believed, as he wrote in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, that the Federalist’s broad 
constructions of national government power would, whether intended or not, have the 
long term tendency of 
consolidate[ing] the States by degrees into one sovereignty, the 
obvious tendency and inevitable result of which would be to transform 
the present republican system of the United States into an absolute, or 
at best a mixed, monarchy.103 
There is no evidence that he changed his mind about this.  It is most likely that 
he spoke less about this danger after the 1820s because by then it was clear that the 
system was tending more toward “anarchical independence” than toward an 
“oppressive aggrandizement” of national power. 
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between diplomacy and this perverted form of “politics” was reflected in Locke’s description of 
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He did, however, mention both extremes in the 1830s when he advanced his 
positive prudential claims defending the status quo constitutional order of the 1830s.  
In his Notes on Nullification (1835), he explained that the system was designed not 
only to overcome the inherent deficiencies of consolidation and pure state 
sovereignty, but also to gain the advantages of each extreme: 
the U. S. have adopted a modification of political power, which aims 
at such a distribution of it as might avoid as well the evils of 
consolidation as the defects of federation, and obtain the advantages of 
both.104 
In that essay he mentioned just one of those advantages.  “Republicanism,” he 
wrote, suffers from “frailties” without “the control of a Federal organization.”  Thus, 
one advantage was the improvement of republican government itself.  In an 
unaddressed letter in 1833, moreover, he delineated what those improvements were:  
“It remained for the people of the U. S.,” he wrote, “by combining a federal with a 
republican organization, to enlarge still more the sphere of representative Govt and by 
convenient partitions & distributions of power, to provide the better for internal 
justice & order, whilst it afforded the best protection agst. external dangers.”105  In 
his view, this association, “by enlarging the practicable sphere of popular 
governments,“ promised the “consummation of all the reasonable hopes of the 
patrons of free Govt.” 
In sum, in the last two decades of his life, Madison had to come to conclude 
the following: 
(1) Disunion and consolidation would both result in the loss of 
republican government in North America. 
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(2) The extended federal republic—a large association of republican 
governments governed with shared sovereignty between those 
governments and a presumptively supreme republican 
superintending government—was the best mode of association yet 
invented for durably mixing republican government with justice, 
order, and external security, and, in turn, thereby preserving 
republican government itself. 
All of these conclusions defied the orthodox understanding prevalent in the 
1780s.  Conventional wisdom held, as we saw in Chapter 2, that such an association 
would be the least rather than the most likely to sustain the conditions requisite for 
durable liberty, for the following reasons: 
(1) Montesquieu and De Lolme had insisted that the British balanced 
constitution was the form best suited for combining “republican 
government” with “internal justice & order.”  With the exception 
of Hume, European authorities thought modern republics were 
destined to be unjust and disorderly and, thus, to succumb to the 
republican violent death. 
(2) The size of the extended sphere that Madison lauded in the 1830s 
was, by Montesquieu’s reasoning, too large for both republican 
government and for the external security of any form of 
government. 
(3) Finally, by Thucydides’ account, republics, by their very nature, 
tend to blunder into imprudent wars thus canceling-out their 
inherent advantages. 
For Madison to reach these conclusions, he would need to not only confront orthodox 
theory; he would also have to readjust the views he held during and shortly after the 
Convention.  As we shall see in the next section, his original constitutional vision is 
best described as a republicanized remix of the old British imperial constitution; one 
that would “superintend” over the republican States so as to prevent them from 
succumbing to the republican violent death or the republican security dilemma.  At 




nations,”106 but reconstruct those opinions in a multifaceted effort to preserve the 
Revolution’s commitment to republican government.  However, at this time he 
focused his efforts on finding a national “republican solution to the diseases … [of the 
State] republican government[s].”107  In the early 1790s, as will be discussed in the 
third section, he discovered that the vast Western expansion that he believed was 
necessary for minimizing the bites of the republican violent death and republican 
security dilemma would, in turn, require a role for the States in preserving popular 
government.  They would be necessary for sustaining engaged republican citizenship, 
mobilizing the country in time of war, and preventing an oppressive aggrandizement 
of national government power. 
Madison in the 1780s: States as Disease in Need of 
Republican Cure 
In this section I seek to reconstruct Madison’s constitutional ideas at the time 
of the founding as a sequential process of reasoning, where he weighed various 
options and chose that which he thought was the best, or, more accurately, the least 
bad.  This is my own construction, based on my interpretation of his writings in the 
critical period and through the Convention.  I seek to demonstrate, in the process, that 
Madison’s thought process was best described as an attempt to create a 
republicanized and thus improved version of the old British imperial constitution: one 
constituted according to republican principles and with the purpose of preserving and 
expanding republican self-government while providing the “superintending” authority 
necessary for providing for the common defense, peace between the States, regulation 
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of commerce, and other public goods once provided by the King in Parliament.  I also 
suggest that Hamilton’s and Madison’s “nationalism” were always different in 
complexion, and their difference can be understood as two distinct orientations 
toward the former British imperial constitution. The biggest difference between th m 
was their approach toward the vacuum left by the loss of monarchy in the old system. 
Let’s begin with the first step in Madison’s reasoning. 
Step 1: The Confederation was a Failure 
In his “Vices of the Political System of the United States” (April 1787), 
Madison listed twelve problems with the status quo constitutional order.  Of these, the 
first nine were about the relations of the States with each other and with the central 
government of the Confederacy.  The last four spoke to the problems inside the 
States.  Among the first nine, the most noteworthy include: 
Failure of the States to comply with the Constitutional requisitions. 
The States routinely came up with excuses for not paying, with the most 
frequent being that they could not pay due to their State’s poor economic health.  As 
Dougherty (2001) has shown, however, there was no significant statistical 
relationship between State income and propensity to pay.  A State was likely to pa  
only when the requisition was earmarked for a service that served that State’s
immediate interest. 
Encroachments by the States on the federal authority 
By this, Madison meant States exceeding their own bounds of authority, such 
as separately negotiating treaties with other nations. 




This was a routine practice, and was badly damaging the United States 
diplomatically (Keohane  2002).   
Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other.  
By this he meant such things as trade protectionism and the externalities of 
monetary policies. 
Want of concert in matters where common interest requires it 
He noted that this was “strongly illustrated in the state of [their] commercial 
affairs.”  The issue highest on his mind most likely was the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty 
negotiated by John Jay in 1785.  The treaty would have given northern merchants 
access to Spanish markets in exchange for Spanish control over navigation of the 
Mississippi River for 25 years.  No issue was important to Southern interests than 
gaining access to the Mississippi.  As McDonald (2002, 14) reports, “when the 
proposal came to a vote in Congress, heated debate along sectional lines stimulated 
mutterings of breaking the Union into two or three regional confederations.” 
Hamilton was also alarmed by these conditions.  However, he also had a 
specific concern that emanated from his observations of New York Governor George 
Clinton’s activities.  He essentially started to pursue a financial program similar to 
what Hamilton would later propose at the national level.  As McDonald put it, 
through his policies, “New York effectively declared that it would be first among 
equals in the United States or else not be one of the States at all” (McDonald  1982, 
87). 




Madison’s study of ancient and modern confederacies had convinced him that 
this was a universal problem with confederations.  The critical vice of those forms of 
association was that they created Imperium in Imperio:  sovereignty within 
sovereignty.  At a more practical level, the problem was that the “superintending” 
authority could not legislate (and execute) measures directly on individuals.  The 
central government instead had to seek compliance from member units (States in the 
American case.)  The problem with this was that there was no effective means of 
enforcement.  The only way to sanction non-compliance was by coercing the States as 
collective units, which meant by force of arms.  For effective governance, therfore, it 
was imperative that the superintending government be able to act directly on the 
American people as though they were members of a single state.  As he put it in 
Federalist #20, history taught “the important truth” that “a sovereignty over 
sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as 
contradistinguished from individuals … is subversive of the order and ends of civil 
polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the 
sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.”108 
On this basic diagnosis, Madison and Hamilton were in full agreement 
Step 3: Union was Necessary / Disunion would be worse than the 
Confederation and was a realistic possibility 
As mentioned above, this step has typically been downplayed by historians 
throughout the 20th century.  I, however, follow Hendrickson in believing the 
Federalists “said what they meant and meant what they said” throughout the 
                                                




Convention and ratification campaign when they expressed fears that dismemberment 
was immanent (Hendrickson  2003, 5). 
Therefore, the next step in the reasoning process was that the alternative to 
finding a solution to the problem of the Confederacy was to break into separate 
confederacies.  This, however, was most certainly a cure worse than the disease.  
First, each separate confederacy would have to overcome the inherent problems of 
confederacies as well.  Second, this ran the risk of turning North America into an 
anarchical system of States (and confederacies) akin to that in Europe.  This would 
create a host of evils—territorial disputes, trade wars, shooting war, and, Madison 
never failed to mention, the republican security dilemma among the states 
themselves. 
Madison and Hamilton were in basic agreement about these things, but they 
did have certain noteworthy differences in this area.  One was already mentioned 
above:  Hamilton never before or after Federalist 8 listed the republican security 
dilemma between the States as one of his fears for disunion.  He almost always 
emphasized wars between the States, weakness abroad, and an exacerbation of 
conflict between the States from European meddling.  There was also fundamental 
disagreement on two additional issues. 
Nature of External Security to be Provided by the Union 
Madison 
Madison and Jefferson believed it was necessary for the preservation of 
republican government in North America to remain secure from Europe with as 
minimal military engagement as possible.  For them, America faced an elaborate 




a dangerous aggrandizement of executive power109, but even the process of armament 
threatened to undermine the socioeconomic basis they thought necessary for 
necessary for republican government (Tucker and Hendrickson  1990; McCoy  1996; 
Robert W. Smith  2004).  An agrarian economy was essential to republicanism for 
two reasons.  First, they thought farmers made the best citizens because of their 
independence.110  Second, Madison in particular thought it was necessary for 
avoiding the severe class conflict that no republican constitutional design could 
prevent from resulting in the republican violent death.111  To remain a republican 
people, they needed to avoid becoming an advanced manufacturing society.  For 
Madison and Jefferson, it was thus essential that they find non-military means for 
providing their defense.  Western expansion was part of this (more below), but they 
also hoped that federal unification would in itself be an effective deterrent to 
European encroachment and that they could use economic sanction (“peaceable 
coercion”) to demand fair terms of trade and just treatment from the European powers 
(Tucker and Hendrickson  1990). 
Hamilton 
                                                
109 “War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created; 
and it is the executive will, which is to direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be unlocked; an  it 
is the executive hand which is to dispense them. In war, the honours and emoluments of office are to 
be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, 
that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passion  
and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambi ion, avarice, vanity, the honourable or 
venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.” (Madison, Helvidius 
IV, 1793.) 
110 Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia.” 
111 Adair (1974, 168) argued that most of the generation thought it was a question if when, not if, 
republican violent death would set-in, requiring recourse to something like the British model. Madison 
actually calculated a year after which he thought population pressures would force a regime change. 




Hamilton, as was discussed in Chapter 3, had a very different future in mind.  
He envisioned, as he said in Federalist 11, that “the Thirteen States, bound together 
in a strict and indissoluble union, [would] … erect… one great American system, 
superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the 
terms of the connexion between the old and the new world!”  He expected the 
Americans to become a formidable military power in the Western hemisphere and, 
indeed, his entire economic program was calculated to, among other things, create the 
military basis for American ascendancy in foreign affairs.  And, as was also discussed 
in Chapter 3, one reason Hamilton was eager to institute the British model was 
because he thought class divisions were nearly severe enough already, and, moreover, 
if he could implement his planned economic program, would soon be exacerbated. 
Envisioned Extent / Purpose of Western Expansion of Union 
Madison 
Madison and Jefferson both believed that the union needed to extend a very 
great distance for the same reasons that they sought to avoid armament.  They both 
believed that remaining an agricultural people would require a territorial expansion 
because otherwise there would be a surplus of labor that would need non-agrarian 
employment to survive.  Furthermore, Western expansion would push back European 





Hamilton, by contrast, seems to have held to Montesquieuian orthodoxy about 
the optimal size for a state.112  He envisioned the United States confining its political 
territory (though certainly not its sphere of control) to the East of the Mississippi.113 
Step 4: The States legislatures were governing irresponsibly, which was bad in 
itself, but was especially alarming because it jeopardized America’s experiment in 
republican government 
At the same time, the republican governments in the States were engaged in 
an irresponsible form of lawmaking.  Not only was their parochialism, recalcitran e, 
and sovereign pretensions the root causes of the crisis of the union, but their internal 
legislation was marked by three vicious qualities:  “multiplicity,” “mutability,” and 
“injustice.”114  Shay’s rebellion had alarmed Madison as much as anyone, but his 
fears ran deeper.   
As a liberal, Madison was most certainly alarmed by what he saw as the abus  
of property rights (injustice) by the democratic assemblies in the States.  But he 
consistently expressed worry that this injustice would lead to the republican violet 
death.  In a letter he wrote about a proposed constitutional reform in Virginia in 1788, 
Madison endorsed a firm Senate as a means of preventing the violent death 
A Senate for six years will not be dangerous to liberty, on the contrary 
it will be one of its best guardians. By correcting the infirmities of 
                                                
112 Stourzh (1970, 193) mistakenly attributed Hamilton’s limited expansion to his "pertinaciously 
holding to the dogma that no free republic could be established and maintained in a large geographical 
areas." In fact, the sphere he had in mind was well beyond what conventional wisdom said was 
appropriate for a republic (see Hamilton, Federalist 9.)  The dogma he seems to have held to was 
Montesquieu’s limit on any state, including monarchy. 
113 Hamilton to general Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Dec. 29, 1802): “You know my general theory 
as to our Western affairs. I have always held that t e <i>unity of our empire</i> and the best interests 
of our nation require that we shall annex to the United States all the territory east of the Mississippi, 
New Orleans included.” 




popular Government, it will prevent that disgust agst that form which 
may otherwise produce a sudden transition to some very different one. 
It is no secret to any attentive & dispassionate observer of ye pol: 
situation of ye U. S., that the real danger to republican liberty has 
lurked in that cause.115 
It is also important to consider closely Madison’s wording in a letter to 
Jefferson after the Convention in 1787: 
The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm 
the most stedfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err 
in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to 
that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the 
Public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our 
national character and interest from the inadequacy of the 
Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform therefore which does 
not make provision for private rights, must be materially defective.116 
The letter implies a lot about Madison’s priorities.  First, he implied that, though most 
citizens were more concerned with their own private interests, the real primary 
problem from the standpoint of the public good was the crisis of the union.  Second, 
he implied that the violation of private rights was a matter of concern for republican 
government.  The crisis had “prepared the Public mind for a general reform,” but, the 
propertied may have been ready for the introduction of something other than a 
republic if they believed it would better protect their rights.  If not for the virtues of 
the members of the Convention, the opportunity presented by the crisis could have 
been seized by the enemies rather than the “stedfast friends of Republicanism.” 
Step 5: The States are the core problem and are actually superfluous (in the 
abstract) from the standpoint of the rights, freedom, and welfare of individual 
Americans 
                                                
115 Madison, 1788, “OBSERVATIONS ON THE DRAUGHT OF A CONSTITUTION FOR 
VIRGINIA” 




Before the Convention, Madison expressed to Edmund Randolph his views on 
the proper place of the States in the reformed constitutional order.  “I hold it for a 
fundamental point,” he wrote, “that an individual independence of the States is utterly 
irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty.”  However, he also thought 
“a consolidation of the States into one simple republic is not less unattainable than it 
would be inexpedient.”  So, he advocated trying to take a “middle ground” that would 
“at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the 
local authorities so far as they can be subordinately useful.”117  At the time, this was 
about as conciliatory toward the idea of States’ rights as Madison would get. 
Several times at the constitutional convention, when refuting those who 
argued for States’ rights on the grounds that a wholly consolidated republic would 
violate their freedom, Madison and Hamilton noted the artificiality of states and their 
ultimate irrelevance to individual rights (in the abstract).  For example, eary in the 
Convention, Madison stated the following: 
Were it practicable for the general government to extend its care to 
every requisite object without the cooperation, of the state 
governments, the people would not be less free, as members of one 
great republic, than as members of thirteen small ones. A citizen of 
Delaware was not more free than a citizen of Virginia; nor would 
either be more free than a citizen of America. Supposing, therefore, a 
tendency in the general government to absorb the state governments, 
no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the 
supposition, that a tendency should be left in the state governments 
towards an independence on the general government, and the gloomy 
consequences need not be pointed out. 
Now his point here was not that the States would be abolished, but only that 
there was asymmetry in the extremes of total disunion and total consolidation.  The 
                                                




latter could, at the level of abstract theory, be republican and thus free, whereas t  
former would lead America to be the face of Europe, with high toned governments 
and standing armies.   
Similarly, Hamilton would state: 
But as states are a collection of individual men, which ought we to 
respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the 
artificial beings resulting from the composition? Nothing could be 
more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It 
has been said that, if the smaller states renounce their equality, they 
renounce, at the same time, their liberty. The truth is, it is a contest for 
power, not for liberty. Will the men composing the small states be less 
free than those composing the larger?118 
Step 6: The Old British Imperial Constitution, though oppressive, was a 
successful model of continental governance. Could they Reconstitute it as a 
Republican Government, Retain Its Virtues, and Employ it in the service of 
Preserving Republican State Governments? 
The key to Madison’s solution to the crisis of the union and the crisis of 
republicanism was to create a genuinely republican supreme national authority with 
an absolute veto over State legislation.  Madison decided that this was the crucial 
element of the old imperial constitution that needed to be incorporated into the new 
constitution.  He made the case for the veto most powerfully at the Convention on 
June 8.  In his view, “an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the states
[was] absolutely necessary to a perfect system.”  The states had shown a “const nt 
tendency … to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national treaties; to 
infringe the rights and interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their 
respective jurisdictions.”  All of these “mischiefs,” in his judgment, could be 
                                                




prevented through the veto.  Moreover, he thought it was “the mildest expedient that 
could be devised” for this purpose.  Without the negative, the national authority 
would have no choice but “an appeal to coercion,” whereas the “negative would 
render the use of force unnecessary.”  Moreover, “to give the negative this efficacy, it 
must extend to all cases. A discrimination would only be a fresh source of contention 
between the two authorities.”  The national government must be the supreme judge of 
constitutional disputes.  The proposed “prerogative [i.e. veto] of the general 
government [would be] the great pervading principle that must control the centrifugal 
tendency of the states; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits, 
and destroy the order and harmony of the political system.”  “This,” he continued, 
“was the practice in the royal colonies before the revolution, and would not have been 
inconvenient if the supreme power of negativing had been faithful to the American 
interest, and had possessed the necessary information.” 
The key then was that the veto wielded under the new system would be 
constituted so as to possess what the imperial constitution had lacked:  faithfulness to 
the “American interest” and “necessary information.”  Elsewhere he would put it 
slightly differently.  The “The great desideratum in Government,” he wrote to 
Jefferson, “is, so to modify the sovereignty as that it may be sufficiently neutral 
between different parts of the Society to controul one part from invading the rights of 
another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest 
adverse to that of the entire Society.”119   
                                                




It is now, after following this train of reasoning, that we can properly place the 
logic of Federalist 10 and 51 into Madison’s program of Constitutional reform.  A 
necessary (though not sufficient) element in the constitution of the veto power was 
that it be based on the republican principle of majority rule (society’s control over the 
sovereignty) and that the majority be kept “netural,” or, that is, prevented from being 
factious.  The national majority of an extended sphere would combine these elements.  
For the reasons made well known in #10 and #51, the majority in an extended sphere 
would be less likely to be factious because it would “make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole [would] have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens; or if such a common motive exist[ed], it [would] be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”120  It 
was through the course of attempting to figure-out a republicanized functional 
equivalent to the British constitution that Madison developed his insight about the 
superiority of large to small republics. 
However, the extended national majority was one, but only one, part of the 
reason that he thought it was safe to vest the veto in the central government.  Just as 
important to Madison was that it would be wielded by the Senate, “the great anchor of 
the Government.”121  In fact, when he spoke of the Senate at the Convention, he 
expressed worry that if it did not have a long enough duration, then even the national 
government could suffer the republican violent death: 
What we wished was, to give to the government that stability which 
was every where called for, and which the enemies of the republican 
form alleged to be inconsistent with its nature. He [Madison] was not 
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afraid of giving too much stability, by the term of seven years. His fear 
was, that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for 
it…. He conceived it to be of great importance that a stable and firm 
government, organized in the republican form, should be held out to 
the people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this 
species of government by the operations of the defective systems 
under which they now live, it is much to be feared the time is not 
distant, when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing 
which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any 
change that may be proposed to them.122 
This Senate, however, would derive its natural aristocratic quality primarily by the 
structure of the institution: its duration (though not specified, it was expected to be 
under ten years) and small size.  It incorporated a popular element because it would 
be nominated by the State legislatures and elected by the popularly elected lower 
chamber.  
Comparison with Hamilton 
It is important to consider how Madison’s Virginia Plan compared and 
contrasted with Hamilton’s.  We have already discussed the central place of the 
executive elected for life in Hamilton’s plan.  Like in Madison’s model, the 
legislature would have an absolute veto over the States.  This was a less popular 
mechanism, however, because the upper chamber had life tenure.  However, the 
central difference between the two plans was that the national legislature wo ld 
appoint the governors to each State who would also have an absolute veto over State 
legislation.  It is often said that this effectively consolidated the States into a single 
unitary state.  There is certainly some truth in this notion, but the more apt description 
is that the States were effectively returned to their old colony status with exception 
being that the people now had the representation in the “Parliament” for which they 
                                                




had initiated the Revolution (and which Hamilton continued to believe was the real 
issue at hand.) 
Rakove (1996) has argued that the two “differed little in their judgment of the 
defects of the Constitution [after the Convention]…. Where they did diverge was in 
their understanding of exactly how ‘subordinate’ or ‘inferior’ a jurisdiction he states 
should retain.” (pp. 197-198) I would argue, to the contrary, that their real difference 
was over why the States should be subordinated and by what principle?  On the one 
hand, Madison, though at this time at his most “nationalistic” stage, still was 
concerned with preserving the States as semi-independent republics.  His veto, awe 
have seen, was intended to prevent the republican violent death within the States, as 
well as to protect the national legislature from State encroachment.  Most crucially, 
he allowed the people of the States to continue exercising direct control over their 
executive.  The citizens in Hamilton’s States, by contrast, would have no effective 
control over the Governors who not only wielded the executive power of the State, 
but also represented an independent will over their legislation.  Madison’s national 
veto, by contrast, would be exercised by legislators nominated by the States and 
elected directly by the elected popular branch.  So both of Hamilton’s veto’s over 
State legislation had greater insulation from popular pressure than did Madison’s.   
This was the core difference in their “nationalisms.”  It was not only a matter of 
degree of consolidation, but also of the degree of uncontrolled (insulated) power 




Rethinking the States Post-Ratification: The Federa l 
Republic and Two Republican Security Dilemmas 
Prior to the 1790s, Madison did not articulate views that would indicate why, 
besides overcoming Montesquieu’s limits on the size of republics, an extended 
republic might be superior to monarchies for external strength.  He had indicated th t 
the strengthened union under the new Constitution would be adequate for external 
security and superior to the old Confederacy, but he had not said it would be superior 
to non-republics in this respect. Montesquieu, it will be recalled, actually only gave 
two reasons to support the conventional wisdom that monarchies are stronger than 
republics in foreign affairs.  One was that monarchs, because of their unitary nature, 
were simply faster than the deliberative assemblies that ruled in republics.  This 
republican security dilemma was overcome, as was discussed in the last chapter, by 
the advent of a unitary republican executive.  The other reason he gave was indirect.  
Monarchies tended to be stronger because they were necessary for the governance of 
territories optimally sized for external security.  The outer limit on size, recall, was 
set by how quickly an army could be moved from one border to another.  In his 
judgment, contemporaneous France and Spain presented the optimal size.  Madison, 
of course, defied this logic by showing how large republics would be more stable and 
just than small republics.  But Madison had not indicated reason for believing 
republics would be stronger than monarchies.   
But Madison thought differently.  In this section I consider two manifestations 
of the republican security dilemma that Madison grappled with in the 1790s, and help 
explain why he came to think the extended federal republic was “the best” at 




extended sphere.  Though Madison’s theory defied Montesquieu’s size trade-offs, 
Madison’s particular constitutional project, I will demonstrate, faced a new trade-off 
of its own.  His resolution to this problem, in turn, was part of the reason he came to 
accept the States as something more than a disease in need of remedy; they becam  a 
part of his cure to the republican security dilemma.  The other problem had to do with 
the problem of the financial institutions of the modern fiscal-military state discussed 
in Chapter 2.  A classic manifestation of the republican security dilemma in the 18th 
century was that systems of war finance, while necessary for effectively fighting 
foreign war, could have the effect of allowing monarchs-executives to aggrandize 
power by allowing them to initiate wars without first extracting revenue from society.  
Madison faced this problem in the context of arguing against Hamilton’s financial 
program.  In so doing, however, he also seems to have sought to resolve the dilemma 
pointed to by Thucydides that democracies, while having certain strategic advantages, 
are prone to falling into imprudent wars leading to their ruin. 
The States and Overcoming Limits to the Extended Sp here 
In the last section I noted that Madison and Jefferson both preferred a very 
large territory so as to allow Americans to remain as long as possible as an 
agricultural society.  This, however, created an institutional design problem for 
Madison, because, although he did not emphasize it in the Fed ralist, he believed that 
the benefits of the extended sphere had a natural limit and, at some point, size would 
be pernicious to rather than supportive of popular government.  To Jefferson in 1787 
he wrote:  “It must be observed however that this doctrine [of the extended sphere] 
can only hold within a sphere of a mean extent. As in too small a sphere oppressive 




one, a defensive concert may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those
entrusted with the administration.”123 
Madison first implied a solution to this problem in #51 when he pointed to the 
“double security” afforded to the people by the ability for the two levels of 
government to “control each other; at the same time that each will be controled by 
itself.”  The implication was that the States would act as agents on the people’s behalf 
if the federal government became oppressive, as he indeed attempted to do with the 
Virginia Resolutions (1798).  Then, in the last two sentences of #51 he noted that this 
implied the States could be useful for extending the “practicable sphere”: 
It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary 
opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, 
provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will 
be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the 
practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious 
modification and mixture of the f deral principle. 
Sheehan (1992) has noted, however, that Madison in his “Notes on 
Government,” which he drafted in 1791-92, had determined that the States were now 
to perform a more robust role in his theory beyond mere mobilization to check 
oppression.  Within the context of a sophisticated argument about the role of public 
opinion in a republic, Madison argued that for a regime to be genuinely free, the 
citizenry and elected leaders would need to engage in a sort of give and take, with the 
people expressing their voice, and it ultimately determining the law, but with the 
officials also actively engaged in opinion leadership.  One implication of this was that 
the spread of representative republics across the territory would be helpful in 
sustaining this active process of opinion formation.  Consequently, Madison had 
                                                




decided that the States had a positive, as well as a negative checking, role to play 
within the context of his theory of the extended sphere of republican government.  If 
his arguments at the Convention suggesting the superfluity of the States were sinc , 
rather than hypothetical or rhetorical, then it is clear that as of 1792 Madison had 
changed his mind.  The upshot was that Madison’s system was now making use of the 
States to improve the process of republican politics at both levels of government 
rather than just extending the sphere to create an effective, yet safe, superintending 
authority to remedy the problem of the States. 
Importantly, this also presented a possible solution to a different problem with 
the extensive sphere with which Madison had to contend.  And this was one was more 
directly related to the republican security dilemma.  Madison had observed that too 
large of a sphere could make a state externally insecure, not for Montesquieu’s 
reasons, but, rather because it was essential for external security that the regime be 
capable of building public support for fighting its wars.  He decided that the States 
would be instrumental for this as well.124 
It seems, then, that this discovery of the utility of the States for extending the 
practicable sphere could be a major reason why Madison became convinced that the 
institutional form of the federal republic found mutual reinforcement in the means 
necessary for external security and republican liberty, and thus averted the rpublican 
security dilemma. 
                                                




Defying the Logic of the Fiscal-Military State (and  
Thucydides) 
Madison seems to have thought he had found another such case of mutual 
reinforcement through the logic he articulated in his Gazette essay “Universal Peace” 
(1792).  This essay, published in the National Gazette, presents a fascinating 
argument about how republics could overcome their propensity to imprudent wars 
pointed to by Thucydides.  Though he did not cite Thucydides, he did cite him in a 
Gazette essay one month and four essays earlier, which suggests he likely had him in 
mind when writing this essay.  By seeking to imbue democracy with wisdom, this 
was a part of Madison’s lifelong project of creatively mixing the advantages of 
aristocracy with democracy.  In this case, the advantages of democracy he highlighted 
included not only the control over rulers by the ruled, but also, by implication, the 
citizen courage traditionally thought to be encouraged by free government.   
On its face, “Universal Peace” is an argument against Rousseau’s alleged125 
endorsement of Abbe Saint Pierre’s peace plan for Europe.  Madison’s argument 
centered around the primacy of regime form in determining inter-regime relations.  
Pierre’s plan—which called for “a confederation of [monarchical] sovereigns, under a 
council of deputies, for the double purpose of arbitrating external controversies 
among nations, and of guaranteeing their respective governments against inter al 
revolutions”—was “as preposterous as it was impotent,” Madison wrote, because it 
failed to comprehend the “impossibility of executing [a] pacific plan among 
governments [i.e. monarchies] which feel so many allurements to war.”  A proper 
plan, he argued, “Instead of beginning with an external application, and even 
                                                




precluding internal remedies, … ought to … commence … with, and chiefly rel[y] 
on, the latter prescription.” 
In a republic, the government is “subordinate to, or rather the same with, the 
will of the community,” but a “hereditary” government has a will independent of the 
rest of the community.  In such regimes, war is declared  
by those whose ambition, whose revenge, whose avidity, or whose 
caprice may contradict the sentiment of the community, and yet be 
uncontrouled by it; by those who are to spend the public money, not by 
those who are to pay it; by those who are to direct the public forces, 
not by those who are to support them; by those whose power is to be 
raised, not by those whose chains may be riveted. 
While these conditions persist, the “disease” of war “must continue to be hereditary 
like the government of which it is the offspring.”  Therefore, war “can no otherwis  
be prevented than by such a reformation of the government, as may identify its will 
with the will of the society.”  That is, a republican revolution, like America’s or that 
then underway in France, would be necessary if there was to be a “universal and 
perpetual peace” among nations.  Most importantly in this regard, each republic 
should be constituted so that war is “declared by the authority of the people, whose 
toils and treasures are to support its burdens, instead of the government which is to 
reap its fruits.” 
However, universal republicanism, while necessary, was not sufficient for 
creating greater peace among regimes.  Madison did not think it inevitable that the 
“will of the community” would be pacific.  If a hereditary regime is belligrent 
because the warlike passions of its minority rulers are impervious to the costs and 
risks of war that they pass onto the majority, it is possible that a republic would also 




internalizing) the risks and costs of war.  (He implicitly assumed that most citizens 
will be risk averse with respect to their lives and fortunes—if not their sacred 
honor?—and thus would be highly reluctant to deliberately impose upon themselves 
the risks and costs of war.  He assumed, that is, that the people were pacific even if a 
popular regime may not be.)  How could the majority conduct such an 
externalization?  Madison did not here consider the possibility that the majority, 
especially in a large extended republic, could force or persuade a sizable minority to 
pay for and fight their wars for them, but he did consider how a current majority 
could pass the financial cost onto a future (and thus un-represented) majority.  A 
current majority that uses a modern system of finance to fund its wars, Madison 
argued, may be psychologically similar to a hereditary monarch or aristocracy that is 
insulated from the burdens of their wars.  Such financial systems were in fact 
designed to make it easier for states to engage in war by allowing “each g neration … 
[to] tax… the principal of its debts on future generations” or by using inconspicuous 
taxation that the current generation does not feel.  To institute a republic with a 
pacific disposition would therefore require “subjecting the will of the society to the 
reason of the society; by establishing permanent and constitutional maxims of 
conduct, which may prevail over occasional impressions and inconsiderate pursuits.”  
This familiar call by Madison for an aristocratic-mechanistic check on popular will 
would, in this case, be achieved by improving the judgment of the people by 
emancipating their reason from their passions through institutional manipulation of 
those passions.  If “each generation … [is] made to bear the burden of its own wars, 




“avarice would be sure to calculate the expences of ambition … [and] in the equipoise 
of these passions, reason would be free to decide for the public good.”  If, he 
concluded, “all nations [were] to follow the example … the temple of Janus might be 
shut, never to be opened more.” 
This argument is intriguing, in no small part because it seemingly suggests 
that Madison was an early believer in “the democratic peace,” if not a nascent 
proponent for an aggressive regime change foreign.  The latter, indeed, would seem to 
follow from the former since an obvious problem with this proposal, if directed 
simply at a single regime, is that it seems to be a form of unilateral constitutional 
disarmament.  Would not constituting a regime to be war-averse imprudently weaken 
its propensity to defend its independence and existence?  Hamilton, in Federalist #34, 
had argued as much when he said constitutional limits on the financial means of 
defense (or offense) would be “novel and absurd.”  “Admitting,” he wrote, “that we 
ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of 
government from offensive war, founded upon reasons of state: yet, certainly, we 
ought not to disable it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity 
of other nations.”  Indeed, Madison seems to have echoed this prudential reasoning in 
Federalist 41, where he wrote: 
The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the 
danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, 
and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the 
impulse of self-preservation …. If one nation maintains constantly a 
disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it 
obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its 
enterprises to take corresponding precautions. 
But Madison made it clear that he in fact did not see his proposed 




disarmament akin to a constitutional prohibition on standing armies.  In his view, the 
former, unlike the latter, would not frustrate the “impulse of self-preservation.”  
Instead it would make the regime stronger in fighting wars necessary for self-
preservation precisely because it would make the regime less likely to pursue wars for 
other (unnecessary) reasons.  If a republic is properly fiscally restrained, thus 
allowing “reason … to decide for the public good,” then, Madison argued, “an ample 
reward would accrue to the state, first, from the avoidance of all its wars of folly, 
secondly, from the vigor of its unwasted resources for wars of necessity and defe ce.”  
Importantly, this award would accrue to the state regardless of what other states do, 
which means there would be good prudential reasons for following his suggested 
“constitutional maxim of conduct” even if other states did not follow suit. 
If it is considered that the essay was generally dismissive of the possibility of 
achieving a universal and perpetual peace—such a thing, “it is to be feared, is in the 
catalogue of events, which will never exist but in the imaginations of visionary 
philosophers, or in the breasts of benevolent enthusiasts”—and that he elsewhere 
made it clear that he thought (like Hamilton in #6) that other factors, especially 
geographic proximity, would often be a source of war regardless of regime for (e.g. 
#41 quoted above), it seems that Madison’s primary purpose with this essay was to 
offer an alternative constitutional strategy (from Hamilton’s) for reconciling security 
and free government.  In this single essay, Madison managed to attack two central 
pillars of Hamilton’s vision for American ascendancy in foreign affairs.  First, he 
offered a rationale for allying with (republican) France rather (monarchical) Britian.  




revolution across Europe would be sufficient for a completely peaceful world, his 
essay did demonstrate how such a revolution could significantly reduce aggressive 
and unnecessary wars, including those involving the United States.  Siding with 
republican France would make the world safer for American republicanism. 
Second, and most importantly, he gave an account of how the government of 
the union could defy the European path of state development—with a symbiosis 
between the ratcheting of executive power, employment of modern systems of 
finances, and fighting wars—while being strong enough to be respectable in foreign 
affairs.  We have seen how Madison had already addressed this problem when he was 
forced to confront the dilemma of size.  If size is essential for external stength, and 
republics are not only able to be, but are actually better when, large, then a classic 
dilemma was averted.  Here Madison confronted a similar republican security 
dilemma which arose from the conventional wisdom that monarchies, equipped with 
modern systems of finance, are stronger in foreign affairs for reasons independent of 
the size of their territories and populations.   
Echoing an insight first made by Thucydides (more in a moment) and 
anticipating contemporary IR scholarship (Reiter and Stam  2002), Madison hit upon 
an important insight:  regimes in which the people who shoulder (and feel themselves 
shouldering) the risks and burdens of war also decide when to declare war are likely 
to pick their fights well (winnable wars) and to be stronger in waging them because 
they likely will have conserved resources by avoiding “wars of folly.”   
Thucydides was perhaps the first to note this strategic advantages enjoyed by 




improved upon the ancient republican experience by overcoming the strategic 
weakness of democracies also noted by Thucydides.  For Thucydides, like Madison, 
republican regimes, wherein present majorities of citizens internalize the burdens and 
benefits of war, can be expected to fight more effectively than regimes in which the 
incentives are aligned differently.  Thucydides, however, quite unlike Madison, 
emphasized the effect of popular participation on citizen/soldier courage and morale:  
citizens/soldiers will fight harder in wars that they, with their fellow citizens, agreed 
to enter into knowing full well that they themselves would absorb the costs and risks 
and enjoy the benefits (400/ 354 B.C.)  By contrast, Madison’s case for republican 
strength, as we have seen, was essentially negative and at the level of judgment rather 
than action.  His republic, in which the raw will of the people would be subjected to 
“the reason of society,” would be strong because it would limit itself to necessary 
wars and have the benefit of resources conserved by avoiding unnecessary wars. 
Importantly, Madison’s view on the source of republican strength was not 
only different from Thucydides’ (for he had a very different republic in mind), but 
also a remedy for what Thucydides saw as the principal strategic weakness of 
(ancient) republics.  As Samuel Issacharoff (2009) has put it well, for Thucydides, 
[t]he equalization of burdens [in Athens] and the predictability of that 
equalization were key to the sense of common enterprise that the 
Athenians were able to bring to war, providing Athens with its 
advantage in the wars against Persia and in the first stages of the 
Peloponnesian Wars.  [However,] these same qualities would 
contribute to misguided military adventures, such as the calamitous 
naval attack on Sicily … [T]his sort of democratized war effort creates 
the risk that popular passion and avarice might gain an upper hand.  If 
these forces go unchecked, as indeed occurred, democracy’s strength 




Madison’s mixed republic, by contrast, would attempt to make the popular vice of 
avarice a source of aristocratic wisdom—and indirectly strength—and thus convert 
Athens’ vulnerability into America’s safeguard.  However, Madison left implicit the 
major assumption that his republic would still retain enough of the citizen courage—
traditionally seen as a leading benefit to the community of democratic liberty—to 
fight its wars of necessity and defense.  Presumably he thought his aristocratic 
corrective to dangerous popular passions would complement rather than extinguish 
the useful and necessary spiritedness of the people. 
Last Thoughts: The Triple-Mixed State and the Preca rious 
Federal Union 
As we saw in the first section, in the last years of his life Madison correctly 
foresaw that the tendency of the federal republic was, as the confederacy had been in 
the 1780s, “tending more toward anarchy in the members than tyranny in the 
head.”126 A major reason for this, he believed, was that since the Battle of New 
Orleans, the States had lost what had hitherto been the most reliable negative 
inducement to union:  a credible external threat.  As we have seen, by the early 1790s 
he had already put considerable thought into the double-edged nature of this factor of 
fortune.  But as he pondered the future of the union in the 1830s, this factor took a 
more prominent place in his thinking about the federal republic.  “The propensity of 
all communities to divide when not pressed into a unity by external danger, is a truth
well understood,” he wrote in 1829. 
There is no instance of a people inhabiting even a small island, if 
remote from foreign danger, and sometimes in spite of that pressure, 
who are not divided into alien, rival, hostile tribes. The happy Union 
                                                




of these States is a wonder; their Constn. a miracle; their example the 
hope of Liberty throughout the world. Woe to the ambition that would 
meditate the destruction of either!127 
This, it must have seemed, was the ironic twist in his reconstruction of 
orthodox liberal republican theory.  The republican union of republics had overcome 
the classic trade-offs of republican vulnerability, but in truth, it was only a 
combination of fortune and remarkable political skill and ingenuity that had allowed 
the Americans to escape the cruel logic of Rousseau’s mixed state.  While that mixed 
state as a fact of the human condition is essentially timeless, the manner in which it 
manifests itself is highly context dependent.  The Americans had actually enjo ed a 
fortuitous triple-mixed state: individuals caught in a system of states wihin a system 
of states.  Prior to the battle of New Orleans, the European system of States had 
presented enough of a threat to cement the union, but not enough to push the union 
into a dangerous aggrandizement of national-executive power.  It was under this 
tenuous condition that the Americans were able to reform their own system of States 
so that it took on its (also always tenuous) partly federal, partly consolidated form.  
And it was under this form alone, Madison firmly believed, that republican 
governments could escape the internal and external cycles that had historically led to 
the destruction of those governments. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered Madison’s constitutional project as a 
multifaceted attempt to find republican answers to the 18th century critique of 
republics.  He, unlike Hamilton, became convinced that Americans had invented a 
                                                




political association superior to the British constitution.  Not only was it more 
conducive to durable liberty than the British model; it was also better adapted for 
providing external security.  To reach these conclusions, he rejected two crucial tenets 
of the 18th century critique of republics.  First, he argued that there is no trade-off 
between the small size requisite for liberty and the large size necessary for external 
security.  However, he came to believe that the States were essential for extending the 
sphere as far as he thought necessary for providing security and preserving the 
socioeconomic basis necessary for preventing the republican violent death.  Second, 
he rejected the idea that modern systems of war finance—and the potential 
aggrandizement of executive power that this could bring—are necessary for external 
security.  Indeed, he argued the opposite:  republican regimes constitutionally 
restrained from borrowing and inconspicuous taxation would be stronger at fighting 
wars, not weaker.  For his part, Hamilton accepted these elements of the classical 
critique.  This provides the final piece of evidence to support this dissertation’s thesis.  
The basis of Hamilton’s and Madison’s political break was, as Madison always said, 
based on their theoretical and principled difference over the necessity and propriety f 






Chapter 6: Summary and Applications 
The American legal constitutional order is, in its essential aspects, a product 
of three defining “constitutional moments” in U.S. history:  the founding period 
examined in this study; the Reconstruction era, formalized in the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
Amendments; and the New Deal era, in which the vision of Herbert Croly and other 
Progressives for robust national socioeconomic regulatory authority received informal 
ratification by the U.S. Supreme Court (Ackerman  1993, 2000).  But the de facto 
nature of the American political regime has always been shaped and strained by 
interactions between its extant political institutions; changes in its broader social, 
cultural, and international context; and efforts by influential political agents to reform 
and create new institutions whenever opportunities to do so arose (see e.g. Skowronek  
1997; Orren and Skowronek  2004).  The great questions concerning the strength and 
fragility of republics recur throughout history, buffeted and supported in turn by 
changes in domestic and international forces of economics, politics, and increasingly, 
technology.  Every critical turn in American history bears the hallmark of some form 
of the debate over republicanism’s weaknesses.  
This dissertation considers how Madison and Hamilton sought to create 
durable governmental institutions conducive to human liberty by anticipating, and 
attempting to thwart, two dynamic socio-political processes they saw as threats to 
republics.  I have called these the “republican violent death,” and the “republican 
security dilemma.”  These were anticipated patterns of political outcomes that 
emanated from the interaction between institutions, social conditions, and geopolitical 




republics into despotic or, at best, limited monarchical regimes.  The immediate 
purpose of this study has been to explain their political alliance and break as resulting 
from their common and disparate solutions to those problems.  However, this study of 
their political thought can also give us insight into modern political conditions and the 
challenges we face as we seek to preserve and improve the republic. 
This concluding chapter is divided into two sections.  In the first section, I 
briefly summarize the historical argument developed in this dissertation.  The, in the 
second section, I consider how this understanding of Madison’s and Hamilton’s 
thought can help us to evaluate and approach the myriad challenges facing the 
American republic today.  To present an application of the theories of republicanism 
and the Founding debates across the broad sweep of American history from the 
Constitutional Convention to the inauguration of Barack Obama is clearly not 
manageable in an entire dissertation, much less a concluding chapter.  However, the 
instructive lens of analysis creative by Madison and Hamilton – the framework of 
their political thought – provides an important base of understanding for modern 
challenges.  Indeed, we can see their debate crop up throughout American history.  In 
this concluding chapter, I will offer a few examples from the 20th and 21st centuries to 
highlight the enduring centrality of republicanism and the Madison-Hamilton debate.   
Summary of Argument 
This dissertation has offered a new interpretation of the theoretical basis of 
Hamilton’s and Madison’s political alliance and estrangement.  I have argued that 
Madison was essentially correct that his and Hamilton’s difference was over degree 




government.  More specifically, I have presented the case that Hamilton never 
evidenced a principled commitment to the republican form and that he believed 
preserving liberty in North America would require adopting a mixed regime, 
complete with a hereditary monarchy, modeled after the British constitution.  This 
thesis defies a scholarly consensus that dates back to the Progressive historians of the 
early 20th century.  Though many have held that Madison ge uinely believed that this 
was the nature of their disagreement, most have concluded he was mistaken about 
Hamilton’s intentions.  I argue not only that Hamilton believed America needed a 
monarchical executive, but also that he deliberately sought to put the regime on a 
developmental path toward monarchy. 
This interpretation has been different from previous studies in part because of 
its thematic and conceptual focus and in part because of how I have approached the 
textual record.  One thematic focus of this dissertation that has led it to deviate from 
dominant scholarly trends is that it has operated from the assumption that Madison 
and Hamilton always believed not only that disunion would have tragic 
consequences, but also that it was an imminent threat for which the establishment of a 
strong “national” government to restrain the States was the only remedy.  Put another 
way, they both genuinely believed the central thesis of Federalists 2-36 that (1) the 
union was necessary for the basic goods most American wanted—security from 
foreign war; internal security from violent rebellion, usurpation, and civil war; 
prosperity through favorable trade relations; and the preservation of free 
government—and (2) a central government at least equally as strong as the one 




historians who downplayed the diplomatic and sectional aspects of the founding, most 
scholars in the 20th century have assumed that the warnings of disunion in the 
Federalist amounted to clever propaganda. 
A second theme guiding my interpretation is a set of beliefs widely held 
among the founding generation that I refer to as the 18th century critique of republics.  
This critique, which was leveled by several prominent 18th century political theories, 
pointed to two dynamic processes that seemed to render republics unfit for modern 
conditions.  One of these was the “republican violent death,” which suggested 
republics naturally tend toward factional violence, anarchy, and, eventually, 
despotism.  The other was the “the republican security dilemma,” which suggested 
that physically contiguous regimes in anarchy with one another will tend to create 
institutions and promote policies that undermine the requirements for domestic 
republican liberty.   
The first dynamic was rooted in the fundamental belief that all regimes are in
motion toward either the extreme of pure republicanism or the other extreme of 
absolute monarchy.  The British constitution was widely thought to exist at a 
middling stage of that developmental path, which led David Hume to write an essay 
speculating as to whether the British constitution was tending toward republicanism 
or absolute monarchy.  However, the developmental path was thought to be cyclical, 
not linear.  If the regime landed in republicanism, it would degenerate into anarchy 
and this would lead to so much violence that the people would seek safety in 
despotism.  The conventional wisdom at the time of the founding, as written by such 




within the British balanced constitutional framework was the best means for 
overcoming the republican violent death while retaining important elements of the 
republican aspiration for liberty as “rule of law, of not men.” 
For the second dynamic, the republican security dilemma, thinkers as diverse 
as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Vattel agreed that this presented a formidable thret 
to republican viability, but none offered a solution that was acceptable to the 
founders.  England, they all agreed, had been able to retain a limited monarchy in 
large part because of geophysical fortune:  its insular position that allowed the state to 
rely more on naval than land forces for pursuing its foreign policy thus taking away 
the “pretense” for the monarch to keep up a large standing army for power 
aggrandizement at home.  For regimes seeking to retain their freedom on the 
continent, however, they were less optimistic.  While they all pointed to 
confederacies, such as that of the Swiss or Dutch, as the best solution for republics on 
the continent, they also agreed that most peoples had been unable to avail themselves 
of this strategy.  Moreover, the founders decided that those confederacies faced 
significant deficiencies, rendering them generally ineffective.    
The other reason my interpretation is different is because of three distinct 
approaches I have used for studying the textual record. First, I begin with the 
assumption that Hamilton’s statements at the Constitution Convention are a reliable 
source of his genuine views.  While most scholars have tended to ignore or explain 
away his statements critical of republics and favorable toward the British constitution, 
I argue that he was more likely to be candid in that context that most any other.  




works in order to discover pertinent passages related to the primary issues and themes 
of this study: monarchy, executive power, republicanism, the republican violent 
death, the republican security dilemma, and the problem of preserving the union.  
This allowed me to discover, interpret, and compare all pertinent passages by 
Madison and Hamilton on a single topic over time and across contexts.  Third, I read 
Hamilton’s writings closely to attempt to distinguish between sincere stat ments and 
those that he made for rhetorical reasons.  This was an important part of my reading
of his Federalist essays. 
By applying this interpretive approach and reading Hamilton’s and Madison’s 
writings with an eye toward the republican security dilemma and republican violet 
death, I discovered strong evidence that Hamilton and Madison both took the 
critiques seriously, but differed fundamentally over how to resolve them.  Their 
common concern with these processes was rooted more fundamentally in their mutual 
aversion to military despotism.  Despite Hamilton’s reputation among some scholars 
as a Hobbesian despot, I found abundant evidence that he feared despotism as much 
as Madison.  This was one reason that they both believed a strong national 
government was necessary to keep the States out of anarchy and therefore the 
republican security dilemma.  This was due to the fact that they both exhibited a fear 
that disunion and anarchy among the States would lead them create large standing 
armies and uncontrolled executives, like the absolute monarchies in Europe.  





Where they differed was in how they sought to resolve these problems.  
Hamilton     viewed these problems through a traditional lens, while Madison sought 
innovative solutions to the problems.  For example, Hamilton, unlike Madison, held 
fast to the orthodox view that executive “energy” in the form of “firmness” through 
electoral insulation was necessary to prevent the republican violent death.  Indeed, at 
times he admitted to believing that nothing short of the British balanced constitution 
presented a reliable solution to the problem.  Madison, on the other hand, generally 
expressed optimism that this problem could be resolved through (1) republican 
institutional design—the extended sphere, representation, bicameralism, national 
superintendence of the States (initially through the Senate veto, but eventually 
through the judiciary), and separation of powers—and (2) policies designed to 
prolong the agrarian stage of political economic development.  Similarly, Hamilton 
thought strong executive authority was necessary to prevent disunion.  At one point 
he even said that the thought a monarch would be superior at cementing the union. 
Part of my interpretation also involved paying close attention to Hamilton’s 
statements that indicated his beliefs about public opinion.  I discovered that Hamilon 
admitted that he did not think it was responsible to speak openly about his belief in 
the necessity of a limited monarch.  Doing so, he suggested, could create fear or 
alarm in the people and potentially trigger the violent death and/or disunion.  
Somewhat ironically, therefore, his fear of despotism emanating from anarchy both 
led him to favor a monarchical executive and led him to be reluctant about admitting 
it publicly.  I suggested that this is a leading reason why scholars have been reluctant 




the belief.  However, my close reading of the textual record revealed several signs of 
his genuine preference. 
Hamilton also expressed a hope that public opinion may one day become 
favorable toward adopting the British constitutional model.  I took this as evidence 
that Hamilton might on occasion engage in opinion leadership in order to gently 
move public opinion closer to his way of seeing things.  I found instances where this 
seems to have been the case.  For example, Hamilton often made a point of 
distinguishing between “free governments” (or, “the principles of civil liberty”), on 
the one hand, and “republican governments,” on the other, in rhetorical contexts 
where it made little sense for him to do so unless he was trying to convince his 
audience to reject their anti-monarchism and return to their pre-1776 faith in the 
superiority of the British balanced constitution.  Two prominent examples of this 
were in Federalist #9 and in his draft of “Washington’s Farewell Address.”  In 
addition to this selective use of terminology, I also demonstrated, through my close 
interpretive reading in Chapter 4, that he seems to have been engaged in long term 
opinion leadership through his bold (and ratification-threatening) defense of the 
British monarch in Federalist #71.  This is one reason that I argue Hamilton 
deliberately sought to put the regime on a developmental path toward monarchy. 
Madison’s optimism about avoiding the republican violent death was 
predicated upon American maintaining a predominantly agrarian economy.  He, like 
most members of his generation, believed that as America transformed into a 
manufacturing society, a majority of Americans would become property-less, which 




superintendence to prevent the republican violent death.  That is, he harbored doubts 
that his republican institutional mechanisms would be sufficient amid substantial 
inequities in property ownership.  A subterranean part of my argument, therefore, was 
that since Hamilton also believed this would be a consequence of property 
bifurcation, the fact that he was comfortable with pursuing policies that would rapi ly 
divide American society into a propertied few and property-less many can only be 
explained by his lacking an aversion to the introduction of monarchy. 
As for the republican security dilemma at the national level, Hamilton’s 
political economic policies were the most important element in his program for 
American greatness.  To pursue this foreign policy required a lack of aversion to 
monarchy both for the indirect reason mentioned above (most thought the social 
bifurcation it would create would require the introduction of monarchy in order to 
prevent the republican violent death) and because it was widely believed that war 
presented an opportunity for executive aggrandizement of power.  Madison and 
Jefferson, who sought to prevent both paths to monarchy, needed to find a way to 
prolong the agrarian stage of development while doing everything possible to assure 
security from Europe without recourse to conventional military means.  This 
converged on their dual policies of extensive Western expansion and the use of 
economic sanctions (“peaceable coercion”) for protecting American rightsand 
interests from European injury.  Western expansion would serve the dual purposes of 
prolonging the agrarian stage of development and removing European threats form 
the continent, while the second would enable the Americans to benefit from favorable 




necessary for producing the military means requisite for doing so through a military 
power balancing strategy.  Again, since there is every reason to believe Hamilton also 
thought this would be a consequence of his power balancing strategy, and because he 
intended America’s Western expansion to stop East of the Mississippi, I argue that 
this is further confirmation of the thesis that Hamilton sought to speed along, or, at 
the very least, simply did not fear, the introduction of monarchy in America. 
Since Madison’s principled commitment to republicanism interacted with his 
understanding of the republican security dilemma to create his policy preferences for 
far-reaching Western expansion and for arresting Hamilton’s economic program, 
Madison made two theoretical breakthroughs to explain how these two policies could 
be compatible with stability and security.  The problem with Western expansion was 
that Madison believed, despite the unqualified optimism of his arguments in #10 and 
#14 about the ability for an extended sphere to improve republican stability, the logic 
could only hold for a territory of “mean extent.”  This, I argue, was a major reason 
that Madison started to reconsider the role of the States in his system.  Though he 
implied in #51, for the first time in the writings, that the States would allow for 
extending the practicable sphere of republican government, he seems to have more 
fully developed this logic in his systematic theoretical study in his “Note on 
Government” in 1791 and 1792.  For our purposes, the most important of these was 
his concern about lessened ability to rally public support for war when the sphere was 
extended too far.  His vision of State representatives as opinion leaders suggested that 
this presented a solution to that problem.  This, I argue, was one of the reasons he 




not only for spreading stable popular governments, but also for providing external 
security. 
His other major breakthrough was to discover, in defiance of conventional 
understandings of the republican security dilemma, that constitutional limits on 
government borrowing could serve to strengthen the regime rather than weaken it.  
His argument was that if each generation was forced to bear the burden of their own 
wars, then they would be less likely to fall into wars of “folly” (imprudence) or 
“wickedness” (government venality.)  This, in turn, would serve to strengthen the 
state by encouraging it to conserve its resources for wars of absolute necessity. 
This study has sought to set the historical record straight about Hamilton’s 
intentions and motives.  Ever since Herbert Croly and other Progressive historians 
decided to hold Hamilton up as a model for modern democratic nationalism, scholars 
have been reluctant to take Madison’s claim seriously that their rupture was due to 
Hamilton’s and the Federalists’ support for monarchical policies and principles.  
More than anything else, this has had the unfortunate consequence of diminishing the 
extent to which Madison engaged with the classical critique of republics to develop 
innovative multifaceted republican cures for “the diseases most incident to republican 
government.” 
Applications: Where We Are, and Where We Are Headin g 
Americans are unique in seeking to find meaning, and even guidance, in the 
present by looking back to the thought and actions of their “founding fathers.”  I am 
not immune to this tendency.  This curiosity gave rise to this study with an eye 




through the lens of the past.  The founders’ context was very different from ours, and 
this makes it difficult to seek guidance from them as we think about the fate of our 
free institutions today.  However, it seems that their views on the two fundamental 
problems facing republics—the republican violent death and the republican security 
dilemma—and the legacy of their efforts to address those problems, can give us some 
helpful insights on our present condition and our possible futures. 
Republican Violent Death 
The 20th century analog to the 18th century fear of the republican violent death 
was a Marxian labor uprising that would seek to overturn republican institutions and 
establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.  Needless to say, such a threat is far from 
credible today.  But it is useful in an effort to begin understanding our present 
condition to examine Herbert Croly’s  (1909) analysis of the problem at the turn of 
last century.  As Croly’s highly influential Progressive manifesto, The Promise of 
American Life, was written a century after Madison’s first year as President and a 
century before Barack Obama’s, the work presents a convenient bridge between the 
era studied in this dissertation and our own times. 
Throughout the book, Croly expressed a fear that a violent clash between the 
wage-earning many and capitalist few could threaten the American republic.  In 
language reminiscent of Hamilton’s fears of demagoguery leading to anarchy and the 
eventual overthrow of free institutions, Croly decried the “aggressive and 
unscrupulous unionism … [that was] beginning to talk as if they were at war with the 
existing social and political order” (p. 128).  The “union laborer,” he wrote with 
alarm, “is tending to become suspicious, not merely of his employer, but of the 




practical dangers” of an overthrow of the “American political and social order” were, 
for the time being, “largely neutralized by the mere size of the country” and the fact 
that “so large a proportion of the American voters [were still] land-owning farmers” 
(pp. 128-129).  But he thought the long-run prospects for America’s national political 
institutions were uncertain and, in the meantime, “particular states and cities [ ould 
not] be considered as anywhere near so secure.”  The bottom line was that the rise of 
corporations and organized labor, “two such powerful and unscrupulous and well-
organized special interests,” had, in Croly’s estimation, “created a condition which
the founders of the Republic never anticipated” (p. 131). 
If Croly’s analysis combined Hamiltonian and Madisonian reasoning 
(apparently unbeknownst to him), his proposed preventive cure was purely 
Hamiltonian.  Using terminology traceable to de Lolme128, Croly insisted that the 
portending rise of capital-labor factional conflict required “as a counterpoise a more 
effective body of national opinion, and a more powerful organization of the national 
interest” (ibid.).  Indeed, the independent regulatory agencies that he had in mind with 
this statement, while based on a very different moral-political psychology frm what 
Hamilton lauded in monarchy, are often referred to today as “neo-Hamiltonian” (e.g. 
Kettl  2002).  Most who would use that label, however, have in mind the “popular but 
responsible” administrative executive most famously portrayed by Hamilton in 
Federalist 72.  But Croly, for one, seems to have also envisaged a functional 
equivalent to Hamilton’s monarchical executive (described in #71) that would stand 
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firmly outside of factional conflict so as to control it and thereby prevent America’s 
free government from succumbing to a violent death.  Croly certainly did not 
explicitly make this connection, but the parallel is nevertheless instructive. 
Croly’s fears notwithstanding, the United States, of course, did not succumb 
to the socialist version of the republican violent death in the 20th Century.129  A 
variety of reasons have been given to explain this (see e.g.Lipset and Marks 2000), 
but this glimpse into Croly’s views at the turn of last century suggests possible 
Madisonian and Hamiltonian institutional explanations.  Though he did not cite 
Madison, Croly himself, as we have seen, pointed to the effect of Madison’s extended 
sphere.  This, in conjunction with the multiple veto points created by the separation of 
powers, which gives minority interests ample opportunities to protect their bottom 
lines, can undoubtedly go a long way in explaining why a majoritarian tyranny did 
not develop and ignite the violent death.130  An alternative, Hamiltonian, explanation 
could be that Croly’s preferred response to the rising tide of labor, electorally 
insulated national regulatory agencies, created the “counterpoise” Croly (and 
Hamilton) thought necessary. 
The example of Croly’s fears about early 20th century American succumbing 
to the anarchy of class interests feels anachronistic given the political apathy of the 
modern era and the strength of governmental institutions.   Yet throughout the 20th 
century, there were periods in which reasonable and well informed political observers 
anticipated the potential collapse of the American experiment.  The Great Depression, 
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the early part of the Cold War, and the Vietnam era all produced critics that 
questioned whether the fabric of American republicanism would be torn asunder 
either by popular factionalism or the centralization of power in government.  These 
particular concerns of the past are largely superfluous today with the impotency f the 
union movement (see e.g. Mosher  2007) and the fact that ordinary Americans are 
apparently still highly unlikely to act out politically based on class interest.   
With the exception of the celebrity-status presidential campaign of Barack 
Obama, there have been relatively few occasions in which American citizens have 
organized substantial political tumult. Recent events seem to confirm that this fea ure 
of modern American political culture is still in full force.  Despite the devastating 
impact the financial crisis has had on millions of Americans, and that many of them 
believe the crisis was attributable to nefarious corporate practices, the only notable 
popular protests in the past year were the “Tea Parties,” which were in respo s  to 
Obama’s proposed (progressive) tax policy.  This is particularly striking cosidering 
that inequalities in wealth and income have reached levels unseen since the 1920s 
(see e.g. Krugman  2002).   
There is no shortage of irrational political activism across the political 
spectrum on a wide range of issues – but nothing rises to anything approaching the 
level of anarchic disruption.  The 9/11 Truth conspiracy on the left all the way over to 
the muddled furor of Palin-ism suggests that the ills of democracy continue to fester 
in the American polity—goaded by ignorance, disillusion and jingo-ism.  And yet, 
there is no power structure for these insurgent ideologies outside of the mainstream 




social order.  In fact, it is the impotency of wild-eyed populism (left and right) against 
social inequalities and the economic dominance of Wall Street and the lobbies of 
capital that characterize modern American politics.  From this vantage point, it is the 
righteous indignation of unrequited suffering that fueled Obama-mania; and 
conversely, it is Rubin-onomics, the coal industry, and the pharmaceutical lobby that 
are blunting the sharp edge of reform politics promised to the people.  The civic 
virtue of informed citizenship has indeed fallen away in a large republican state – but 
it has not given way to violent anarchism, but rather to oligarchic levels of social
inequalities that perversely produce only tepid passion for redress that rarely hits the 
streets in protest. 
Indeed, those scholars and commentators who have pointed to social threats to 
the republican constitutional order have appropriately focused their attention, ot on 
excessive democracy leading to anarchy, but on social and economic forces pushing 
toward greater centralization of government power.  It should be recalled that 
Madison and Hamilton both believed “liberty” could be lost, not only by too little 
“power” (i.e. anarchy igniting the violent death), but also by gradual accumulations of 
government power over time.  Though Hamilton and Madison differed fundamentally 
over the best constitutional strategy for finding a proper balance between “lib rty” 
and “power,” they both believed it was necessary to find such a balance. 
It is useful to consider that two prominent political theorists from opposite 
ideological perspectives, Sheldon Wolin and Paul Rahe, have recently argued that 
America is moving dangerously toward despotism (Wolin  2003; Rahe  2009).  While 




increasing role of the national government in all spheres of American life, and both 
point to an ominous decline in citizen vigilance.  For Wolin, it is all explicable by the 
systemic needs of a totalizing capitalism.  He warns of an emerging “inverted 
totalitarianism,” run by a corporate power elite who “share with Nazism the 
aspiration toward unlimited power and aggressive expansionism, [but whose] 
methods and actions seem upside down.”  According to Wolin, “under Nazi rule there 
was never any doubt about ‘big business’ being subordinated to the political regime,” 
but in the “United States … it has been apparent for decades that corporate power has 
become so predominant in the political establishment … and so dominant in its 
influence over policy, as to suggest a role inversion the exact opposite of the Nazis'.”  
For his part, Rahe does not seem at all concerned about class structure, but, for our 
purposes, it is noteworthy that his immediate target is Croly’s (and, by extension, 
Hamilton’s) solution to the republican violent death: the ever increasing reach of the 
administrative state.  Rahe, however, follows Tocqueville (1994) in blaming it on 
what he sees as the tyrannical force of the excessive egalitarianism that they both 
considered to be the fundamental principle of modern democracy.  Rahe’s 
conservative solution includes a roll back of the federal government, reinvigoration of 
civil society, and return to traditional moral values.  Ironically, the American left that 
was most alarmed by the Bush version of big government will happily embrace 
Obama’s new New Deal and the ballooning federal presence in American social life.  
Although these two presidents have enormous differences, they are united in 




Both traditional conservatives, like Rahe, and libertarian conservatives (e.g. 
Hayek  1944; Nozick  1974; M. Friedman and R. D. Friedman  1980; Goldberg  
2008; Beck  2009) are dismissive of class structure and often appeal to the authority 
of the founders to support their case for saving liberty from excessive government 
power.  However, it is important to note that Hamilton and Madison did not believe 
bifurcated wealth and income is inconsequential to the preservation of free 
government, even in the absence of a realistic threat of the republican violent death.  
Although it was not emphasized in this dissertation, for it was not perceived by 
Madison or Hamilton as a realistic threat at the time, the 18th century discourse on 
factional conflict allowed for an equilibrium outcome other than the violent death: 
aristocratic/oligarchic domination.  Hamilton and Madison were united in disfavoring 
this development.  Though they are well known for criticizing excessive democracy 
and favoring institutional protections for the propertied, neither of them would have 
endorsed tyranny by the few if they had perceived it as a credible threat.  One of 
Hamilton’s stated reasons at the Convention for favoring a monarch, recall, was that 
he thought it was necessary to maintain a balanced separation between the few and 
the many.  That balance was necessary, in his view, because if the founders were to 
“give all power to the many, they will oppress the few,” and if they were to “give all 
power to the few, they will oppress the many.”131  Madison, similarly, endorsed the 
representative republic in part because “it chuses [sic] the wisdom,” of which 
“aristocracy has the chance; whilst it excludes the oppression of that form.”132 
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Conservatives and progressives are always going to find many points of 
disagreement, but it seems clear to me that they should find common cause in seeking 
to reconstruct a middle class that can prevent elite domination of the political pro ess.  
In an age of globalization, however, this will necessarily require redistributive 
policies coordinated at the national, if not international, level.  Taking Madison as his 
point of departure, Stephen Elkin  (2006) has demonstrated that such national policies 
can be made conformable to, and may be necessary for realizing, the aspirations for a 
robust and prosperous market economy and reinvigoration of local civic engagement.  
Much more work following Elkin’s model of “new constitutional” political science is 
required as we seek to preserve and invigorate republican self-government amid the 
inevitable economic inequalities produced by the economic foundations of the 
modern commercial republic.133 
Republican Security Dilemma 
The relevant contextual factors with which Madison and Hamilton had to 
grapple as they confronted the logic of the republican security dilemma were, as with 
the problem of the republican violent death, radically different from those that apply 
today.  For example, no one today worries about (or plausibly hopes for) “anarchical 
independence” among the States.  Since the Civil War, federal supremacy has become
firmly established, a recent trend of policy “devolution” and Supreme Court 
declarations of Constitutional limitations on national authority notwithstanding.  This
supremacy is based not only on Constitutional amendments and Supreme Court 
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decisions—for that would be irrelevant if the States drifted back toward anarchy—but 
also on a robust American national identity and the shift in the balance of material 
resource power toward the national government.  For example, state militias have 
been gradually converted into units of the National Guard (Deudney  2007, 175-176) 
and the states’ budgets have become highly dependent on federal funds (Peterson  
1995).  Never in modern memory has this financial dependency been more true than 
at this time of economic crisis. 
In addition to the changed structure of the union, the national government’s 
place in the broader international “anarchical society” is radically different as well.  
In this section, we will consider two of those relevant differences.  First, while 
Hamilton and Madison had to contend with the credible threat of European 
domination, the United States today stands in a position of overwhelming global 
military supremacy.  Consequently, the relevant question today is whether the 
republic can withstand present efforts to extend and entrench American empire.  
Second, changes in the nature of weapons technology—both their destructive force 
and availability to non-state actors—threatens to create a global security nvironment 
much worse than Hamilton and Madison envisaged even for the States in the event of 
disunion.  This, in turn, portends a manifestation of the republican security dilemma 
that will incline all regimes, including the United States, to increasingly develop 
repressive institutions that undermine the practices necessary for durable republican 
liberty. 
Can There Be An American Republican Empire? 
A striking development in recent years is the growing willingness for certain 




empire.”  It is no longer thought necessary to use euphemisms, such as “benign 
hegemony” and “global leadership,” when speaking favorably of a development that 
arguably began in the wake of World War II and apparently culminated in a plateau 
of perpetual US dominance with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Johnson  2004).  
The rise of a multi-polar world in the form of Chinese and Indian economic power 
and the consolidation of the European Union has not altered America’s unrivaled 
military position in the global order.  Though debating the merits of American empire 
deserves careful analysis and evaluation from the standpoint of justice and prudence, 
I will here just note one prudential question that Madison and even Hamilton would 
have considered imperative to ask but that contemporary proponents of American 
empire have not, in my view, given adequate attention:  Can the domestic requisites 
for American republican liberty be preserved if it seeks to solidify a global empire? 
A presentation at Harvard six years ago by Stephen Rosen (2003), one of the 
leading proponents of American empire, is indicative of the present state of debate on 
the nature and consequences of America’s hegemonic role in the world.  Rosen’s talk 
laid-out the case for empire by noting several systemic benefits it provides—relative 
peace and stability; promotion and preservation of “minimally acceptable” regimes 
around the world; greater prosperity—and by suggesting that no other plausible 
approach to world organization would as reliably provide those benefits.  After the 
talk, he called on an audience member who asked the following question:  “You were 
notably silent about the cost of empire domestically … [Can you] name an imperial 
order that was a democracy?”  Rosen then gave this striking response: 
Yes, there have been imperial democracies--the Roman, the British, 




fathers when they said, we are constructing a democracy but we hope 
we are constructing a democracy that can deal with the world outside 
our borders as well. 
This dissertation has given two reasons, from the standpoint of historical 
accuracy, to question the validity of this response by Rosen.  First, we have seen that 
Madison and Hamilton were in agreement that a republic could not remain a true 
republic while pursuing an aggressive foreign policy.  While Hamilton did envision 
America becoming a great military power, he and Madison both believed this would
result in the development of a monarchical executive.  Hamilton’s vision of a mixed 
constitutional regime saw that executive as not only compatible with, but also 
necessary for, durable American liberty.  But his foreign policy was calculated, I have 
argued, to reconcile American external and internal liberty.  Hamilton’s foreign 
policy was intended to balance external powers, not pursue imperial domination.  It is 
not clear that even he can be cited as believing an imperial foreign policy could be 
made compatible with domestic liberty, even with his pseudo-republican 
understanding of what the latter entailed.  However, there is no question, as we have 
seen, that Madison believed republics are highly susceptible to subversion from any 
form of ambitious foreign policy. 
This brings us to the second, and more salient, problem with Rosen’s 
historical references.  Conventional wisdom in the 18th century held that, while it is 
true that Rome was an imperial power while it was still a republic, it is also true that 
imperial overstretch ultimately subverted the republic.  Madison himself, recall, 
argued that “the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs.”134  
                                                




This was also the core thesis of Montesquieu’s Considerations on the Causes of the 
Greatness of the Romans and their Decline (1734), and a theme repeated throughout 
his Spirit of the Laws (1752).  Hume went so far as to say even his imagined Perfect 
Commonwealth (1752) would not be immortal, in part, because it would be 
susceptible to making the Roman mistake: 
extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the ruin of every free 
government; and of the more perfect governments sooner than of the 
imperfect; because of the very advantages which the former possess 
above the latter. And though such a state ought to establish a 
fundamental law against conquests, yet republics hare ambition as well 
as individuals, and present interest makes men forgetful of their 
posterity. 
To be fair, the Madison and Hamilton examples hardly prove that America’s 
free institutions cannot withstand the kind of imperial foreign policy advocated for by
Rosen and others.  Indeed, he could retort that Madison’s and Hamilton’s reasoning 
cannot very well explain how the United States endured the Cold War without the 
Presidency evolving into something resembling monarchy.  He might concede that 
the office has become much more powerful, relative to the other branches, and that 
this was due in large part to America’s changing role in the international system 
(Schlesinger  2004; Yoo  2006).  Moreover, he might even grant that the Cold War 
altered the informal constitution of the America republic due to the political power 
now wielded by the arms industry (Rundquist and Carsey  2002) and by a news media 
that has discovered that war coverage can be highly profitable (Baum  2005; 
Bacevich  2005).  Even after conceding those points, he still could say with 
justification that the institution today—popularly elected (with nearly all adult 




follow public opinion—is actually more democratic than Madison or Hamilton 
envisioned. 
However, the goal of global imperial domination will require a level of 
international commitment much greater than that of the Cold War.  Moreover, it will 
not benefit from the ideological reflexivity of that conflict, which induced Americans 
to prove the superiority of liberal democracy to Communism by better living up to 
their espoused commitment to civil rights and liberties (see e.g. Klinkner and Rogers 
M Smith  1999).  Perhaps most importantly, Rome clearly should not be held-up as a 
model of successfully reconciling republican government with expansive 
imperialism.  The question should be, not why Rome succeeded at this, but, rather, 
why it eventually failed. 
For these, and a variety of other reasons, further research is required on the 
likely consequences of American global domination on its domestic liberties.  This, in 
turn, must be balanced by careful analysis of alternative achievable models of global 
organization.  Currently, there is something of a division of labor—along ideological 
lines—among constitutional scholars in the treatment of these interrelated issu s.  For 
example, Yoo (2006) places America’s changing role in the international system at 
the center of his explanation (and justification) for changes in the balance of 
warmaking power among the branches of the national government.  However, one 
will look in vain for any discussion in his book on the impact of these developments 
on the structural basis of domestic liberty.  Louis Fischer (2008), by contrast, exhibits 
precisely the opposite tendency.  He has a lot to say about the founders’ (especially 




preserving liberty, but he is silent about (1) what kinds of international systems, and 
American roles within them, are necessary for sustaining such a domestic structural 
arrangement and (2) the merits of such systems relative to those less conducive to 
optimal domestic structures.  I confess that I share Fischer’s concerns, but I do 
believe Yoo has addressed an important piece of the overall puzzle and presented a 
formidable argument worthy of serious consideration and response on its merits.135 
The Age of Terrorism and the New Mixed State 
Looking at some of the major works published in recent years on 
constitutional law in an age of terrorism, it is striking that scholars with otherwise 
divergent views agree that terrorism creates a unique and serious threat to securi y, 
and requires unprecedented responses that threaten American liberty.  Richard Posner 
(2007) sees the problem as such: 
the ’war on terrorism’ is not a conventional war, because it is not a 
military conflict with a foreign state. But it has essential features of a 
war, indeed of a total war.  It is a violent conflict with a powerful, 
resilient enemy . . . . Their lack of a national base … weakens our 
ability to retaliate against them or even find them.  The stakes are 
magnified by the enemy’s effort to obtain and deploy weapons of mass 
destruction, which are becoming increasingly accessible to terrorist 
groups and against which, in the hand of terrorists, retaliation in kind 
is impossible…. [I]t is the peculiarly insidious character of the terrorist 
threat that requires responsive measures that test our commitment to 
civil liberties.  (pp. 147-148) 
One of the most devastating implications of our present condition, he continues, is 
that “a terrorist attack … incites curtailments of civil liberties” (149).  Consequently, 
“[c]ivil libertarians should value safety [from terrorist attacks] not only for its 
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intrinsic merits,” but also because of the predictable popular support for more 
repressive measures in the wake of an attack.  Posner calls for a context-sensitive 
approach to judicial decision making that seeks to find a perfect balance between 
“liberty” and “safety.”  He makes it clear, however, that providing safety in he age of 
terrorism require substantial reductions in traditional liberties.136 
While concurring with much of Posner’s grave assessment, Bruce Ackerman 
(2007) points out that, while seeking to prevent terrorist strikes is important (both 
intrinsically and for protecting civil liberties in the long-run), we should accept the 
fact that we will not be completely successful at the attempt.  In his view, 
“[p]reventive measures will sometimes fail” and so the “only question is how often
the security services will drop the ball:  once out of ten threats, once out of a hundred, 
once out of a thousand?” (14).  Indeed, Ackerman argues that we should accept the 
fact that “[i]t may be only a matter of time before a suitcase A-bomb decimates a 
major American city” (p. 43). 
Also unlike Posner and most other conservatives, Ackerman believes we are 
led astray by speaking and thinking of terrorism through “the fog of war talk” (p. 14).  
He makes two important distinctions between our conflict with terrorism and 
traditional wars.  First, he argues that the root problem is the availability of weapons 
of mass destruction to non-state actors.  This means that, unlike traditional wars and 
the image portrayed by Posner, there is in fact no identifiable enemy to defeat: 
If the Middle East were magically transformed into a vast oasis of 
peace and democracy, fringe groups from other places would rise to 
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fill the gap.  We won’t need to look far to find them.  If a tiny bank of 
extremists blasted the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, others will 
want to detonate suitcase A-bombs as they become available, giving 
their lives eagerly in the service of their self-destructive vision. (p. 14) 
Second, Ackerman argues that traditional wars, or, at least “our most terrible” 
ones—especially the Civil War and World War II—“not only involved mass 
slaughter but presented a genuine threat to the very existence of our government” (p. 
21).  It was in these wars that posed a serious “existential threat to the nation” (ibid.) 
that repression was arguably most justified and, not surprisingly, the very ones in 
which “presidents acted unilaterally with devastating effect on civil libert es” (p. 20).  
Terrorism, by contrast, only indirectly threatens our existence as a free soci ty by 
coaxing us into treating it like a direct existential threat: 
Just as the Spanish American War did not pose an existential threat, 
neither does the struggle with terrorism.  We will suffer grievous 
casualties in future attacks, but the only thing that genuinely threatens 
to jeopardize our polity is the war talk that we hear around us.  It is 
precisely this rhetoric that will encourage courts to rubber-stamp 
presidential decisions to respond to terrorist attacks with escalating 
cycles of repression.  If the courts don’t challenge the language of war, 
they will ultimately acquiesce in the permanent destruction of our 
liberties. (p. 22) 
The reason Ackerman believes the “destruction of liberties” will be “permanent,” it 
should be made clear, is because the nature of the struggle is permanent.  Since there 
is no identifiable enemy, and the problem is rooted in the availability of devastating 
weapons to “the millions of haters in the world” (p. 13) who are prone to use them, 
there will be no end to the justifications for repression that are given today.  Indeed, 
as such weapons are likely to become increasingly available to non-state actors, the 




Based on the terminology and concepts developed in this dissertation, we can 
think of this emerging permanent condition of insecurity as constituting a 
fundamental shift in the traditional nature of the republican security dilemma.  To see 
the shift, it is helpful to think of it terms of Rousseau’s “mixed state.”  Rousseau'  
concern, recall, had to do with the problem that while, in a civil state, the means of 
coercion—by  individuals in their relations with each other and by the state itself—
are under the control of law, the means of coercion from external states are not 
controlled by law.  Consequently, the civil state must develop the capacity to meet 
external force with force, which can have the unhappy consequence of introducing 
institutions into the civil state that can undermine the domestic constraints of law.  
This condition was a “mixed state” because the law-bound sovereign civil state 
eliminated anarchy among individuals, but itself remained in a state of anarchy (“or 
state of war”) between other sovereign states. 
The fundamental problem today is that civil states no longer have a monopoly 
on the means of catastrophic force.  Consequently, civil states can only imperfectly 
remove individuals from the “state of war” in their relations with each other.  The 
overall consequence of this seems to be that individuals in their relations with both 
fellow citizens and non-citizens are simultaneously drawn toward both a universal 
state of war and universal civil state.  Individual states may retain the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force, but that is little consolation if a neighbor might be willing 
to illegitimately detonate a suitcase nuclear bomb.  In such a situation, the state 
cannot reliably uphold law through the deterrent effect of sanctions.  Consequently, 




state toward greater intervention into the lives of its own citizens and, under 
international anarchy, into the sovereign territory of other states.  Thus, the 
constraints of both domestic and international law are giving way to the logic of 
emergency executive action, and thereby the civil state is undermined.   
This, however, is being met with greater calls for enforceable universal hum n 
rights protections.  Thus, the drift toward the universal state of war is reinforcing 
pressure for norms, laws, and relations of universal civility.  This dual development is 
symbolized by two remarkable and unprecedented developments in U.S. 
Constitutional case law.  On the one hand, we see a U.S. citizen captured and 
detained as an "illegal enemy combatant," and, according to the plurality, potentially 
legitimately denied habeas corpus through procedures other than those required by 
Article One, Section Two137.  This is one of many examples of how the fundamental 
securities of the civil state can be undermined by the logic of terror prevention.  On 
the other hand, we have seen the extension of habeas corpus to non-citizens138, which 
shows the current propensity toward extending the logic of the civil state beyond 
traditional territorial borders.  The traditionalist Scalia’s bewilderment in both cases is 
a sure sign that our current condition is unprecedented. 
In considering how we might be able to preserve our free institutions under 
these conditions, it is useful to first reconsider Madison’s analysis of the 
Constitution’s approach to preventing military despotism in Federalist #41.  He 
began by noting that a “standing [military] force … is a dangerous, at the same time 
that it may be a necessary, provision.”  Therefore, he continued, a “wise nation[,] … 
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whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become 
essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and 
the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties."  In his
judgment, moreover, "the clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the 
proposed Constitution.”  Then Madison explained how the Constitution prudently 
sought to reduce both the “necessity” and the “danger” of resources (here, standing 
armies) that can be essential for safety but potentially pernicious to liberty. 
The Constitution reduced the danger of such resources by anticipating how 
they can undermine liberty and by regulating their use accordingly.  In this case, he 
was referring to the limitation on appropriations for armies to two years.  A standing 
army would threaten to become an instrument of despotism only when the people 
could not disband it through their power over the purse.  A constitutional limitation 
on appropriations for the Army to two years would make effectual the people’s power
of the purse, and thus enable them to retain control over this potentially dangerous but 
necessary instrument. 
To prevent the necessity of introducing such resources in the first place, he 
noted how the union would help the States to escape the republican security dilemma.  
That is, by escaping anarchy in their relations with each other, the Stateswould 
escape the necessity of providing for their own security from one another and thus 
their citizens would be freed from that systemic origin of military despotism.     
Two scholars, Ackerman and Daniel Deudney (2007), have recently presented 
solutions that resemble this prudence that Madison endorsed.  Ackerman’s proposed 




constitutional provision that limits army appropriations to two years, the emerg ncy 
constitution anticipates the dangers created by the means used to provide security and 
then regulates them in order to prevent a long-term threat to liberty.  Ackerman, we 
have seen, argues that Americans cannot possibly achieve total security from terrorist 
strikes even with the most repressive preventive measures.  He thus endorses 
beginning with a default normal state wherein some reasonable balance is struck 
between efforts at terrorist prevention and Americans’ commitment to living as a free 
people under their traditional civil rights and liberties (p. 6). 
The problem addressed by his emergency constitution is how to meet two 
imperative objectives in the wake of a devastating terrorist attack.  First, the 
government must be empowered to act to prevent a second (or third, fourth, etc.) 
strike.  Second, a way must be found to channel “collective anxiety” away from 
support for repressive policies and institutions and toward “more constructive forms” 
(ibid.).  The emergency constitution serves both objectives by allowing for a 
temporary constitutionally regulated “state of emergency” that permits presidents to 
take extraordinary measures to prevent a second strike while, in the process, easing 
the anxiety of the people by giving them confidence that the effective sovereignty of 
the state is in tact (pp. 4-7).  The legally designed procedures of the emergency 
constitution, moreover, are designed to induce the executive to pursue only measures 
that are effective at preventing a second strike while minimizing the burden placed on 
innocent citizens (p. 4).  The principal measure would be a nationwide dragnet, 
whereby law enforcement officials are authorized to detain suspected terroris s to 




lapses, all those not found guilty are released and financially compensated through 
the operating budgets of the law enforcement agencies.  This rule would reduce the 
injustice of detentions while serving as an incentive to minimize arbitrary arests (pp. 
49-50).  Moreover, although the President may declare the state of emergency 
unilaterally, she must get majority Congressional approval two weeks later, or else 
the country will return to a normal constitutional state.  This initial authorization will 
expire after two months unless a Congressional supermajority of 60% reauthorizes; 
that reauthorization will lapse two months later unless the President gets 70% of 
Congress to reauthorize; and so on (p. 4).  The further specific details are less 
important than the general approach.  This is precisely the kind of Madisonian 
reasoning that we need if we are to preserve liberty in this new security milieu. 
Deudney’s (pp. 271-277) approach to the problem is reflective of Madison’s 
second example of how the Constitution prudently protects liberty from the advent of 
military despotism.  Just as Madison argued that the central government established 
by the Constitution prevented the “necessity” of standing armies in the States by 
preventing the States from falling into the republican security dilemma, Deudney 
argues that the survival of free institutions today requires preventing the acute 
terrorist security threat described by Posner and Ackerman by reducing the 
availability of destructive weapons to non-state actors.  Moreover, Deudney argues 
that for this arms-control strategy to be effective, we must construct a world 
organization with effective authority over individuals, as opposed to states.  Since the 
objective of this institution is to preserve (and allow the further development of) 




world organization is to assure that it does not itself become a source of arbitrary 
power.  For a model of how to constitute this global organization, Deudney has 
pointed to the original antebellum American constitutional order.  The great virtue of 
that international organization, he argues, is that it was effectively structured for 
keeping it limited to its minimally authorized objectives.  Unlike calls for a “world 
federation”—modeled after federal states like the contemporary U.S. or Germany—
the “states-union” model would preserve substantial state sovereignty.  This would be 
a key mechanism for self-limiting the organization.  However, since it would applyto 
individuals, it also would include electoral institutions and the separation of powers.  
Deudney argues, further, that since this organization would not need to interact with 
other organizations in anarchy, it would avoid the republican security dilemma.  
Consequently, “an important set of pressures for hierarchical centralization would be 
absent,” and, therefore, this “world government, unlike all previous governments, 
could be a purely republican … arrangement” (pp. 276-277). 
Deudney makes a persuasive case for the utility of such an organization for 
preserving republican liberty under modern conditions.  However, it is important to 
note that Madison gave reason to believe such an association, or any supreme world 
constitutional order, cannot be sustained.  Madison believed, it will be recalled, that 
the union as constituted prior to the Civil War was in grave danger of dissolution due 
to the lack of a significant external threat.  Madison and Deudney both noted that the 
lack of an acute external threat had the beneficial effect of allowing the Americans to 
prevent an oppressive aggrandizement of executive power.  But Deudney’s appraisal 




substantial state sovereignty) differs from Madison’s in a critical respect ( p. 171-
175).  Although Deudney mentioned the lack of an external threat as a reason, he 
explained its effect as being indirect through enabling the rapid Western expansion 
that he argues was the direct cause of instability and disunion.  Madison, however, 
thought both factors had a strong i dependent impact and later in life only 
emphasized the lack of external threat.  He seems to have thought that Calhoun and 
others would not have been so brazen had they thought the South would have to go it 
alone against a formidable European rival.  As it was, however, they were able to
imagine that, in the event of disunion, they would be secure from Europe.  
Circumstances gave them the freedom to imagine a rosier future than any informed 
American could entertain when contemplating disunion before the Battle of New 
Orleans. 
This does not mean Madison was correct, but it does present a significant 
challenge to Deudney’s analysis.  If Madison was right, then cementing a world 
“states-union” may require greater effectual means of military coercion than 
Deudney’s model suggests.  Thus, one of its expected virtues—tightly constrained 
executive power—would not manifest.  Further research should address this 
challenge posed by Madison’s understanding of the dynamics governing the stability 
of the antebellum American constitutional order.  If Deudney is right about the 
necessity of a world government for preserving and expanding free institutions int  





The conclusion that must be drawn from this survey of our present condition 
is that the fate of the American republic, as well as republican regimes around the 
world, is far from certain.  Socioeconomic, cultural, geopolitical, and technological 
factors seem to all be pushing toward, as Madison would put it, an “oppressive 
aggrandizement” of national executive power.  The core of the history and theory 
presented in this dissertation is far from a snapshot of a transient moment in time.  It 
shines a spotlight on the origins of an American political dilemma that has persi ted 
throughout our history and sits at the foundation of the existential political debates of 
modern times.  It cries out for more research if not a fundamental change of attitude 
about how the research of politics and the practice of politics should intersect. I do 
not here offer specific courses of action, but, I will conclude with a thought and a 
plea. 
The great virtue of these founders, and something worthy of emulation, was 
their prudence.  Aristotle taught us that prudence is the qualities of character and 
intellect of political agents who “by reasoning, aim at and hit the best thing attainable 
to man by action” (Aristotle and Chase  1998, 1141.b12).  Perhaps the most important 
lesson to learn from these founders is that if we are to preserve and expand human 
liberty, and other valuable human ends, we will need to better develop the capacity 
for prudent political action, which, in turn, will require a political science more like 
theirs than our own.  Their political science, after all, sought to give practical 
guidance to those prudent political actors facing the all-important question, so 




positivistic, and postmodern, as opposed to prudential, social science finds it difficult 
to believe that the counterfactuals of early American political development—the 
perpetual wars among the several confederated alliances of North America; the 
military despotisms this created; the constitutional monarchy, established in 1857—
did not occur, in part, because at crucial moments of decision, influential agents, 
endowed with prudence and informed by a prudential political science, aimed at and 
achieved the best (which may have been the least bad) thing attainable by action 
under the circumstances.  Our current disciplinary specializations and 
interdisciplinary divisions have rendered us unfit for providing ourselves, and the 
next generation, with the knowledge necessary for prudent action.  Political scientists 
need to become economists, economists need to become political scientists, and both 
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